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ABSTRACT 
Several stakeholders in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry have emphasized the need for petroleum 
sector reforms in Nigeria. Canada is reputed to have one of the best oil and gas tax regimes in the 
world. This thesis argues that certain tax measures in Canada’s oil and gas industry have 
considerable potential for addressing certain industry inefficiencies in Nigeria’s petroleum sector. 
In developing this argument, this thesis gives an overview of oil and gas taxation in both 
jurisdictions and examines the possibility of transferring laws between Nigeria and Canada by 
exploring legal and tax comparative law theories. The thesis also examines the major challenges 
in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry and identifies viable areas in Canada’s oil and gas tax system 
which have the potential to address these challenges. Given the peculiarities of oil and gas taxation 
in each jurisdiction, this thesis suggests that the selected Canadian fiscal and administrative 
measures may require certain modifications in order to make these measures more suitable for 
Nigeria’s legal and tax system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First, I thank God for giving me the strength and clarity of mind to write this thesis. He alone made 
it possible for me to complete this amazing journey. I am also grateful for the support I have 
received academically, financially and morally in the process of writing this thesis.  
My deep appreciation goes to Professor Tamara Larre, for giving me the freedom to wander 
intellectually and for helping me work through my ideas with insightful comments and prompt 
replies to my many emails. I could not have wished for a more approachable and considerate 
supervisor. I also appreciate my Advisory Committee members - Professor Heather Heavin for the 
direction she provided at the outset of this thesis and Professor Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu for her 
valuable suggestions and thought-provoking questions. Your close attention to my work and 
helpful comments have made me a better researcher. I would also like to appreciate Professor Kim 
Brooks for her time and willingness to evaluate my work as an external examiner. Thank you. 
I wish to acknowledge the generous funding and supportive academic environment provided to me 
by the College of Law, its faculty and staff. I also appreciate my colleagues within the LL.M. 
program whose warm company and occasional conversation made my LL.M. experience more 
enjoyable. 
Finally, but most importantly, my deepest gratitude goes to my family members for their 
unwavering support, especially, in my moments of fear, discouragement and exhaustion. To my 
husband, Oladepo, thank you for allowing me to ramble on about my research and for acting 
interested! Your faith in me and good-humored nudging kept me going.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
DEDICATION 
To those who work tirelessly to ensure that “the labor of our heroes past shall never be in vain”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PERMISSION TO USE ................................................................................................................. i 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ iii 
DEDICATION.............................................................................................................................. iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................. v 
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Background ................................................................................................................ 5 
1.3.1 The Need for Petroleum Sector Reforms in Nigeria ................................................. 6 
1.3.1.1 The Ripple Effect of Recurrent Fuel Shortages ......................................................... 6 
1.3.1.2 Lack of Transparency and Accountability ................................................................. 8 
1.3.1.3 Environmental Degradation and its Consequent Effects ......................................... 11 
1.3.1.4 Tax Evasion ............................................................................................................. 14 
1.3.1.5 Inadequate Technology and Qualified Personnel in Tax Administration ............... 15 
1.3.2 Justifying the Preference for Canada as a Comparator ............................................ 17 
1.3.3 Some Criticisms and Challenges of the Canadian Petroleum Industry ................... 19 
1.3.4 The Role of Taxation ............................................................................................... 21 
1.3.5 Using the Tax System as a Tool for Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Reforms ...................... 22 
CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................................................ 25 
TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS CORPORATIONS IN CANADA AND NIGERIA ......... 25 
2.1. Overview of Corporate Taxation in the Canadian Oil and Gas Industry ................ 25 
2.1.1 Corporation Taxes ................................................................................................... 26 
2.1.1.1 Federal Tax .............................................................................................................. 27 
2.1.1.2 Provincial Tax .......................................................................................................... 28 
2.1.2 Royalties and Other Applicable Taxes .................................................................... 29 
2.1.3 Oil and Gas Tax Administration in Canada ............................................................. 31 
2.2 Overview of Taxation in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry .................................. 32 
2.2.1 Corporation Taxes ................................................................................................... 33 
 vi 
 
2.2.1.1 Petroleum Profits Tax .............................................................................................. 34 
2.2.1.2 Companies Income Tax ........................................................................................... 40 
2.2.2 Royalties and Other Applicable Taxes .................................................................... 43 
2.2.3 Oil and Gas Tax Administration in Nigeria ............................................................. 44 
2.2.4 Imminent Tax Reforms in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry ................................... 45 
2.3 Legal Considerations for the Proposed Reforms ..................................................... 50 
2.3.1 Ownership of Mineral Rights and Government Participation ................................. 50 
2.3.2 Legislative and Taxing Powers ................................................................................ 52 
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................... 54 
LEGAL TRANSPLANT THEORIES: AN APPROACH TO OIL AND GAS REFORMS 
IN NIGERIA................................................................................................................................ 54 
3.1 Legal Transplant Theories ....................................................................................... 55 
3.1.1 Alan Watson’s School of Thought .......................................................................... 56 
3.1.2 Pierre Legrand’s School of Thought ....................................................................... 57 
3.1.3 Otto Kahn-Freund’s School of Thought .................................................................. 59 
3.1.4 The Transferability Debate ...................................................................................... 61 
3.2 Exploring the Viability of Legal Transplants for Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Reforms .. 65 
3.3 Tax Transplants Literature ....................................................................................... 67 
CHAPTER FOUR ....................................................................................................................... 70 
USING THE TAX SYSTEM AS A TOOL FOR PUBLIC POLICY ..................................... 70 
4.1 The Concept of Tax Expenditures ........................................................................... 74 
4.1.1 Positive Aspects of Tax Expenditures as a Tool for Law Reform .......................... 76 
4.1.1.1 Unfavourable Aspects of Tax Expenditures as a Tool for Law Reform ................. 77 
4.1.2 Methods of Evaluating Tax Expenditures ............................................................... 77 
4.1.2.1 Ex-ante Assessment ................................................................................................. 79 
4.1.2.2 Ex-post Evaluation .................................................................................................. 82 
CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................................ 87 
PROPOSING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR 
REFORMS  ................................................................................................................................. 87 
5.1. Fiscal Measures for Nigeria’s Petroleum Sector Reforms ...................................... 88 
5.1.1. Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) Tax Credit ........... 88 
5.1.1.1. Ex-Post Evaluation .................................................................................................. 90 
5.1.1.2. Ex-Ante Assessment ................................................................................................ 93 
 vii 
 
5.1.2. Clean Energy Generation Equipment - Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance ...... 100 
5.1.2.1. Ex-Post Evaluation ................................................................................................ 101 
5.1.2.2. Ex-Ante Assessment .............................................................................................. 103 
5.1.3. Pollution Tax ......................................................................................................... 106 
5.1.3.1. Specific Ex- Post Evaluation for Environmentally Related Taxation ................... 110 
5.1.3.2. Generic Ex-Post Evaluation ................................................................................... 113 
5.1.3.3. Ex-Ante Assessment .............................................................................................. 115 
5.2. Administrative Measures ....................................................................................... 120 
5.2.1. Informants Lead Program ...................................................................................... 121 
5.2.2. Mandatory Reporting Standards for the Extractive Sector .................................... 126 
CHAPTER SIX ......................................................................................................................... 132 
PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES AND CONCLUSION ......................................................... 132 
6.1. Challenges and Prospects ...................................................................................... 132 
6.2. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 134 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 137 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Nigeria has a rich variety of both renewable and non-renewable resources such as cocoa, 
groundnut, palm produce, rubber, iron ore, petroleum, lead and limestone to mention a few.1 
However, most of these resources remain underexplored since Nigeria’s first commercial oil 
discovery in Oloibiri, the present day Bayelsa State of Nigeria in the late 1950s.2 Since that 
discovery, crude oil (commonly known as petroleum) has been the most dominant of Nigeria’s 
natural resources in terms of revenue generation.3 Current statistics indicate that Nigeria is Sub-
Saharan Africa’s largest oil producer and is among the top five exporters of Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) in the world.4 The income generated from crude oil accounts for about seventy-five percent 
(75%) of government revenue,5 thirty-five percent (35%) of the country’s gross domestic product 
and over ninety percent (90%) of total export revenue for the country.6  
However, the current state of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry suggests that the oil revenue generated 
from petroleum has not been deployed in a manner conducive to the sustainable development of 
the oil and gas industry. Over the years, it has been consistently emphasized that the legal and 
                                                          
1 Ludwig Schätzl, Petroleum in Nigeria (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 152 [Schätzl]; Nigerian Federal 
Ministry of Information, “Investment Opportunities in Nigeria”, online: Federal Ministry of Information 
<http://fmi.gov.ng> [NFMI]. Note that the usage of the term “petroleum” in Nigeria includes both oil and gas. See 
Petroleum Act, LFN 2004, c P10, s15 (1) [Petroleum Act]. This legislation is the primary statute that regulates the 
exploration and production of oil and gas in Nigeria. 
2 There appears to be a disagreement among prominent commentators on the exact date of the discovery. For instance 
Schätzl, ibid at 4 cites 1956; Godfrey Etikerentse, Nigerian Petroleum Law (London: Macmillan, 1985) at 2 cites 
1956; Emmanuel I Kachikwu, “Legal Issues in the Oil and Gas Industry” (1989) 2:9 GRBPL 33 cites 1957 and Yinka 
Omorogbe, “The Legal Framework for the Production of Petroleum in Nigeria” (1987) 5 J Energy Nat Resources L 
273 at 274 [Omorogbe, Legal Framework] cites 1958. However, there is a consensus among these commentators that 
the first oil discovery was made at Oloibiri village. 
3 NFMI, supra note 1; Chris Ehinomen, Babatunde Afolabi & Samuel Ogundare, “The Restructuring of the Nigerian 
Economy and the Nigerian Oil Sector Earnings Nexus”, (2014) SSRN 1 at 3 [Ehinomen,Afolabi & Ogundare]. 
4 AfDB/OECD/UNDP, African Economic Outlook 2015: Regional Development and Spatial Inclusion, OECD 
Development Centre, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015) at 27; Independent Statistics & Analysis, “Nigeria: Country 
Analysis Brief Overview”, (last updated 27 February, 2015), online: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
<http://www.eia.gov>. [U.S Energy Info]. 
5 International Monetary Fund, Nigeria: 2013 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Press Release and Statement by 
the Executive Director for Nigeria, IMF Country Report No. 14/103, (April 2014), online: < http://www.imf.org>. 
6 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), “Nigeria: Facts and Figures”, OPEC Annual Statistical 
Bulletin 2014 at 58, online: <http://www.opec.org> [OPEC Facts]. 
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regulatory framework governing the petroleum industry in Nigeria has not evolved at the same 
pace as developments in the petroleum industry and does not take into account the significant 
advancements and challenges that have occurred in the industry over the years.7  
Looking at the industry from an international stand point, the Independent Statistics and Analysis 
(ISA) conducted by the United States Energy Information Administration notes that there are 
certain issues limiting the growth of the Nigerian petroleum industry.8 Specifically, the ISA 
conducted on Nigeria’s petroleum industry revealed that “instability in the Niger Delta”, “violence 
from militant groups” and “[p]oorly maintained, aging pipelines and pipeline sabotage from oil 
theft” are factors limiting the growth of the Nigerian petroleum industry.9 The ISA also stated that 
“[r]ising security problems coupled with regulatory uncertainty” in the petroleum industry have 
resulted in decreased oil exploration in the Nigerian petroleum industry.10  
From a national perspective, the Nigerian government has attributed the dwindling growth in 
petroleum sector to crude oil theft and pipeline vandalism.11 Stakeholders, on the other hand, have 
identified inadequate financing, poor policy implementation, professional knowledge gaps and 
low capacity building as the major factors limiting the growth of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.12 
Considering that crude oil is “Nigeria’s single biggest source of income,”13 there is an urgent and 
compelling case for petroleum sector reforms so that Nigeria can fully realize the benefits of its 
abundant oil resources.  
                                                          
7 Tominiyi Owolabi, Wolemi Esan & Damilola Salawu, “Oil and Gas Regulation in Nigeria: Overview”, (1 May 2014) 
online: Practical Law <uk.practicallaw.com>. 
8 U.S Energy Info, supra note 4. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Goddey Wilson, “The Nigerian State and Oil theft in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria” (2014) 16:1 J Sustainable 
Development Afr 69 at 70 [Wilson]; Femi Asu, “Nigeria’s oil industry attraction undermined by risks”, Business Day 
(11 June 2014) online: <http://businessdayonline.com>. Asu’s article also notes that crude oil theft, vandalism, pirate 
attacks and the uncertainty of the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill deter foreign direct investment in Nigeria.  
12 Wilson, ibid at 78; Isaac Aregbesola, “Nigeria’s oil and gas industry: The challenges and prospects”, People’s Daily 
(10 April 2014) online: <www.peoplesdailyng.com>. 
13 Wilson, supra note 11 at 70; OPEC Facts, supra note 6; Emeka Chiakwelu, “Nigeria: Naira's Dithering - Nollywood 
and Agriculture Can Aid Ebbing Nigerian Currency”, Daily Independent (13 November 2014), online: < 
http://dailyindependentnig.com> [Chiakwelu]. 
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Like Nigeria, oil revenue also plays a dominant role in Canada’s economy.14 However, Canada’s 
petroleum industry is considered a “strong global player on the oil and gas stage”.15 Some 
commentators have noted that Canada’s good institutional management for petroleum resources,16 
its minimal government interference at the operational level of petroleum operations as well as its 
fair and robust regulatory controls make Canada’s oil and gas industry a preferred jurisdiction for 
oil and gas investment.17 Specifically, a study conducted on petroleum resources and economic 
growth between Nigeria, Brazil and Canada suggests that there are certain institutional measures 
that Nigeria can learn from Canada in terms of management of oil revenue.18 Given Canada’s 
preferred status in the global oil and gas industry, this thesis compares certain aspects of Nigeria 
and Canada’s oil and gas corporate tax systems with a view to proffer administrative and tax-
related measures for Nigeria’s petroleum sector reforms.  
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. This first chapter discusses the need for petroleum reforms 
in Nigeria by identifying the major challenges in Nigeria’s petroleum industry. The challenges 
discussed relate to the ripple effect of recurrent fuel shortages on the Nigerian economy, the lack 
of transparency and accountability in petroleum sector operations, the environmental degradation 
resulting from petroleum exploration, the problem of tax evasion and the inadequacy of 
technology and qualified personnel in the general tax administration of the oil and gas industry. 
Since this thesis aims to draw on measures adopted in Canada’s oil and gas industry for Nigeria’s 
petroleum reforms, this first chapter also provides the basis for the preference for Canada as a 
comparator and considers the current challenges in the Canadian petroleum industry. The next 
section of this chapter examines the revenue generating function of the tax system and introduces 
                                                          
14 Independent Statistics and Analysis, “Canada: Overview”, (30 September 2014) U.S Energy Information 
Administration, online: <http://www.eia.gov> [EIA, Canada Info]; Ivey Energy Policy and Management Centre, 
“Developing Global Market Access for Canada’s Oil and Gas Industry”, (November 2014) Policy Brief at 1, online: 
<http://www.ivey.uwo.ca>. 
15 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Unlocking Canada’s Oil and Gas Industry – Is Canada Becoming an Energy 
Superpower?”, (7 May 2013) PWC Energy Vision Report at 2, online:<http://www.pwc.com> [PWC, Energy Vision]. 
16 Emmanuel Nathan & Bassey E Okon, “Institutional Quality, Petroleum Resources and Economic Growth: A 
Difference-In-Differences Approach Using Nigeria, Brazil and Canada”, (2013) 3:20 IJHSS 198 at 205 [Nathan & 
Okon]; Shawn McCarthy, “Mandatory-reporting plan for energy and mining companies welcomed by provinces”, The 
Globe and Mail (26 August 2014) online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
17 PWC, Energy Vision, supra note 15 at 9. 
18 Nathan & Okon, supra note 16.  
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the underlying and reformative roles of the tax system. The final section of this introductory 
chapter illustrates how the thesis proposes to use tax reforms in addressing the challenges in 
Nigeria’s petroleum sector. 
Chapter two of this thesis is divided into three major sections. The first section gives an overview 
of corporate taxation in the Canadian oil and gas industry with a specific focus on federal and 
provincial corporation taxes, royalties, indirect taxes as well as oil and gas tax administration in 
Canada’s petroleum industry. Similarly, the second section of chapter two provides an overview 
of corporate taxation in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry by describing the taxation of petroleum 
profits, the companies’ income tax, royalty structure and other applicable taxes as well as Nigeria’s 
oil and gas tax administration and the imminent reforms in Nigeria’s petroleum industry. In the 
third section, this chapter identifies relevant legal considerations for the proposed 
recommendations by comparing the ownership of mineral rights, the extent of government 
participation as well as legislative and taxing powers in both jurisdictions.  
Based on the contextual background provided in chapter two, chapter three of this thesis focuses 
on legal transplants as an approach to oil and gas reforms in Nigeria.  This section of the thesis 
explores three competing views on legal transplant theories – those of Alan Watson, Pierre 
Legrand and Otto Kahn-Freund. The chapter examines and tests these three competing schools of 
thought to determine the transferability of laws between Nigeria and Canada. The second section 
of the chapter looks at the viability of legal transplants for Nigeria’s petroleum sector reforms by 
exploring the existence of legal transplants in Nigeria’s legal system. The final section of chapter 
three discusses tax transplants as a type of legal transplant and examines Carlo Garbarino’s view 
on corporate tax transplants. Specifically, the tax transplant section focuses on the two major types 
of corporate tax transplant – the simple corporate tax transplant and the hybrid corporate tax 
transplant. 
In chapter four, this thesis examines the propriety of using the tax system as a tool for public policy 
implementation. This chapter explains how governments use the tax system as a tool for non-tax 
policy implementation through tax expenditure programs (TEs). In exploring TEs, the positive 
and unfavourable aspects of TEs as tools for reforms and the methods that can be used to evaluate 
TEs are also discussed. Specifically, this thesis discusses the ex-post method which is used for 
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evaluating existing TEs and the ex-ante method which is used when introducing new TEs into a 
tax system. 
Based on the background provided in the preceding chapters, chapter five identifies fiscal and 
administrative measures in Canada’s oil and gas tax system that have the potential to address 
problems in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. In addition to identifying certain recommendations for 
reforms, chapter five also explores the viability of these prospective measures by drawing on the 
ex-post and ex-ante methods for evaluating tax expenditures discussed in chapter four. Where 
applicable, the thesis suggests certain modifications to the recommendations to boost the chances 
of successful transfer into the Nigerian tax and legal system.   
In chapter six, the prospects and challenges of the recommendations proposed in chapter five are 
discussed. Given the peculiarities of oil and gas taxation in Nigeria and Canada, the thesis 
concludes that proper adaptation and implementation of the proposed Canadian measures can 
positively influence petroleum sector reforms in Nigeria. 
1.3 Background 
According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the oil and gas industry was responsible for 
N34.2 trillion in oil revenue from 2000 to 2009, which amounts to over 80% of revenue generated 
into Nigeria’s Federation Account during that period.19 In recent times, this amount has 
significantly increased as the 2014 CBN Statistical Bulletin indicates that Nigeria derived 
approximately N36 trillion from oil revenue between 2010 and 2014 alone.20 These figures are 
reflective of the substantial revenue generated from the oil and gas industry over the years. 
Unfortunately, this oil wealth has done very little to improve the standard of living of Nigerians21 
and several commentators have noted that the activities of the oil industry are responsible for 
widespread corruption, oil spillage and certain environmental and health challenges in oil 
                                                          
19 Central Bank of Nigeria, “Statistical Bulletin 2010”, (2010) CBN Annual Statistical Bulletin at Table B.1.1. This 
table contains a summary of federal government finances. The Central Bank of Nigeria is the apex bank in Nigeria. 
20 Central Bank of Nigeria, “2014 Statistical Bulletin”, (2014) CBN Annual Statistical Bulletin at Table B.1.1. 
21 Michael L Ross, “Nigeria’s Oil Sector and the Poor” (2003) Position Paper for DFID-Nigeria, UCLA, Los Angeles, 
online: <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu> [Ross]; Dorcas Onigbinde, “Natural Resource Management and its Implications 
on National and Sub-regional Security: The Case of the Niger Delta” (2008) KAIPTC Occasional Paper 22 at 2 
[Onigbinde]. 
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producing communities in Nigeria.22 The problems identified by these commentators portray some 
of the current industry inefficiencies in the Nigeria’s oil and gas industry and justify the proposal 
for the reforms contemplated in this thesis. 
1.3.1 The Need for Petroleum Sector Reforms in Nigeria 
While a detailed analysis of all the inefficiencies of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the problems and challenges discussed in this section provide a concise 
overview of the major challenges in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. The major challenges include 
recurrent fuel shortages, lack of transparency and accountability, environmental degradation, tax 
evasion, inadequate technology and lack of skilled personnel in petroleum operations. As will be 
seen below, these challenges present a compelling case for oil and gas sector reforms in Nigeria. 
1.3.1.1 The Ripple Effect of Recurrent Fuel Shortages 
Despite being Africa’s largest producer of crude oil, Nigerians still suffer from frequent fuel 
shortages.23 The rate of recurrence of fuel scarcity in Nigeria has been a major cause of friction 
between Nigerians and the government for several decades.24 The irony has been attributed to 
several factors like regulatory uncertainty in the petroleum sector, the poor state of the country’s 
oil refineries, failure to pay oil marketers, militant activity and oil theft in the Niger Delta region 
of the country and corruption in the administration of the petroleum industry.25  
                                                          
22 Onigbinde, ibid at 15; Nwezeaku NC, “The Impact of Public Sector Financial Management on the Economies of 
Sub-Saharan Africa”, (2010) 40 Int. J. Finance Econ 87; Collins NC Ugochukwu & Jurger Ertel, “Negative Impacts 
of Oil Exploration on Biodiversity Management in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria”,  (2008) 26:2 Impact Assessment 
& Project Appraisal at 139; Konye Obaji Ori, “Nigeria: Oil Companies Blamed, Amid Pollution Reports”, The Africa 
Report, (7 November 2013), online: <http://www.theafricareport.com>; Oil Watch, “Nigeria: Oil Pollution, Politics 
and Policy”, (2012) Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth and Oil Watch Africa, online: 
<http://eraction.org/publications> at 4. 
23 U.S Energy Info, supra note 4; Punch, “Fuel Scarcity Hits Lagos, Worsens in Abuja, Others”, Punch Newspaper (2 
March 2015), online: <http://www.punchng.com>; Associated Press, “Nigeria, Africa’s biggest oil producer, dogged 
by fuel shortages blamed on corruption”, Fox News (5 April 2014), online: < http://www.foxnews.com>. 
24 See generally, Bolanle Omisore, “Nigerians Face Fuel Shortages in the Shadow of Plenty”, National Geographic, 
(11 April 2014), online: <http://news.nationalgeographic.com>; Tunde Dodondawa & Muhammad Sabiu, “Nigerians 
May Suffer Acute Fuel Shortages for Weeks”, Nigerian Tribune, (4 March 2014), online: <http://www.tribune.com> 
25 See generally U.S Energy Info, supra note 4; James Butty, “Nigeria Oil Workers Strike Over Inefficiencies, 
Corruption”, Voice of America (16 December 2014), online: <http://www.voanews.com>; Sarah Kent, “Nigeria Loses 
Billions to Inefficiencies in Oil Sector- Watchdog”, The Wall Street Journal (30 July 2013), online: 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles>; The Economist, “Nigeria’s Oil: A Desperate Need for Reform”, The Economist, (20 
October 2012), online: <http://www.economist.com>; Emma Ujah & Michael Eboh, “Real Causes of Fuel Scarcity, 
by Okonjo Iweala”, Vanguard Newspaper, (4 March 2015), online: < http://www.vanguardngr.com>. 
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In different parts of the world, petroleum products are used in various activities (ranging from 
cooking, electricity supply, manufacturing, production of goods, transportation) and are also a 
source of foreign exchange for the governments. This indicates that the availability of petroleum 
products play a tremendous role in the daily life of citizens and countries as a whole. 
Consequently, an unexpected decrease in the supply of petroleum is likely to have adverse effects 
on any economy that relies on petroleum for the aforementioned activities.  
Nigeria is no exception to the adverse effects that result from a decrease in supply of petroleum 
products as the irregular supply of petroleum products in Nigeria usually results in artificial 
inflation in the Nigerian economy.26 In practical terms, a typical incidence of scarcity of petroleum 
products in Nigeria results in long queues of vehicles at several filling stations across the country 
accompanied by “sky-rocketing, deviating pump price and racketeering”.27 For instance, the recent 
incidence of fuel scarcity that occurred in May 2015 brought about a sharp increase in pump price 
of premium motor spirit (PMS, also called petrol) from the official price of N87 per liter 
(approximately $0.53 CAD) to N250 per litre (approximately $1.52 CAD) across major cities in 
the country.28 On some rare occasions, the scarcity of petroleum products extends to the aviation 
industry where the scarcity of aviation fuel results in domestic and international airlines 
rescheduling their flights and leaving passengers stranded.29 
In 2006, The African Economic Research Consortium conducted a study on the economic effects 
of the fuel crisis on Nigeria’s economy.30 This study highlighted the multifarious nature of the 
fiscal impact of fuel scarcity in Nigeria. In discussing the economic effects of fuel scarcity on 
business owners, the study noted higher costs of operation (due to an increase in price of raw 
materials), reduced productivity of workers caused by the tardiness resulting from limited means 
                                                          
26 EF Ogunbodede, AO Ilesanmi & F Olurankinse “Petroleum Motor Spirit (PMS) Pricing Crisis and the Nigerian 
Public Passenger Transportation System”, (2010) 5:2 TSS 113 [Ogunbodede, Ilesanmi & Olurankinse]. 
27 Sunday S Akpan & Michael Nnamseh, “Managing Risks of Petrol Scarcity in Nigeria: A Test of the Efficacy of 
Strategic Management Approaches” (2014) 14:2 Global J of Human Soc Sc 25 at 27. 
28 News Agency of Nigeria, “Scarcity: Fuel sells at N250 per litre in Oyo” The Guardian (2 May 2015), online: < 
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com>.  
29 See generally, Lawani Mikairu, “Nigeria: Fuel Scarcity – Arik to Suspend Operations Today”, Vanguard, (2 May 
2015), online: <www.vanguardngr.com>; Ozioma Ubabukoh, “Passengers stranded as scarcity of fuel grounds 
international flights” Punch Newspaper, (2 May 2015), online: < http://www.punchng.com>. 
30 Adeola Adenikinju, & Niyi Falobi. “Macroeconomic and Distributional Consequences of Energy Supply Shocks in 
Nigeria” (2006) online: < http://aercafrica.org> [Adenikinju & Falobi]. 
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of transportation and ultimately a decline in sales profits given the aforementioned low 
productivity and increase in operating expenses.31  
A more recent study conducted in 2010, focused on the impact which fuel scarcity has on 
manufactured and agricultural products.32 It was noted that the extra costs resulting from the 
drastic increase in price of petroleum products during any incidence of fuel scarcity are usually 
passed on to the final consumer of any goods or services.33 For instance, transport businesses that 
buy fuel at the increased pump price (due to the demand exceeding supply) would transfer such 
costs to their passengers including farmers and manufacturers who in turn pass the costs to 
wholesalers, who ultimately pass them to retailers or the final consumers.34 Given the ripple effect 
of these extra costs, incessant scarcity of petroleum products usually results in a huge rise in the 
cost of living among citizens as some stakeholders are reluctant to revert to the pre-scarcity price 
of their goods and services. In addition to the above, the incidence of scarcity also makes it almost 
impossible for millions of Nigerians to move around, offer their goods or services for exchange 
or go about their daily businesses and means of livelihood. Perhaps the ripple effect of incessant 
fuel scarcity on other sectors of Nigeria’s economy is sufficient in affirming the desperate need 
for oil and gas reforms in Nigeria.35  
1.3.1.2 Lack of Transparency and Accountability 
Another major problem in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry is the lack of transparency and 
accountability, especially in the regulation and general administration of petroleum activities. The 
lack of transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s petroleum industry creates a high 
vulnerability for corrupt practices.36 While corruption is a global phenomenon and is not 
synonymous with Nigeria alone, it is a pandemic that “has defied all the necessary medicines”.37 
The problem of corruption in Nigeria is one that cuts across the different sectors of the economy.38 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 Ogunbodede, Ilesanmi & Olurankinse supra note 26. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid at 120. 
35 Adenikinju & Falobi, supra note 30. 
36 Salisu Ogbo Usman, “The Opacity and Conduit of Corruption in the Nigerian Oil Sector: Beyond the Rhetoric of 
the Anti-Corruption Crusade." (2011) 13:2 J Sustainable Development Afr 294 at 294. 
37 Victor E Dike, “Corruption in Nigeria: A Paradigm for Effective Control”, Africa Economic Analysis (23 January 
2008), online: < http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org>. 
38 See generally, Emeka E Okafor, “Corruption and Implications for Industrial Development in Nigeria” (2013) 7:29 
Afr J BM 2916. Okafor states that corruption is the major obstacle for socio-economic development in Nigeria; 
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Nigeria’s position in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for the past three years is reflective 
of the high rate of corruption in the country.39 The CPI is an assessment carried out by an 
international anti-corruption organisation based in Germany called Transparency International.40 
This organisation ranks several countries based on how corrupt each public sector is perceived to 
be.41 The results of the CPI report by Transparency International in 2012 and 2013 places Nigeria 
in 139th and 144th positions respectively out of about 176 countries that were surveyed.42 In the 
most recent survey conducted in 2014, Nigeria was ranked as the most corrupt country in Sub-
Saharan Africa and had a position of 136th (worst) out of 174 countries.43 
Despite the fact that corruption is also evident in other sectors of Nigeria’s economy, the incidence 
of corruption in Nigeria’s petroleum industry is particularly high.44 For instance, the 2009 to 2011 
assessment of the petroleum industry conducted by the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI) disclosed several areas lacking in accountability of oil revenue.45 The NEITI is 
a Nigerian agency which is responsible for (among other things) the development of a framework 
for accountability and transparency in the reporting and disclosure of revenues due to or paid to 
the federal government of Nigeria by all companies in Nigeria’s extractive industry.46 Some 
specific activities identified in the NEITI assessment report that reflect the lack of transparency 
and accountability include underpaid royalty and taxes by stakeholders, non-remittance of revenue 
derived from the domestic sale of crude oil by Nigeria’s national oil company and poor data 
management by the Niger Delta Development Commission.47 Based on this report and similar  
                                                          
Bolarinwa Bayode, Analysis of Organizational Leadership: A Phenomenological Study of Organizational Leaders in 
the Private Sector in Nigeria (PhD Diss, Walden University, 2008) (Michigan, United States: UMI Dissertations 
Publishing, 2008). Bayode states that while corruption exists in both the private and public sector, the public sector is 
much more corrupt than the private sector. 
39Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2014”, Transparency International website, online: < 
http://www.transparency.org >. 
40Transparency International, “Who We Are”, Transparency International website, online: 
<http://www.transparency.org>.  
41 Ibid. A country’s score shows the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 to 100 (0 indicates 
highly corrupt and 100 indicates very clean). Nigeria currently has a score of 27. 
42 Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2013”, Transparency International website, online: < 
http://www.transparency.org>. 
43 Supra note 39. 
44Ross, supra note 21 at 18; Ogbonnaya Orji, “NEITI and the Petroleum Industry Bill”, The Punch (24 May 2012) 
online: <http://www.punchng.com>. 
45 Patrick Ugeh, “Nigeria: NEITI - How the Country Loses Oil Revenue”, All Africa (18 August 2009), online: 
<http://allafrica.com>. 
46 See generally, Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act, LFN 2007 s2 [NEITI Act]. 
47 Ibid. 
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reports evaluating the Nigerian oil and gas industry, there appears to be a general consensus that 
the missing revenues are depriving Nigerian citizens of a fair share of the country’s oil wealth that 
could go to improving education, health and creating employment for the youth.48 
The overlapping role performed by the federal government in the petroleum industry has been 
considered a major contributing factor to the lack of transparency and accountability in the 
petroleum sector.49 This is because the federal government performs a dual role as a commercial 
entity and a regulator in the petroleum industry.50 The federal government conducts commercial 
operations through its national oil company called the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) and also regulates and supervises activities in the petroleum industry through its 
petroleum regulatory authority called the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR).51 Thus, the 
government negotiates and performs commercial activities in the petroleum industry through the 
NNPC and also plays a supervisory role through the DPR. Specifically, the NNPC is vested with 
the exclusive responsibility for the development of the upstream and downstream sectors of the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry, which entails exploiting, refining, and marketing Nigeria’s crude 
oil.52 The DPR, on the other hand, is the governmental agency that is charged with the 
                                                          
48 Transparency International Secretariat, “Transparency International Calls on the Nigerian Government to Step Up 
its Fight Against Corruption and Welcomes an Investigation into the Oil Sector”, Transparency International Press 
Release, (27 February 2014) online: <http://www.transparency.org>. Huguette Labelle, the Chair of Transparency 
International also added that the Nigerian government owes it to Nigerians to investigate the oil and gas industry and 
hold those responsible for corrupt practices to account.  
49 Muideen Olaniyi, “Nigeria: Under APC, NNPC Must Publish Its Balance Sheet – Lai Mohammed”, Daily Trust (11 
January 2015) online: <http://allafrica.com>; Chukwudi Nweje, “Nigeria: How Lack of Transparency in Oil Sector 
Under-Develops Nigeria”, Daily Independent (24 August 2014), online: <http://allafrica.com>. 
50 Ibid; NNPC, “Operators in the Industry”, NNPC Business, online: < http://www.nnpcgroup.com>.  
51 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, LFN 2004, c C23, s 44(3) [1999 Constitution]; Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation Act, LFN 2004, c N123, s 1 [NNPC Act]; Department of Petroleum Resources, 
“Functions”, Department of Petroleum Resources, online: < https://dpr.gov.ng/> [DPR Functions] (accessed on 21 
April 2015). 
52 NNPC Act, supra note 51 at Preamble. In Nigeria, agreements setting out the terms of operations are entered into 
between the federal government and oil producing companies (usually international oil companies). Since ownership 
of petroleum resources is vested in the government, the federal government grants licences and leases to oil 
companies. The NNPC, acts as a representative of the federal government and holds the interests of the government 
and also negotiates privately with the companies who act as operators. The role of “operator” in the technical sense 
is dependent on the nature of contractual arrangement a party has with the federal government. Under the most 
common arrangement called the joint venture arrangement, one of the partners to the joint operating agreement (JOA) 
is designated the operator. Usually, the NNPC is an equity shareholder and the foreign oil company is the operator. 
However, the NNPC reserves the right to become an operator under the JOA. The operator’s role is to conduct, manage 
and control the activities of the joint venture in accordance with the JOA in order to achieve the objectives of the 
parties. See generally Omorogbe, Legal Framework supra note 2 at 286. For a detailed account of the different 
contractual arrangements under Nigerian petroleum law, see Yinka Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Lagos: 
Malthouse, 2003) at ch 4 [Omorogbe, Oil and Gas]; Kamoru T Lawal, “Taxation of Petroleum Profit under the 
Nigeria’s Petroleum Profit Tax Act”, (2013) 4:2 Int’l JALSG 1 online: <http://www.icidr.org>.   
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responsibility of regulation and supervision of all the operations being carried out under different 
licenses and leases in Nigeria’s petroleum industry.53 Consequently, there is very limited room for 
objective scrutiny of petroleum activities since the federal government’s participation is evident 
in every sector of the industry including the upstream, midstream and downstream sectors.54  
In emphasizing the poor transparency of Nigeria’s petroleum industry, some writers have 
described the NNPC as “being accountable to no one” because it controls all aspects of the industry 
from the exploration of petroleum to the production, refining and sale of the finished petroleum 
products.55 Perhaps this excessive control by the national oil company in Nigeria’s petroleum 
industry is responsible for the corporation being referred to as one of the world's most “closed” 
oil companies.56 Based on a study conducted by the Revenue Watch Institute and Transparency 
International, Nigeria’s NNPC is reported to have the worst transparency record out of the “44 
national and foreign oil companies” that were examined.57 Thus, it is apparent that the limited 
channels for checks and balances of petroleum operations is a contributory factor to the limited 
growth and development of Nigeria’s petroleum industry.  
1.3.1.3 Environmental Degradation and its Consequent Effects 
While proceeds from crude oil has been of great financial benefit to Nigeria, its exploration has 
resulted in massive environmental degradation for oil producing communities in Nigeria.58 The 
negative impact of oil exploration activities has been attributed to oil spillages and gas flaring, 
which are prevalent in the Niger Delta area where most of Nigeria’s petroleum exploration 
activities are carried out.59 Some of the adverse effects of petroleum activities in these areas range 
from environmental hazards, health risks, high unemployment rates and economic loss. 
                                                          
53 DPR Functions, supra note 51. 
54 The Economist, “The Scope of Corruption in Nigerian Oil is Truly Horrifying”, Business Insider, (19 October, 
2012), online: <http://www.businessinsider.com>. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58Wilson, supra note 11 at 76; Ephraim Ikechukwu Elenwo & Justine Ayaegbunem Akankali, “Environmental Policies 
and Strategies in Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry: Gains, Challenges and Prospects” (2014) 5:4 Nat Resources J 884 at 
885 [Elenwo & Akankali]; Jethro Ibileke, “Nigeria Overdue for Environmental Audit”, The News, (11 November 
2014), online: <http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng> [Ibileke]. 
59 Kadafa Adati Ayuba, “Environmental Impacts of Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” 
(2012) 12:3 Global J Sc Frontier Res Env’t & Earth Sci 18. 
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The chemical composition of Nigeria’s crude oil has been identified as a major contributory factor 
to the adverse environmental effects caused by oil exploration activities. The nature of Nigeria’s 
gas reserves is predominantly “associated gas” - a natural gas found in deposits of petroleum which 
comes to the surface during oil production.60 Since Nigeria’s crude oil is usually found in 
reservoirs of this nature, oil production is often accompanied by the production of natural gas. 
Nigeria has a large-scale proven natural gas reserves and is often described as a “gas province 
with a little bit of oil in it”.61 However, the expensive cost and poor availability of infrastructure 
for refining its associated gas by oil producing companies has been identified as the major cause 
of excessive gas flaring in Nigeria.62 Oladipo and Eyesan noted that, “[i]t is simply not 
commercially viable for oil producers to put in place requisite infrastructural facilities to develop 
and trap associated gas”.63 Therefore, oil exploration companies “flare” the associated gas 
generated during exploration of crude oil by releasing the gas into the atmosphere rather than 
capturing the natural gas for utilization. This release of associated gas contributes to greenhouse 
gas emissions, acid rain and similar adverse environmental effects.64  
A recent assessment of gas flaring in Nigeria indicates that Nigeria flares about 17.2 billion cubic 
meters (m3) of natural gas annually during the exploration of crude oil in the Niger Delta region.65  
This amount of gas that is flared is estimated as being equal to a quarter of power consumption of 
the African continent in 2013.66 In 2013, the Director of Nigeria’s DPR noted that Nigeria incurs 
a loss of $4.9 million USD daily due to gas flared during oil exploration activities.67 Specifically, 
the rate of gas flaring at that time (2013) was 1.4 billion cubic feet of gas and this was measured 
                                                          
60 This incidental discovery of natural gas is sometimes regarded as a nuisance and treated as a waste. See Yinka 
Omorogbe, “Law and Investor Protection in the Nigerian Natural gas Industry” (1996) 14 J. Energy Nat Resources L. 
179 at 181; Ibironke Tinuola Odumosu, Reforming Gas Flaring Laws in Nigeria: The Transferability of the Alberta 
Framework (LL.M Thesis, University of Calgary, 2005) [Unpublished] at 1. However, Nigeria also has non- 
associated gas reserves which are reservoirs that contain only natural gas and no oil. 
61 Mark Hollingsworth & Von Kemedi, Against the Odds (Leicestershire, UK: Susquehanna Press, 2015) at 124; 
Kayode Oladipo & Yuli Eyesan, “Unlocking Nigeria’s Gas Potential” (16 March 2015) King & Wood Mallesons 
Publication at 29, online: <http://www.savca.co.za> [Oladipo & Eyesan]; Tade Oyewumi, “The Nigerian Gas 
Industry: Policy, Law and Regulatory Developments” (2013) ACASP 1 at 3 online: <http://www.acas-law.com>;  
62 Anslem O Ajugwo, “Negative Effects of Gas Flaring: The Nigerian Experience”, (2013) 1.1 J Envt'l Pollution & 
Hum Health 6 [Ajugwo]. 
63 Oladipo & Eyesan, supra note 61 at 31. 
64 Ajugwo, supra note 62 at 7. 
65 Ibid at 6. 
66 Ibid at 7. 
67 Mohammed Shosanya, “Nigeria Loses U.S. $4.9 Million to Gas Flare Daily”, Daily Trust (10 July 2013), online: < 
http://allafrica.com>.  
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against $3.5 per 1000 standard cubic feet of gas to arrive at monetary value of the adverse effect 
of gas flaring.68 
Apart from gas being flared, oil spillages also contribute to the environmental degradation of oil 
producing communities. The oil that is spilled as a result of oil exploration activities results in 
water pollution, land degradation and deforestation.69  Given that a large majority of residents in 
the Niger Delta area of Nigeria are involved in farming and fishing activities, oil spillages have 
destroyed the means of livelihood of most residents in the oil producing areas.70  Thus, there is a 
high unemployment rate in such communities.71 It has been reported that this high rate of 
unemployment is a major contributory factor to the youths of these communities engaging in oil 
theft and vandalism for the purpose of economic survival.72 According to the 2013 NEITI report, 
Nigeria lost approximately $11bn to oil theft and vandalism between 2009 and 2011.73 
In addition to the economic loss resulting from the above, scientific research has identified several 
health implications of gas flaring and oil spillages on human health. Research carried out on the 
health impact of the pollution on residents of the Niger Delta has revealed that exposure to the 
aforementioned environmental hazards could result in “respiratory problems, skin ailments such 
as rash and dermatitis, eye problems, gastro-intestinal disorders, water borne diseases and 
nutritional problems associated with poor diet” as a result of the contamination of food and water 
in these regions.74  
Even though there have been attempts to impose fines and implement laws to address these 
environmental problems in Nigeria (some of these measures are discussed in the latter part of the 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Elenwo & Akankali, supra note at 58; Ibileke, supra note 58. 
70 Ibid; Wilson, supra note 11 at 72. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Wilson, supra note 11 at 72; Simon Utebor, “I Vandalised Oil Wellheads to Protest Unemployment”, The Punch (8 
April 2014), online: <http://www.punchng.com>. 
73 Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “EITI Annual Activity Report 2013”, (June 2014), online: 
<http://www.neiti.org.ng> at 24; Noel Onoja, “Nigeria loses $11bn to oil theft, vandalism – NEITI”, Vanguard (30 
July 2013), online: <http://www.vanguardngr.com>. 
74 Pyagbara Legborsi Saro, “The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution on the Environment and Wellbeing of a Local 
Indigenous Community: The Experience of the Ogoni People of Nigeria”, (Paper delivered at the Workshop Organized 
by United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, Government of Khabarovsk Krai and Russsian Association of Indigenous People of the North on August 27-
29, 2007) [unpublished]. 
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thesis) these measures have not had the desired effects as the problems continue to persist.75 
Therefore, this thesis also argues that there is a compelling need to explore alternative or 
supplementary means to address the problems of oil spillage and gas flaring in Nigeria. 
1.3.1.4 Tax Evasion 
Generally, the incidence of tax evasion in any country reduces the revenue needed by the 
government for the provision of public goods for citizens.76 In May 2014, a diagnostic study of 
Nigeria’s tax system revealed that sixty-five percent (65%) of eligible corporate taxpayers in 
Nigeria do not pay taxes to the federal government as required by tax laws.77 This conduct was 
reported to have contributed to an eight percent (8%) decline in tax revenue contribution to 
Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the period under consideration.  
Multinational oil companies have been identified as being responsible for a high percentage of the 
tax evasion incidents in the petroleum industry.78 Despite the fact that these multinational oil 
companies earn huge profits from their commercial activities in Nigeria, Adegbie and Adeniran 
noted that “[t]ax evasion and tax avoidance are unnecessary evils being practiced by the oil 
exploring and extraction companies”.79 In some cases, corporate taxpayers prefer to give bribes 
amounting to a (substantial) fraction of their tax liability to tax officials rather than paying their 
applicable tax liability.80 Similarly, the failure of tax officials to remit taxes collected from 
compliant corporate taxpayers to the federal government also contributes to the high incidence of 
tax leakage in the oil and gas sector of Nigeria’s economy.81 In August 2013, Nigeria’s Minister 
                                                          
75 Oladipo & Eyesan, supra note 61 at 31; Aderonke Adejugbe & Bayo Onamade, “Nigeria: Gas Flaring in Nigeria: 
Challenges & Investment Opportunities”, (31 July 2014), online: <http://www.strachanpartners.com>. 
76 OJ Otusanya, “The Role of Multinational Companies in Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance: The Case of Nigeria” 
(2011) 22:3 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 316 at 316. [Otusanya] 
77 Friday Atufe, “65% of Corporate Citizens Don’t Pay Tax – Okonjo-Iweala”, Leadership Newspaper, (16 May 
2013), online: < http://leadership.ng>. 
78 Otusanya, supra note 76. 
79 Folajimi Festus Adegbie & Samuel Adeniran Fakile, “Petroleum Profit Tax and Nigeria Economic Development” 
(2011) 1:1 IJRCM 11 at 17. 
80 Sesan Olufowobi, Chukwudi Akasike & Temitayo Famutimi “Four Britons Arraigned for Bribing Lagos [and] 
Rivers Officials” (22 December 2012), Bribe Nigeria (blog), online: < http://www.bribenigeria.com>. In this case, 
the officers of the company bribed tax officials “to avoid, reduce or delay paying taxes on behalf of [their] oil- and 
gas-industry workers”. This shows that not only is tax evasion a problem in Nigeria, the poor reputation of the tax 
administration in Nigeria is being exploited by foreign companies. This does not augur well for the country’s image. 
81 Jude Okwe, “FIRS: Corruption, Enemy of Tax Administration”, ThisDay Live (13 May 2013), online: < 
http://www.thisdaylive.com>. 
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of Finance confirmed that Nigeria loses “over N 80 billion monthly from tax dodgers”.82 In order 
to fully realize the financial benefits of being an oil producing country, there is a desperate need 
for Nigeria to address the issue of tax evasion, especially in its petroleum sector. 
1.3.1.5 Inadequate Technology and Qualified Personnel in Tax Administration 
Lack of qualified personnel and the slow pace of technology are additional factors limiting the 
growth of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. According to Okonjo Iweala - Nigeria’s former finance 
minister - the automation of Nigeria’s tax administrative system is very fundamental to efficient 
revenue collection and prevention of tax leakages for the government.83 A 2010 study conducted 
on tax administration in Nigeria reveals that the slow pace of technology in tax administration is 
a contributing factor to the high rate of tax evasion in Nigeria.84  
Currently, the majority of tax filings and tax remittances in Nigeria are done manually through the 
submission of hard copies of relevant documents. Such manual tax filing system has the tendency 
to increase human errors and processing times as tax officials may be required to sort through 
unrelated paperwork in order to find relevant data needed for any verification exercise. Notably, 
there have been recent attempts by the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) to automate and 
improve the use of technology in Nigeria’s tax administration.85 Specifically, the FIRS has 
embarked on an Integrated Tax Administration System (ITAS) project.86 This project is directed 
at enhancing tax administration and ultimately simplifying the tax compliance process in Nigeria 
through the use of technology.87 This initiative is currently in its pilot phase and is only available 
for taxpayers in selected tax offices.88 However, when the ITAS system is fully operational in the 
whole of Nigeria, taxpayers will be able to file their tax returns electronically and pay their taxes 
                                                          
82 “Nigerians don’t like to pay tax – Finance Minister”, Editorial, The Leader News (18 August 2013), online: 
<http://theleaderassumpta.com>. 
83 Agency Report, “FG Urges FIRS To Deploy Technology to Boost Its Operation”, Leadership Newspaper (24 June 
2014), online: <http://leadership.ng>. 
84 See generally, James Abiola & Moses Asiweh, “Impact of Tax Administration on Government Revenue in a 
Developing Economy – A Case Study of Nigeria” (2012) 3:8 Int’l J Bus & Soc Sci 99; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
“Nigeria @ 50: Top 50 Tax Issues”, (October 2010) online: PricewaterhouseCoopers < http://www.pwc.com>. 
85 Federal Inland Revenue Service, “FIRS Launches Tax E-Filing Platform”, FIRS Press Release (14 Dec 2014), 
online: <http://www.firs.gov.ng >; Isaac Anumhie, “FIRS launches online tax payment”, Sun Newspaper (3 March 
2015), online: <http://sunnewsonline.com>. 
86 Ibid. 
87 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “FIRS introduces electronic filing of tax returns and online payment of taxes”, (February 
2015), online: <http://pwcnigeria.typepad.com> [PWC, ITAS]. 
88 Ibid. 
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online.89 This improvement is particularly relevant to oil and gas taxation in Nigeria because the 
eligible taxes included in the pilot phase include (but are not limited to) the major oil and gas taxes 
in the petroleum industry (companies’ income tax and petroleum profit tax).90 With this 
development, it is expected that filing of tax returns can be done by taxpayers at anytime and 
anywhere within the required filing period.  
While this thesis is not oblivious to the teething problems that the ITAS may have to overcome, 
the thesis argues that leveraging the enormous capabilities of technology in automating processes 
through the proper implementation of the ITAS will significantly improve the administrative 
efficiency of tax compliance in Nigeria.91 Even though the efficacy of the ITAS is not verifiable 
as the program is still in its pilot phase, this thesis contemplates that the effective implementation 
and full adoption of the program would increase compliance, reduce the cost of tax administration 
and ultimately increase government’s revenue.  
In addition to the need for advanced technology in tax administration, Nigeria’s National Tax 
Policy report indicates that a major factor limiting the development of tax administration in 
Nigeria is shortage of qualified personnel. 92 This shortage of skilled workers has been attributed 
to poor funding of tax administrative agencies as the agencies do not have the financial capacity 
to attract the required personnel.93 In 2013, Micah, Ebere and Umobong, noted that the FIRS had 
only 645 tax professionals out of a total of 7,643 employees, which amounts to 12.6% of its total 
workforce during the period under review.94 Consequently, the few tax professionals that are 
available often delegate certain roles to subordinates or third parties that lack the required 
competency to meet the ever increasing challenges and difficulties in Nigeria’s tax administrative 
system.95 In addition, the competent staff members (tax professionals) are not provided with 
regular training to keep them abreast of global trends in tax administration.96 
                                                          
89Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid at 22. 
92 Nigeria Leadership Initiative (NLI), The NLI White Papers Volume 2 at 47, online: <www.nli-global.org> at 47. 
The NLI White Papers were generated to identify critical issues in the Nigerian tax system in relation to policy, 
legislation and tax administration. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Micah Leyira, Chukwuma Ebere & Asian Umobong, “Tax System in Nigeria – Challenges and the Way Forward”, 
online: (2012) 3:5 Research J of Fin & Acc at 1 [Leyira, Ebere & Umobong]. 
95 NLI, supra note 92. 
96 Leyira, Ebere & Umobong, supra note 94.  
 17 
 
While the inefficiencies discussed above may paint a bleak picture of Nigeria’s petroleum industry 
and its oil and gas tax administration, the industry has enormous potential for exponential growth. 
However, such growth can only be achieved if the structural defects and turbulence hindering the 
growth of this industry are removed.97 In providing context for the great potential inherent in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas sector, current projections indicate that reforms in Nigeria’s oil and gas 
industry will result in a major increase in its oil revenue. Specifically, it has been noted that “[w]ith 
the right reforms … liquids production could increase from an estimated 2.35 million barrels a 
day, on average, in 2013 to a new high of 3.13 million by 2030”.98 In monetary terms, this means 
that the “[o]il and gas [industry] would then contribute $108 billion annually to the [Nigerian] 
economy, compared with $73 billion in 2013.”99 Given this potential for exponential growth, the 
need for oil and gas reforms to harness this growth is great.  
1.3.2 Justifying the Preference for Canada as a Comparator 
In suggesting the tax system as a tool for Nigeria’s oil and gas reforms, this thesis will explore the 
policies and practices in Canada’s oil and gas tax system with a view to propose recommendations 
that can address the current industry inefficiencies in Nigeria. To propose such recommendations, 
it is important for a prospective law reformer to explore a tax system that has a reputable petroleum 
industry and also shares certain similarities with Nigeria’s petroleum industry for the purpose of 
effective comparison. As will be seen in subsequent paragraphs, Canada’s petroleum industry 
satisfies these requirements and provides a suitable model for petroleum sector reforms in Nigeria. 
From a global perspective, Canada ranks as the fifth largest oil producer and controls the third 
largest proved oil reserves in the world.100 Despite Canada’s relatively small share of the world’s 
proven natural gas reserves, it is the fifth largest dry natural gas producer and the fourth largest 
exporter of natural gas in the world.101 Based on the 2014 Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI), which highlights how each country manages environmental issues, Canada had an 
                                                          
97 Marcel Mbamalu, “Nigeria: Local Firms Are Gradually Reclaiming Nigeria's Oil Sector, Says Abazie”, The 
Guardian, (20 October 2015), online: < http://allafrica.com>. 
98 Acha Leke et al, “Nigeria’s renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa’s largest economy”, (July 2014), 
McKinsey Global Institute Report, online: <www.mckinsey.com> at 53. 
99 Ibid. 
100Government of Canada, “About Crude Oil and Petroleum Products”, Natural Resources Canada website, (5 
September 2014) online: < http://www.nrcan.gc.ca>; EIA Canada Info, supra note 14 at 1. 
101 EIA Canada Info, ibid. 
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admirable score of 73% with respect to safeguarding human health from environmental harm 
while Nigeria had a significantly lower score of 39.2%.102  
In addition to Canada’s enviable reputation,103 certain similarities between Nigeria and Canada’s 
oil and gas industry is another factor that informed the preference for Canada’s tax system as a 
model for reforms. Geographically, Nigeria and Canada both have vast endowment of crude oil 
and natural gas reserves concentrated in select areas of the country - the majority of Nigeria’s 
crude oil and gas reserves is located in the Niger Delta region104 while in Canada’s crude oil and 
gas reserves are concentrated in the western provinces.105 In addition to this geographical 
similarity, both countries have been oil producing countries for several decades and oil revenue 
plays a dominant role in the economy of both countries.106  
Perhaps, the most important justification for the choice of Canada as a model for Nigeria’s 
petroleum sector reforms is the fiscal structure of Canada’s oil and gas industry. It has been noted 
that the tax and royalty elements of the Canadian fiscal structure acknowledges the high-risk and 
high-cost nature of oil and gas exploration and development activities.107 A most recent example 
relating to this claim is the structure of the new British Columbia Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
Income Tax Act.108 This legislation imposes tax at a gradual rate so as to facilitate a corporation’s 
recovery of capital investment on liquefaction activities and ensure flexibility of the transition 
process following the introduction of the LNG tax.109 In addition to well-structured legislation, 
                                                          
102Environmental Performance Index, “Country Rankings”, online: < http://epi.yale.edu/ >. The EPI assessment is a 
joint project between the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy and the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network at Columbia University, in collaboration with the World Economic Forum. 
103 Harrission Jacobs, “The 17 Countries Sitting on the Most Valuable Energy Reserves”, Business Insider (13 
February 2014), online: <http://www.businessinsider.com>  
104 Kadafa Adati Ayuba, “Oil exploration and spillage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” (2012) 2:3 Civil & Env’l Res 
38.The article calls it the Niger Delta basin and continental shelf. 
105 Some commentators refer to it as the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin; Robert Bott, David M Carson & Jan W 
Henderson “Evolution of Canada's Oil and Gas Industry” Canadian Center for Energy Information, online: (2004) 
<http://www.energybc.ca> at 1; Canada Association of Petroleum Producers, "Crude Oil: Forecast, Markets, and 
Transportation" (June 2014), online: <http://www.capp.ca>. 
106See generally, EIA Canada Info, supra note 14; Todd Whitcombe, “Canadian economy dependent on oil” The 
Prince George Citizen Newspaper (19 January 2015), online: <http://www.princegeorgecitizen.com>; For Nigeria, 
see Chiakwelu, supra note 13. 
107Bob Bleaney, “Canadians Realize Significant Value from Oil and Gas Sector”, online: (2014) Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers <http://www.capp.ca> [Bleaney]. 
108 Bill 6, An Act to introduce the Liquefied Natural Gas Income Tax Act, 3rd Sess, 40th Parl, British Columbia, 2014. 
109 Canadian Energy Law, “BC Unveils the Liquefied Natural Gas Income Tax Act-significant issues and uncertainty”, 
(6 November 2014), Canadian Energy Law website, online: < http://www.canadianenergylaw.com>. 
 19 
 
Canada’s oil and gas tax system has also been noted as very instrumental in attracting oil and gas 
investments and maximizing the economic benefit derived from Canada’s oil wealth for both 
Canadians and the Canadian government.110 In addition to its fiscal framework, Canada is also 
recognized for oil and gas technology and innovation which is an additional factor that makes the 
Canadian petroleum industry even more attractive.111 
In order to attract oil and gas investment as well as safeguard the Nigerian petroleum industry’s 
competitiveness and relevance in the international oil and gas industry, certain international fiscal 
policy standards are beneficial and worthy of emulation.112 For instance, recent reforms in the 
Mexican petroleum industry is said to be responsible for the increase in Mexico’s economic and 
investment prospects for the supply of oil.113 Considering the recent decline in the United States’ 
import of crude oil from Nigeria, there is an urgent need to implement fiscal measures that will 
attract additional foreign investment for Nigeria.114 Since Canada is recognized as “one of the 
most stable jurisdictions to do business in” among the world’s major oil-producing nations,115 the 
Canadian oil and gas industry provides a good reference point if Nigeria intends to adopt policy 
measures that meet international standards. 
1.3.3 Some Criticisms and Challenges of the Canadian Petroleum Industry 
Although there are laudable tax initiatives in the Canadian oil and gas industry, Canada’s oil and 
gas industry – like other oil and gas industries - is by no means a perfect one. This is because the 
Canadian oil and gas industry also has some challenges which are worth mentioning. Some of 
these challenges relate to fluctuating oil prices and expensive cost of extraction in the oil sands 
while other challenges relate to human resources and technological challenges.116 In terms of 
                                                          
110 Bleaney, supra note 107. 
111 Mario Toneguzzi, “Global Petroleum Show to be biggest ever”, Calgary Herald (20 May 2014), online: < 
http://www.calgaryherald.com>. 
112 Frank Uzuegbunam, “Nigeria oil and gas reforms: endless revolving door”, Business Day (22 January 2014) online: 
< http://businessdayonline.com>. 
113 Ibid. Particularly, there are concerns that  that Mexico’s reforms may adversely affect the quantity of Nigeria’s 
crude oil export to the United States because the proximity of Mexico to the United States (Nigeria’s largest customer 
for crude oil) provides a cheaper alternative for the US. See Roseline Okere & Sulaimon Salau, “Nigeria: U.S. Crude 
Oil Import from Nigeria Declines by 93 percent”, The Guardian (24 November 2014) online: <http://allafrica.com> 
[Okere & Salau]. 
114 Okere & Salau, ibid. 
115 PWC, Energy Vision, supra note 15 at 9. 
116 For fluctuating oil prices see Michael Mckerracher, “Western Canada Will Feel the Decline in Oil Prices, But It’s 
Not Catastrophic” The Globe and Mail, (14 December 2014), online:  <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>; for 
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human resources, the Canadian oil and gas industry has been described as having an aging 
workforce. Despite having a competitive salary rate, corporations in the oil and gas industry have 
difficulties in recruiting younger generation of workers.117 Specifically, it has been noted that 
“[o]nly 18% of the current Canadian oil and gas labor force is under 35”.118 In 2012, the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce predicted a shortfall of 130,000 skilled workers in Canada’s oil and gas 
industry over the next decade.119 The importance of skilled workers is particularly important to 
this industry given the increase in oil production predictions for the industry. For instance, it has 
been predicted that “Alberta oil sands production alone is set to double to 3.8 million over the next 
decade, while the liquefied natural gas projects will also require significant labour force”.120 Thus 
a decline in labour force may have long term adverse effects on the continued relevance of the 
Canadian oil and gas industry.  
In addition to the declining and aging labour force, there are also concerns regarding acquisition 
and advancement of technology in the oil and gas industry.121 Given that technology advancement 
is crucial in maintaining the Canadian oil and gas industry competitiveness with its international 
counterparts, it is very important for the industry to acquire workers with the requisite 
“sophisticated and up-to-date training and skills”.122 Acquisition of such skills could be 
challenging if there are no workers that match the required competency. Apart from the need to 
attract competent employees, these challenges could also adversely affect the delivery and quality 
of petroleum products or major capital projects and ultimately, the international reputation of the 
Canadian petroleum industry and the revenue generated from the industry.123 Thus, in proposing 
                                                          
expensive cost of extraction see Jeff Lewis, “Is Oil Sands Development Still Worth It?” The Globe and Mail, (28 
October 2014), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
117 Hussain Yadullah, “Canada energy labour shortage: Young workers shun oil and gas sector”, Financial Post 
Energy (14 May 2013), online: <http://business.financialpost.com>. Canadian oil and gas professionals typically 
receive the fifth most generous pay packages in the world behind their counterparts in Norway, Australia, Netherlands 
and New Zealand. 
118 Ibid.  
119 CBC News, “Labour shortage 'desperate,' Chamber says”, CBC News (8 February 2012), online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca>. 
120 Supra note 117. 
121 Ernst & Young, “Human Resources in Canada’s Oil and Gas Sector: A snapshot of challenges and directions”, 
(2011), online: Ernst & Young < http://www.ey.com> at 4. 
122Ibid at 1 [emphasis added]. On page 2, this report anticipates shortage of 77,000 workers in Alberta alone in the 
“coming decade”. 
123 Ibid. 
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recommendations for reforms, this thesis acknowledges these shortcomings and the impact they 
may have on the proposed recommendations.  
1.3.4 The Role of Taxation 
Even though the primary (and most popular) objective of taxation is to raise revenue, the tax 
system plays other roles in the economy.124 These underlying roles of the tax system have been 
recognised and discussed at length in legal, economic and tax scholarship.125 The report of the 
Royal Commission on Taxation (“Carter Commission”), which is the seminal work on tax policy 
in Canada, is particularly instructive in this regard.126 Specifically, Volume Two of this report 
discusses the “Use of the Tax System to Achieve Economic and Social Objectives”.127 In 
emphasizing the multiple roles of taxation, the Carter Commission noted that taxation is not solely 
for raising of revenue for public goods as there are other alternative means through which the 
government can raise its revenue (such as borrowing, creating money and commandeering 
resources).128  The Carter Commission report also noted that, “[t]he first and most essential 
purpose of taxation is to share the burden of the state fairly among all individuals and families”.129  
This claim suggests that the purpose of a tax system is beyond the primary purpose of raising 
revenue for government expenditures but extends to secondary purposes such as ensuring 
“fairness” and equality among taxpayers. 
In addition to the revenue generating function of taxation, it is important to acknowledge that the 
tax system also has redistributive and regulatory functions.130 The redistributive function of the 
tax system is closely related to its primary function of raising revenue. Through the imposition of 
                                                          
124 Peter W Hogg, Joanne E Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 8th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 
2010) at 2. The authors state that the main objective of taxation is to raise revenue and also acknowledge the other 
roles of the tax system. 
125 Neil Brooks, “The Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accommodating the Rich” (1993) 31:1 
Osgoode Hall Rev 138 at 140-4; Robin W Boadway & Harry M. Kitchen, Canadian Tax Policy, 2d ed., Canadian Tax 
Paper No 76 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984) at 1. 
126 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) [Carter Commission]. This 
report has been described as the “starting point for any responsible program of income tax reform in an industrialized 
country”. The Report is issued in six volumes and subsequent reference to the report in this thesis will be done by 
volume number; see also Boris I Bittker, “Income Tax Reform in Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation” (1968) 35 U Chicago L Rev 637 at 637-38. 
127 Carter Commission, Vol 2, ibid at 17.  
128 Carter Commission, Vol 2, ibid at 2-5. 
129 Carter Commission, Vol 1, ibid at 4 [emphasis added]. 
130 Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “Three Goals of Taxation” (2006) 60:1 Tax L Rev 1 at 3. 
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various types and rates of taxes, the government can target certain groups of taxpayers and reduce 
the uneven distribution of income and wealth resulting from normal operation of a market-based 
economy.131 In addition to this redistributive purpose, taxation also has a regulatory function. For 
instance, Avi-Yonah noted that through the tax system, the government can conduct the 
“regulation of private sector activity by rewarding activities that are considered desirable (via 
deductions or credits) and deterring activities that are considered undesirable (via increased 
taxation).”132 Such regulatory provisions in the tax system are called “tax expenditures”.133 
Given the multiple roles of the tax system discussed above, one may reasonably question how the 
tax system can address the aforementioned challenges in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. Without 
relegating the other functions of the tax system, this thesis suggests the regulatory function of the 
tax system for this purpose. In terms of the regulatory function of taxation, it has been advised that 
governments should only regulate through the tax system (as opposed to other means of 
regulation) when (i) such regulation is applied to a small group of taxpayers; (ii) the taxpayers in 
question are sophisticated enough to deal with complex tax incentives; and (iii) the regulatory goal 
for the particular provision is clear and related to the level of tax.134 This thesis argues that the 
regulatory function of taxation is relevant for addressing the inefficiencies in Nigeria’s petroleum 
industry because these three conditions are present. Specifically, the thesis contemplates that the 
regulatory function is applicable in the context of oil and gas reforms because (i) the proposed 
reforms are intended for corporate taxpayers in the petroleum industry (a small group of 
taxpayers); (ii) the taxpayers are corporations and are reasonably equipped to “deal with complex 
tax incentives”; and (iii) the “reform of the petroleum industry” provides a clear “regulatory goal” 
for the application of the regulatory function of taxation. Consequently, this thesis contends that 
the regulatory role of taxation is a viable means for promoting oil and gas reforms in Nigeria. 
1.3.5 Using the Tax System as a Tool for Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Reforms  
As discussed in the preceding section, this thesis looks at the regulatory function of the tax system 
in proffering Canadian measures that have the potential to address the aforementioned challenges 
                                                          
131 Ibid at 3. 
132 Ibid at 24. 
133 Ibid at 23. 
134 Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and Other Regulatory 
Taxes" (2010) Law & Economics Working Papers, Paper 21 at 8. 
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in Nigeria’s petroleum industry. While this thesis does not contemplate that the tax system is the 
only tool with which the previously identified problems can be addressed, this thesis argues that 
the tax system provides a promising avenue for improving administrative efficiency and growth 
of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry while raising tax revenue for the federal government. For 
instance, tax incentives administered through the tax system can help to attract investment in the 
oil and gas industry while the imposition of tax on undesirable activities can influence corporate 
decisions and mitigate the incidence of such activities.135 
Given the reputation of the Canadian petroleum industry, this thesis argues that there are certain 
regulatory provisions in Canada’s tax system that are potentially beneficial to Nigeria’s petroleum 
industry. Therefore, this thesis proposes five recommendations derived from Canada’s oil and gas 
tax regime to address the previously identified problems in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. While 
some of the selected Canadian measures are novel to the Nigerian petroleum industry, the other 
measures simply provide supplementary insights to existing measures in Nigeria’s oil and gas tax 
system.  
Specifically, the thesis proposes that the incentivizing of research and experimental development 
(R&D) in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry through tax credits can address the problem of recurrent 
fuel shortages and inadequate technology. In practical terms, the thesis contemplates that such 
R&D incentives are likely to promote local investment in oil exploration activities and increase 
local production of petroleum products thereby reducing Nigeria’s heavy reliance on imported 
petroleum products. Similarly, such R&D credits may also incentivize existing international oil 
companies to invest in more advanced technology for oil exploration activities especially for the 
utilization of associated gas. Secondly, the thesis suggests that the use of clean energy generation 
equipment by oil exploration companies can mitigate the adverse environmental effects of oil 
exploration activities in oil producing communities. The use of clean energy equipment can be 
promoted by granting an accelerated capital cost allowance for purchase of specified clean energy 
generation equipment to eligible oil and gas companies. In addition to the use of clean energy, the 
thesis also recommends the imposition of a pollution tax to address the problem of environmental 
degradation and its consequent effects in the oil producing communities in Nigeria. In addition to 
                                                          
135 The preference for the tax system as a tool for public policy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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these three fiscal measures, the thesis also proposes two tax administrative measures. First, the 
thesis recommends Canada’s tax informant reporting program to address the problem of tax 
evasion and aggressive tax avoidance. Finally, the thesis recommends the recent mandatory 
reporting requirement for Canadian extractive companies to address the problem of lack of 
transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector.  
To fully appreciate the anticipated benefits of the measures proposed in this thesis, an overview 
of the oil and gas tax regimes in Canada and Nigeria is beneficial. In addition to providing a 
contextual basis for the recommendations proposed in this thesis, an overview of taxation of oil 
and gas corporations in both countries is also essential for identifying certain features in both tax 
systems that may promote or hinder favourable adoption of these measures in Nigeria’s oil and 
gas industry. 
 25 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS CORPORATIONS IN CANADA AND NIGERIA 
The Canadian Income Tax Act1 is the legal basis for imposition of federal income taxes on 
corporations resident in Canada for income tax purposes. A corporation is deemed resident in 
Canada if the corporation was incorporated in Canada, the corporation’s reorganization was done 
under Canadian laws or the corporation was a Canadian corporation prior to its reorganization.2 
Generally, the federal government has legislative powers to impose taxes on corporations. 3 In 
addition to federal income taxes, provincial and territorial income taxes are also levied on 
corporations. While the provinces have constitutional powers to impose taxes under respective 
provincial statutes,4 the territories do not have separate constitutional taxing powers but derive 
their taxing powers from the federal government.5 It is as a result of this imposition of taxes at the 
various levels of government that Canada is considered to have a multi-tier system of taxation. 
2.1. Overview of Corporate Taxation in the Canadian Oil and Gas Industry 
In Canada, business in the oil and gas industry can be conducted by corporations, individuals acting 
in personal interest, trusts, joint ventures and partnerships. For income tax purposes, the nature of 
an oil and gas business entity is very significant. Even though the focus of this thesis is the taxation 
of oil and gas corporations, it is instructive to note that the tax treatment applicable to other 
business entities in the oil and gas industry is quite different from the applicable tax treatment for 
corporations. For instance, oil and gas businesses that are conducted as partnerships are not treated 
                                                          
1 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c1 (5th Supp) [ITA]. 
2 ITA, ibid, s 89. The ITA defines a Canadian corporation as one that is resident in Canada and was i) incorporated in 
Canada ii) resident in Canada from June 18, 1971, to the present or a corporation formed by a corporate reorganization 
is a Canadian corporation due to incorporation in Canada only if i) the reorganization happened under the laws of 
Canada or a Canadian province or territory; and ii) each of the involved corporations was, just before reorganization, 
a Canadian corporation. However, a corporation that was incorporated outside Canada can also be resident in Canada 
if its central management and control is located in Canada. See also De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited v. Howe, 
[1906] AC 455; Unit Construction Co v Bullock, [1960] AC 351; and M.N.R. v. Crossley Carpets (Canada) Ltd., 69 
DTC 5015 (Ex. Ct.). These are leading cases that have affirmed the judicial position in terms of residence of a 
corporation in Canada. 
3 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5, s 91 [Constitution Act, 1867] 
vests taxing powers in the federal government. 
4 Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982] ss 92(2), 
92A (4) grants provinces the exclusive jurisdiction to make laws relating to exploration and management of non-
renewable natural resources within their provinces. 
5 Constitution Act, 1982, ibid, s 32 (1). 
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as separate entities from their partners for tax purposes and are not liable to tax.6 However, the tax 
liability on the income derived from the partnership business is imposed on the partners.7 
Similarly, income derived from oil and gas joint ventures are proportionately allocated to the joint 
venture participants and reported in the participants’ income tax returns for the relevant tax year.8 
With respect to corporate entities, which is the focus of this thesis, income tax liability for a 
corporation in any given year is determined by applying the relevant tax rates to the applicable tax 
base of the corporation. Although oil and gas corporations are taxed at the same rate as other 
Canadian corporations, a slight variation is that oil and gas corporations are also subject to the 
payment of royalties.9 In addition to income taxes and royalties, oil and gas corporations are also 
subject to goods and services tax (GST), provincial sales tax (PST) and harmonized sales tax 
(HST).10  
2.1.1 Corporation Taxes 
In Canada, a corporation’s taxable income is based on the company’s profits which include its 
business income, capital gains as well as property income.11 Under this classification, business 
income is revenue that was derived from a certain degree of commercial activity12 while property 
income relates to proceeds from passive investment like collection of rent, interest, royalties and 
dividends.13 Notably, the “income” of a corporation for accounting purposes is quite different from 
its “income” for tax purposes. This is because certain elements must be added to or deducted from 
a corporation’s accounting income in order to determine its taxable income. According to the ITA, 
a corporation’s taxable income in a tax year is “the taxpayer’s income for the year plus the 
                                                          
6 Deloitte, “Oil and Gas Taxation in Canada: Deloitte Taxation and Investment Guides”, (2013) online: Deloitte 
<www2.deloitte.com> at 5 [Deloitte]. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ernst & Young, “Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide”, (2014), online: Ernst & Young <http://www.ey.com> at 100 [EY, 
Tax Guide]. The authors state that “[c]rown royalties are applicable to crown lands, at a rate of 10% to 45%; [there 
are] special regime[s] for oil sands and offshore production; [and] freehold royalties vary from lease to lease.”  
10 Basically, non-resident corporations that are not subject to the ITA Part I income tax are required to pay a 
withholding tax (ITA Part XIII tax) based on the gross amounts of their passive investment they receive or derive 
from Canadian taxpayers. Although the withholding tax rate is 25%, the applicable withholding tax rate depends on 
the country of origin of the non-resident corporation. This is because such rate may be subject to a reduction if the 
non-resident corporation originates from a country with which Canada has signed a tax treaty. 
11 Ibid. 
12 ITA, supra note 1, s 125 (7) defines the “income of the corporation for the year from an active business”. 
13 Ibid. 
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additions and minus the deductions permitted”.14 Due to this reclassification of income items, the 
prior determination of a corporation’s taxable income is essential for arriving at an accurate 
corporate income tax liability amount.15  
Once a corporation’s applicable tax rate and taxable income has been determined, certain 
deductions may be available to reduce the corporation’s tax liability. For instance, royalties paid 
to provincial governments and certain non-capital expenditures are deductible for the purpose of 
computing a corporation’s taxable income.16 Also, capital expenses of the corporation can often 
be depreciated, with special regimes applicable to oil and gas expenditures.17 
2.1.1.1 Federal Tax 
At the federal level, corporation tax is imposed on both local and foreign corporations deriving 
income or doing business within Canada.18 Thus, a company which is not resident in Canada for 
the taxation year but “carried on business in Canada” at any time in that tax year would be liable 
to pay taxes on the income derived from such business.19 Further to section 253 of the ITA, a non-
resident corporation will be deemed to be carrying on business in Canada regardless of which 
stage of the commercial activities was conducted in Canada.20 Upon confirmation that a company 
has carried on business in Canada, such a resident/non-resident company will be liable to pay 
federal and provincial taxes on its taxable income.21  
                                                          
14 ITA, supra note 1, s 2(2). 
15 ITA, supra note 1, Division C. For instance, the “deductions permitted” relate to expenses a corporation is allowed 
to claim on its income taxes. The allowable deductions are provided in Division C of the ITA. Charitable donations 
and certain dividends received from a corporation’s foreign affiliate are some examples. 
16 Deloitte, supra note 6 at 2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 ITA, supra note 1, s 2 (3). 
19 Although the ITA is silent on the meaning of “carrying on business in Canada”, the phrase has been interpreted by 
the provisions of s 253 of the ITA (also called a deeming rule). This section provides an “extended meaning of carrying 
on business” and provides details of activities that constitute “carrying on business in Canada”. 
20 A non-resident corporation will be deemed to be carrying on business in Canada if the corporation: i) produces, 
grows, mines, creates, manufactures, improves, packs, preserves or constructs, in whole or in part, anything in Canada, 
regardless of whether the non-resident sells it or exports it from Canada without selling it. ii) Directly or indirectly 
solicits orders or offers anything for sale in Canada regardless of whether the contract or transaction is to be completed 
inside or outside Canada or partly in and partly outside Canada. iii) Disposes of Canadian resource property, timber 
resource property, Canadian real property (excluding capital property). ITA s115 stipulates how to arrive at a non-
resident corporation’s taxable income in Canada. 
21 Where the business is not carried on through a “permanent establishment”, some tax reliefs may be applicable 
depending on Canada’s tax treaty with the contracting country or state. See generally, Convention with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital, Canada and United States, September 26 1980, Article V (entered into force 16 
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Once the taxable income of a resident oil and gas corporation has been determined by applying 
the applicable additions and deductions, the corporation is subject to a federal income tax at the 
rate of thirty-eight percent (38%).22 This rate is reduced by ten percent (10%) where the 
corporation has a permanent establishment in a Canadian province23 and by another thirteen 
percent (13%) for corporations that are not eligible for other preferential tax treatment.24 Such 
preferential tax treatment could be in the form of additional reductions or credits. For instance, the 
small business deduction which is an annual tax credit for certain businesses is aimed at reducing 
the tax liability of eligible small businesses in Canada.25 Thus, the minimum federal income tax 
rate for corporations in Canada is fifteen percent (15%) or eleven percent (11%) for corporations 
that are able to claim small business deductions.26 The computed corporate tax liability is payable 
in monthly or quarterly installments subject to some exceptions27 and the CRA may charge interest 
and penalties when a corporation makes late or insufficient payment of its tax liability.28  
2.1.1.2 Provincial Tax 
Apart from the federal taxes, oil and gas corporations are also subject to provincial tax or territorial 
tax depending on the tax rate applicable to the province or territory29 in which it has permanent 
                                                          
August 1984). This provides that a U.S. entity that carries on business in Canada without a permanent establishment 
(e.g broker, general commission agent acting in the ordinary course of business) would not be taxed on the income 
derived from such business. Furthermore, Income Tax Regulations CRC, c 945 s 402 [ITR] defines a permanent 
establishment as a fixed place of business of the corporation, including an office, a branch, a mine, an oil well, a farm, 
a timberland, a factory, a workshop or a warehouse.  Where the corporation does not have any fixed place of business, 
its permanent establishment is the principal place in which the corporation’s business is conducted. 
22 ITA, supra note 1, s 123(1). 
23 Ibid, s 124 (1). 
24 Ibid, s 124 (1) (f); Deloitte, supra note 6 at 1. The 10% reduction is called provincial abatement and is applied 
to provide allowance for provincial taxes. Therefore, income earned outside Canadian province is subject to the 
full 38% tax rate. In addition, the 13% is called general rate reduction and it is applicable to corporations that are 
not subject to any other exemptions. 
25 ITA, supra note 1, s 125 (1) & s 125 (2); Canada Revenue Agency, “The Small Business Deduction”, Interpretation 
Bulletin IT-73R6 (25 March 2002) at para 1. 
26 ITA, supra note 1, s 125 provides for small business deductions; see also, Canada Revenue Agency, 
“Corporation Tax Rate” (3 March 2014), website, online: Canada Revenue Agency <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>  
27 For instance, instalment payments are not applicable where a corporation is in its first tax year, has a tax payable 
that is $3000 or less or has a tax year that is shorter than one month. See generally, s 157 of ITA; Canada Revenue 
Agency,” When You Do Not Have to Pay Instalments” (1 January 2014), online: Canada Revenue Agency 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>. 
28 ITA, supra note 1, s 161 (11) provides for the Receiver General to collect interests and penalties; Canada 
Revenue Agency, “When We Charge Interest and Penalty”, (1 January 2014), online: Canada Revenue Agency < 
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>. 
29 Canada has ten provinces (Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, British Columbia, Prince 
Edward Island, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador) and three territories (Yukon, the Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut). 
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establishment.30 The provincial income tax rates are within a range of ten percent (10%) to sixteen 
percent (16%) of the corporation’s taxable income depending on the province in which the 
corporation is situated.31 Provincial income tax rates are applied to taxable income, which is 
essentially the same as for federal purposes, though provincial tax credits often differ from those 
offered federally. It is noteworthy that provincial tax liability is not a deductible item for the 
purpose of arriving at a corporation’s federal taxable income.32 In addition, a particular corporation 
that has permanent establishment in more than one province is expected to allocate taxable income 
to each of the provinces.33 The basis for this allocation of taxable income to each province is by 
calculating the weighted average of revenue, salaries and wages ‘reasonably attributable’ to the 
respective provinces.34 
2.1.2 Royalties and Other Applicable Taxes 
In Canada, ownership of the majority of mineral rights are held by the federal, provincial and 
territorial governments (“governments”).35 These mineral rights are leased to interested parties for 
the exploration of oil and gas.36 Consequently, a corporation engaged in the production of oil and 
gas is required to pay royalties to the holder of such mineral rights. These payments vary from 
province to province because each province or territory operates its own royalty regime. Where 
the mineral rights are owned by private individuals or companies (also called freehold leases), the 
royalty payments are called “freehold royalties.”37 Given that the freehold royalties are paid to the 
private individuals and not to the governments, “freehold mineral taxes” are levied on such 
freehold leases.38 However, for the purpose of this thesis, the term “royalties” is used in reference 
                                                          
30 Supra note 21. In American Income Life Insurance Co. v. The Queen, 2008 DTC 3631, 2008 TCC 306, the court 
held that a United States company did not have a permanent establishment in Canada because inter alia the office of 
its Canadian agents were not at its disposal.  
31 Constitution Act 1982, supra note 4, s 92 of gives provinces taxing powers. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. In addition, where a corporation has a permanent establishment in more than one province, the corporation is 
expected to complete Schedule 5 whether or not the corporation has taxable income in these provinces.  
34 ITR, supra note 21 provides general rules for the allocation of taxable income among the provinces 
35ITA, supra note 1; Technology Tax Credits Limited, “10% Alberta SR&ED Tax Credit”, online: Technology Tax 
Credits Limited < http://www.sredservices.ca>.   
36 Canada Revenue Agency, “Mining Regulations” (16 November 2013), online: Canada Revenue Agency 
<http://www.nrcan.gc.ca>. 
37 Canada Revenue Agency, “Oil and Gas Extraction Reporting Guide”, Schedule II para 15, online: Canada Revenue 
Agency <http://www23.statcan.gc.ca> 
38 Freehold Mineral Rights Tax Act of Alberta, RSA 2000, c F-26 s 2. See generally, Canada Revenue Agency, “Oil 
and Gas Extraction Reporting Guide”, online: Canada Revenue Agency <http://www23.statcan.gc.ca> and Alberta 
Energy, “About Freehold Mineral Tax”, online: Alberta Energy <http://www.energy.alberta.ca> Alberta has a 
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to crown royalties as governments own about ninety percent (90%) of mineral rights in Canada.39 
These royalty payments are usually based on production and the royalty percentage varies 
according to the freehold lease. Unlike provincial taxes, royalties are fully deductible in 
computation of federal income tax.40 Therefore, the royalties paid by Canadian corporations to the 
owners of the mineral rights are fully deductible for federal income tax purposes.41  
In addition to royalties, goods and services tax (GST) is also levied on the sale of all goods and 
services in the Canadian oil and gas industry.42 The GST is a federal sales tax which is applicable 
at the point of supply of domestic and imported goods or services in Canada. In addition to the 
GST, some provinces also impose additional taxes on goods and services called the provincial 
sales tax (PST).43 A province where GST and PST are applicable may choose to merge the two 
taxes into a unified tax called the harmonized sales tax (HST)44 while some other provinces prefer 
to levy GST and PST as separate sales taxes on taxable supplies. Combined provincial and federal 
sales taxes ranges from 5% to 15%. However, some taxable supplies are zero-rated. For instance, 
basic groceries, livestock and most fishery and agricultural products are zero-rated for GST and 
HST purposes. That is, GST/HST will apply to these supplies but at a rate of 0%.45 However, input 
tax credits can be claimed by the corporation on such zero-rated goods and services.46 
In the same vein, some goods and services are exempt from GST/HST. For instance, health, child 
care, dental and residential rentals are exempt from GST/HST. In the oil and gas industry, some 
transactions are GST/HST exempt because such transactions are not deemed supplies of goods 
and/or services.47 For instance, acquisitions of certain natural resources property rights are not 
                                                          
specified royalty provision for freehold mineral tax and this is contained in the Freehold Mineral Taxation Act of 
Alberta. 
39 Supra note 36.  
40 Canada Revenue Agency, “Mining Specific Tax Provisions” (7 July 2014), online: Canada Revenue Agency < 
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca>. 
41 Ibid; PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Canadian Mining Taxation: Guidance on the Complexities”, (2013) online: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers <http://www.pwc.com>. 
42 Excise Tax Act, RSC 1985, c E-15, Part IX, s 122-3 [Excise Tax Act] imposes GST on all taxable supplies in Canada. 
43 For instance, Ontario Retail Sales Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.R.31 (as amended) s2 imposes PST in the province of 
Ontario. 
44 Excise Tax Act, supra note 42, s 123(1) describes these provinces as “participating provinces”. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid.The input tax credits can be used to recover GST/ HST paid or owed on purchases and expenses related to a 
corporation’s commercial activities in the form of input tax credits. 
47 EY Tax Guide, supra note 9 at 107 
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deemed as a supply.48 Thus, GST/HST would not apply to such transactions because the 
consideration paid or payable in respect of these rights, are not deemed to be consideration for 
purposes of levying GST/ HST. 
2.1.3 Oil and Gas Tax Administration in Canada 
In Canada, the Department of Finance Canada is responsible for development and evaluation of 
corporate tax policies,49 however, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) administers such fiscal 
policies on behalf of the federal and provincial governments in Canada (except Alberta and 
Quebec).50 The CRA collects and remits corporate taxes to relevant provinces based on tax 
collection agreements with such provinces.51Alberta and Quebec have separate provincial tax 
administrative agencies for administration of taxes.52 
Oil and gas corporations, like other business entities in Canada play a major role in the CRA’s 
corporate tax administration because the Canadian tax system adopts a self-assessment regime 
whereby taxpayers have the responsibility to complete and file income tax returns with the CRA.53 
Where the CRA disagrees with the information provided in a taxpayer’s income tax return, such 
a taxpayer has the opportunity to make an appeal with respect to the reassessment made by the 
CRA.54 
                                                          
48 Excise Tax Act, supra note 42, s 162(2), lists some natural resources property rights which would not be deemed to 
be a supply and for which consideration paid would not be attributable to such rights. 
49 Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11 s 14-5. The Department is responsible for formulation of general 
tax policies including policies for corporation in Canada. 
50 Canada Revenue Agency Act, SC 1999, c 17 [CRA Act] s 2(a); ITA, supra note 1, s 22(1). 
51CRA Act, ibid, s 63(1) on “Agreements to Administer a Tax”. For implementation, see generally s 5(1) (b) CRA 
Act which states that: the CRA is responsible for “implementing agreements between the Government of Canada or 
the Agency and the government of a province or other public body performing a function of government in Canada to 
carry out an activity or administer a tax or program. Specifically, Corporations Tax Act, RSO 1990, c C-40 s 98.1 (1) 
[Ontario Corporation Tax Act] empowers Ontario’s Minister of Finance and the Minister of Revenue to enter into an 
agreement with the CRA for administration and enforcement of the CRA Act. 
52 Constitution Act 1982, supra note 4 at s 17. 
53 Canadian Tax Dispute Help, “Overview of the Tax Dispute Process in Canada”, online: Canadian Tax Dispute Help 
<http://taxdisputehelp.ca>. The result of the evaluation conducted by the CRA is called the “Notice of Assessment”. 
This article provides an abridged process of Tax Appeals in Canada. Tax appeal in Canada may result in a confirmation 
or variation of the assessment by the CRA or further appeal to the Tax Court of Canada and ultimately the Federal 
Court of Appeal. 
54 ITA, supra note 1, s 165 and 169.  
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In addition to administration of taxes, the CRA Act also empowers the CRA to administer various 
social and economic benefit and incentive programs delivered through the tax system.55 However, 
the CRA is expected to consult with provincial governments on matters that may substantially 
affect a tax or program of activity being administered by the CRA.56 In addition to the above, the 
CRA is also responsible for resolution of tax related disputes57 and other compliance matters58 
such as tax investigations and tax audits in order to ensure accurate and proper administration of 
taxes in Canada.59 
2.2 Overview of Taxation in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry 
In terms of ownership of resources, the ownership of mineral rights is vested in the Federal 
Government by virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.60 In sharp contrast 
to Canada, which allows for diversity in the type of business entities engaged in its oil and gas 
industry, only companies incorporated in Nigeria may engage in the exploration or production of 
petroleum in the Nigerian petroleum industry.61 Section 2 of Nigeria’s Petroleum Act62 provides 
that, “[a] licence or lease … may be granted only to a company incorporated in Nigeria under the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act or any corresponding law.”63 Under the Petroleum Act, there 
                                                          
55 See generally CRA Act, supra note 50 at s 5 (1) (b-c) states that the CRA is responsible for “implementing 
agreements between the Government of Canada or the Agency and the government of a province or other public body 
performing a function of government in Canada to carry out an activity or administer a tax or program; examples of 
such program is the Scientific Research and Experimental Development Tax Credit Program, Canada child tax benefit 
(CCTB) and Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB). 
56 CRA Act, supra note 50 at s 40 (1-2). 
57 ITA, supra note 1, s 165(2) provides that the CRA may accept service of the notice of objection on behalf of the 
government. 
58 ITA, supra note 1, s 231 (1). 
59 CRA Act, supra note 50 at s 40(2). Of the ten provinces in Canada, Alberta and Quebec stand out in the area of tax 
administration as these are the only two provinces that do not have corporate tax collection agreement with the CRA. 
Alberta’s corporation taxes are administered by the Tax and Revenue Administration (TRA). In addition to the 
administration of Alberta’s corporate taxes, the TRA is also saddled with the responsibility of administering Alberta’s 
scientific research and experimental development program. In the administration of these taxes, the TRA operates 
under the supervision of Alberta’s Minister of Finance - Alberta Corporate Tax Act, RSA 2000, c A-15, s 55(1). 
Similarly, Revenu Quebec is responsible for the administration of corporate taxes in Quebec. This agency is also 
under the supervision of the Minister of Finance of the province. In addition to provincial taxes, the Revenu Quebec 
also administers GST within its territory. 
60 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, LFN 2004, c C23, s 44(3) [1999 Constitution]. Specifically, 
the Constitution provides that, “the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in under 
or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria 
shall vest in the Government of the Federation.” 
61 Companies and Allied Matters Act, LFN 2004, c C20, s 54 [CAMA]. 
62 Petroleum Act, LFN 2004, c P10, s 2 [Petroleum Act]. 
63 Ibid. 
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are three major types of interests that can be granted to oil companies namely exploration, 
prospecting and production. Specifically, oil exploration licences (OEL) are non-exclusive 
licences which are granted for the conduct of preliminary exploration surveys.64 An oil prospecting 
licence (OPL), on the other hand, is an exclusive licence granted for more extensive exploration 
surveys and includes the right to take away and dispose of oil discovered while prospecting.65 The 
third type of interest is the oil mining lease (OML) which is a lease that allows for full scale 
commercial production once oil is discovered in merchantable quantities in the specified acreage.66 
As mentioned earlier, these concessions can only be granted to companies incorporated under 
Nigerian law.67 
The principal statutes with which the federal government manages the oil and gas resources 
include the Petroleum Act,68 Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA),69 Oil Pipelines Act,70 Nigeria 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Act71 and the Environmental Impact Assessment Act.72 Apart from 
the PPTA, other tax regulations which are also applicable to corporations in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry include the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA),73 Capital Gains Tax Act74 and Value 
Added Tax Act.75 However, the tax legislations which govern the major oil and gas corporation 
taxes are the PPTA and the CITA. The PPTA governs the taxation of petroleum operations while 
the CITA is Nigeria’s general corporate income tax regulation. Taxation of the oil and gas industry 
under these two legislation are discussed in further details below.  
2.2.1 Corporation Taxes 
Nigeria’s oil and gas corporations are taxed under the PPTA or the CITA depending on the 
particular sector of the petroleum industry in which the corporation operates. The three major 
                                                          
64 Ibid, s 2(1) (a). 
65 Ibid s 2(1) (b). 
66 Ibid s 2(1) (c). 
67 Ibid. s 2(2). 
68Petroleum Act, supra note 62.  
69 Petroleum Profits Tax Act, LFN 2004, c P13 [PPTA]. 
70 Oil Pipelines Act, LFN 2004, c O7. 
71 Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Act, LFN 2004, c N87. 
72 Environmental Impact Assessment Act LFN 2004, c. E12. 
73 Companies Income Tax Act LFN 2004, c. C21 [CITA]. 
74 Capital Gains Tax Act LFN 2004, c. C1. 
75 Value Added Tax Act LFN 2004, c. V1 [VAT Act]. 
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sectors of petroleum operations in Nigeria are upstream, downstream and service sectors.76 The 
upstream sector relates to exploration and production of crude oil and gas and the companies in 
this sector are taxed under the PPTA.77 However, profits derived by an upstream company which 
are not related to “petroleum operations”78 are liable to tax separately under the CITA.79 The 
downstream sector involves the processing of petroleum collected in the upstream stage into 
finished products.80 This stage also includes the distribution and marketing of petroleum products 
to consumers. Companies operating in the downstream sector are taxed under the CITA.81 
Companies in the services sector provide support services to the upstream and downstream 
sectors.82 Examples of these support services are seismic data acquisition, drilling services, 
production support services, refinery maintenance, banking, catering and related services.83 Like 
the downstream sector, companies in the services sector are also subject to tax under the CITA.84 
The applicable tax rates under the PPTA and CITA regimes are discussed in subsequent 
paragraphs. 
2.2.1.1 Petroleum Profits Tax 
The PPTA85 is the tax legislation governing the taxation of companies engaged in “petroleum 
operations” in Nigeria. Section 2 of the PPTA defines petroleum operations as: 
“the winning or obtaining and transportation of petroleum or chargeable oil 
in Nigeria by or on behalf of a company for its own account by any drilling, 
mining, extracting or other like operations or process, not including refining 
at a refinery, in the course of a business carried by the company engaged in 
                                                          
76 Some literature also include a “midstream” sector in the classification of the oil and gas industry. However, the 
midstream sector operations are usually included in the downstream sector. See KPMG, “KPMG Nigeria Oil and Gas 
Industry Brief” (June 2014), online: KPMG Nigeria <http://www.kpmg.com> at 5 [KPMG Brief]. 
77 PPTA, supra note 69, s 8. This section provides for the “charge of tax” for companies engaged in “petroleum 
operations” and s 2 of the Act describes these companies as upstream companies. 
78 PPTA, supra note 69 at s 2 defines petroleum operations. Note that upstream companies that also conduct some 
downstream sector operations will be liable to tax under the CITA for such downstream operations. 
79 CITA, supra note 73; KPMG Brief, supra note 76.  
80 KPMG Brief, ibid at 8. 
81 Supra note 79. 
82 KPMG Brief, supra note 76 at 9. 
83 Ibid. 
84 CITA, supra note 73. 
85 PPTA, supra note 69 at s 2.  
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such operations, and all operations incidental thereto and sale of or any 
disposal of chargeable oil by or on behalf of the company”.  
Based on this provision, oil and gas industry activities that are not covered by the given definition 
are liable to tax under the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA).86 Where a corporation’s activities 
are categorized as “petroleum operations”, the applicable tax rate for such oil and gas corporation 
under the PPTA is further dependent on the nature of the contractual arrangement the corporation 
has with the federal government.  
The terms of participation for oil and gas corporations are contractual arrangements which 
stipulate the rights and duties of the parties. The national oil company (NNPC) is the entity that 
negotiates and enters into such contractual agreements on behalf of the federal government and 
thus, is charged with the responsibility of giving effect to these contractual agreements.87 
Examples of such contractual arrangements are Joint Ventures (JVs), Production Sharing 
Contracts, (PSCs) and Service Contracts (SCs).88 However, the JVs and PSCs are the most 
common types of contractual arrangements used by upstream petroleum corporations and these 
two arrangements are liable to tax under the PPTA. 
Under Nigerian petroleum law, JVs are described as any agreement or arrangements under which 
the NNPC “jointly owns and develops various oil and gas concessions in Nigeria”.89 In practical 
terms, the NNPC collaborates with international oil companies (IOCs) to exploit petroleum 
resources through a joint operating agreement (JOA) which provides a framework for the joint 
venture relationship.90 Under a JV arrangement, ownership, funding and production sharing are 
all based on each JV partner’s equity share - the parties jointly hold the OML and the costs for 
exploration, development and production of the petroleum (and the hydrocarbons produced) are 
shared among the parties in proportion to the participating interest held by each party under the 
JOA.91  
                                                          
86 CITA, supra note 73. 
87 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, LFN 2004, c N123, s 5 [NNPC Act]. See especially, s 5 (1) (g). 
88 CITA, supra note 73; Yinka Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse, 2003) at 38-54 [Omorogbe, 
Oil and Gas]. 
89 Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act Decree No 9 of 1999, LFN 2004 c D3 s 18 
[DOIBPSCA]. 
90 Omorogbe, Oil and Gas, supra note 88 at 47. 
91  Ibid. 
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The OML essentially constitutes the concession for the production of petroleum and authorizes 
the lessee (oil companies) to “search for, win, work and carry away” discovered petroleum.92 The 
OML only confers a non-possessory interest of the petroleum produced in the lessee while the 
ownership of land and all the resources on and under such land remains under the exclusive 
ownership of the federal government.93 However, the NNPC (on behalf of the government), 
acquires participatory interests in the concession and the relationship and interests of the parties 
to the JV are characterized by a combination of the OML and three separate agreements namely 
the participation agreement, the JOA and the heads of agreement.94 These three agreements define 
the relationship between the federal government (represented by the NNPC) and the oil producing 
companies.95  
The participation agreements disclose the respective interests of the NNPC and the oil companies 
in the concession.96 The participation agreements under JVs are essentially the same in substance 
but may vary in detail because they are individually negotiated by the parties to the concession.97 
The JOA, on the other hand, sets out the legal relationship that governs the parties’ operational 
and administrative relations under the concession.98 Specifically, the JOA lays down the rules and 
procedure for the joint development of the concession area and the property jointly owned by the 
parties to the concession.99 Under the JOAs, the oil company is designated the operator and is 
responsible for the conduct of all joint venture arrangements in a prudent manner.100 However, the 
NNPC reserves the right to be operator.101 The third agreement – the heads of agreement – are 
short but extremely important documents between the parties that lay down the general principles 
                                                          
92 Petroleum Act, supra note 62 at s 2 (1) (c). 
93 1999 Constitution, supra note 60 at s 44(3). 
94 Omorogbe, Oil and Gas, supra note 88 at 47. 
95 Yinka Omorogbe, “The Legal Framework for the Production of Petroleum in Nigeria” (1987) 5 J Energy Nat 
Resources L 273 at 277 [Omorogbe, Legal Framework]. 
96 Ibid. The interest acquired by the NNPC (on behalf of the federal government) is referred to as “participating 
interest” and it includes a participating interest in the OML, the fixed and movable assets of the oil company in Nigeria 
and the working capital applicable to the operations of the OML. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid at 279; Omorogbe, Oil and Gas, supra note 88 at 48. 
99 Omorogbe, Oil and Gas, ibid. The term “joint property” under the Nigerian JOA includes expenditure for all 
activities and services of the oil company such as staff salaries, housing scheme, gratuities, pensions etc. However, 
the extent of NNPC’s interference with the internal management of the oil company is for the purpose of monitoring 
the oil company’s compliance with Nigerian laws. For additional details on the operating agreements, see Martin M 
Olisa, Nigerian Petroleum Law and Practice (Ibadan: Fountain Books Ltd, 1987) at 83-93. 
100 Omorogbe, Legal Framework, supra note 95 at 279. 
101 Ibid at 286.  
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intended to govern the offtake, scheduling and lifting agreements for crude oil.102 In addition to 
these three agreements, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is also entered into by the 
parties.103 The MOU sets out the commercial terms of the JV including the manner in which 
revenues from the JV are allocated between the partners such as the payment of taxes and 
royalties.104 Generally, the NNPC holds a sixty percent (60%) interest in all the JVs except the JV 
operated with Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) where the NNPC holds a 55% 
participatory interest on behalf of the federal government.105 
For corporations under the JV arrangement, petroleum profits tax (PPT) is imposed at the rate of 
eighty-five percent (85%) on the corporation’s chargeable profit.106 The corporation’s “chargeable 
profit” is described as its assessable profits based on petroleum operations carried out within each 
accounting period less the deductions allowed under the PPTA.107 However, a tax rate of sixty-
five point seven five percent (65.75%) is applicable to the chargeable profits of corporations that 
are within their first five years of business.108 After the initial five years, the chargeable profits of 
the corporation are taxed at the general rate of eight-five percent (85%).  
Due to funding pressure from the JV arrangements, the federal government commenced the 
adoption of the PSC model as the preferred petroleum arrangement with oil companies.109 PSCs 
have been defined as “an agreement under which a foreign company, serving as a contractor to 
the host country/its national oil company, recovers its costs each year from production and is 
further entitled to receive a certain share of the remaining production as payment in kind for the 
exploration risks assumed and the development service performed if there is commercial 
                                                          
102 Ibid. 
103 Yinka Omorogbe, “Fiscal Regimes” (Paper delivered at the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
Civil Society Capacity Building Workshop, at Presidential Hotel, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, 28 July 2005) 
[unpublished] at 9. 
104 Ibid. 
105 For details of the NNPC’s participatory interests in the JV operations in Nigeria, see generally NNPC, “Joint 
Venture Operations”, NNPC Business, online: < http://www.nnpcgroup.com>. 
106 PPTA, supra note 69 at s 21  
107 Ibid, s 9. The PPTA in s 9(4) describes “assessable profits” as adjusted profits less the deductions allowed in s 16 
of the Act (for instance loss incurred by a company during a previous accounting period is an allowable deduction) 
while chargeable profits is defined in s 9(5) as assessable profits less deductions allowed under s 20 of the PPTA 
(which include annual allowances and petroleum investment allowance).   
108 PPTA, supra note 69 at s 21 (2). The initial tax rate is to enable the company recover its pre-production costs. 
109 KPMG Brief, supra note 76 at 7. This model was adopted in 1993 and all new government contracts with oil 
companies since that time have been PSCs. As a result of the way Nigeria’s oil and gas industry has evolved, most 
onshore operations today are JVs, and most deep water offshore operations are PSCs. 
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discovery”.110 In practical terms, the oil producing country (or national oil company) owns the 
concession and engages the oil producing companies as contractors to conduct petroleum 
operations on behalf of itself and the country.111 However, the contractor bears all exploration and 
development risk and is exclusively responsible for financing the costs of the whole petroleum 
operation which includes the exploration, development and production.112 If the exploration is 
successful and oil is discovered in commercial quantities, the contractor recovers the exploration 
and development costs and will be entitled to reasonable profit upon commencement of 
commercial production.113 If the exploration is unsuccessful, the contractor will bear all the losses.  
In Nigeria, deep water and frontier oil exploration operations utilize PSCs while the main onshore 
exploration and production activities are conducted under JVs.114 Consequently, most of the PSC 
fields in Nigeria are located offshore. Given the location of the PSC fields, a separate legislation 
called the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act (DOIBPSCA) 
regulates oil production activities in these fields.115 The DOIBPSCA defines a PSC as “any 
agreement or any arrangements made between the Corporation or the Holder and any other 
petroleum exploration and production company or companies for the purpose of exploration and 
production of oil in the Deep Offshore and Inland Basins”.116 The first Nigerian PSC was the 
Ashland Oil PSC which was signed between Ashland Petroleum Corporation and NNPC in 1973 
with Ashland as the designated contractor.117 
Under the DOIB PSC arrangement, the ownership of the OPL and the OML is held entirely by the 
NNPC, which engages the petroleum and exploration company as a contractor to conduct 
petroleum operations on behalf of itself and the NNPC.118 The oil company, as contractor finances 
the entire cost of exploration and can only recoup such costs in the event of a commercial 
discovery.119 If oil is discovered and extracted under the PSC arrangement, a quantum of the oil 
                                                          
110 Gao Zhiguo, International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions (London: Graham 
&Trotman, 1994) at 72.  
111 Francisca Nlerum, “Reflections on Participation Regimes in Nigeria’s Oil Sector” (2010) 6 NCLR 145 at 157 
[Nlerum]. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid.  
115 DOIBPSCA, supra note 89. 
116 Ibid, s 18. 
117 Omorogbe, Legal Frameworks, supra note 95 at 279-80. 
118 DOIBPSCA, supra note 90, s 18; KPMG Brief, supra note 76 at 7. 
119 DOIBPSCA, ibid, s 8 (1-2). 
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is allocated to the NNPC that will generate proceeds equal to the royalty payable under the 
concession (referred to as “royalty oil”).120 After royalty oil is paid, the oil company will be 
allocated a portion of the oil produced that is sufficient to reimburse the operating costs incurred 
by the company (referred to as “cost oil”).121 Thereafter, a portion of the remaining oil is allocated 
to the NNPC as petroleum profits tax to enable the NNPC pay the applicable income tax on behalf 
of itself and the contractor in accordance with the provisions of the PPTA (referred to as “tax 
oil”).122 For companies under the PSC arrangement, the contractor is subject to a petroleum profits 
tax at 50% of chargeable profit for the whole duration of the contract.123 The balance of the oil, if 
any (after cost, tax and royalty have been paid), is shared between the parties in accordance with 
the terms of the PSC agreement (referred to as “profit oil”).124 Notably, the tax oil is also split 
between the parties in the same ratio as the split of profit oil stated in the terms of the PSC.125  
Thus, royalties, recovery costs, taxes and profits under the PSC are paid in kind and not cash. 
As under the Canadian tax system, Nigerian oil and gas corporations are also entitled to claim 
certain deductions in the computation of their taxable profits. For PPTA purposes, all expenses 
that are “wholly, exclusively and necessarily” incurred for petroleum operations are allowable 
deductions for computing adjusted profit. 126  Examples of such expenses are royalties on exported 
crude oil, exploration costs, transportation costs, and shipping costs. Upon arriving at the adjusted 
profit after taking these allowable deductions into consideration, the assessable profit is 
determined by taking into account prior year losses yet to be recouped by the company.127 Where 
such losses cannot be relieved from the current adjusted profits such unrelieved losses can be 
carried forward indefinitely to subsequent tax years.128 
                                                          
120 Ibid, s 7. Whatever remains after these deductions is shared among the parties by the ratio stated in their PSC and 
is called “profit oil”. 
121 Ibid. In addition to cost oil, there is a payment of royalty (royalty oil) which is fixed according to the location of 
the particular oil field such that the deeper the concession is from onshore, the lower the royalty rate that will be 
applicable to such concession. 
122 DOIBPSCA, ibid, s 9. 
123 DOIBPSCA, ibid, s 3(1); PPTA, supra note 69 at s 22. 
124 DOIBPSCA, ibid, s 10. 
125 DOIBPSCA, ibid, s 12. 
126 PPTA, supra note 69 at s 10. 
127 Ibid, s 16. 
128 Ibid. 
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2.2.1.2 Companies Income Tax  
In addition to JVs and PSCs arrangements discussed above, a third contractual arrangement in 
Nigeria’s petroleum industry is the service contracts (SCs).129 A SC could either be a risk-service, 
pure-service or a technical assistance agreement.130 Under the risk-service arrangement, the oil 
producing country owns the concession as well as the petroleum discovered while the oil company 
who is engaged as the contractor bears all the risks.131 Pure-service and technical assistance 
agreements, on the other hand, are simply contracts for work - the contractor is brought in to 
perform defined services or tasks and is compensated accordingly. Unlike the risk-service 
contracts, the risks under the pure-service and technical assistance agreements are borne by the 
government.132  
In 1987, Nigeria had eleven (11) SCs with IOCs and NNPC in the nature of risk-service 
contracts.133 However, SCs are no longer popular in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Presently, 
the contract between the NNPC and Agip Energy & Natural Resources (AENR) which was first 
signed in 1979 is the only active risk-service contract in Nigeria’s petroleum industry.134 Under 
the Nigerian SCs, the concession is held by the NNPC while the oil company (contractor) provides 
the required technical expertise and finances the exploration and development operation.135 The 
initial term of the contract is two (2) or three (3) years and is renewable at the option of the NNPC 
for an additional term of two (2) years.136 If commercial discovery is made within the term of the 
contract, the exploration and development costs are recoverable and the contractor is entitled to 
compensation for the risk taken and remuneration for the services rendered.137 Conversely, if there 
                                                          
129 Nlerum, supra note 111 at 161. Note that an oil company may have different arrangements with the government. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Omorogbe, Oil and Gas, supra note 88 at 42. 
132 Ibid at 43-4. The pure-service or technical assistance agreements are usually used in the areas of proven reserves 
such as the oil rich Middle East countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Venezuela, Kuwait, and Bahrain. See Nlerum, 
supra note 111 at 162. 
133 Omorogbe, Legal Frameworks, supra note 95 at 281. 
134 National Petroleum Investment Management Services, “Nigeria Dynamic Fiscal Regime”, NAPIMS, online: 
<http://www.napims.com> accessed on 25 August, 2015. 
135 Omorogbe, Legal Frameworks, supra note 95 at 281. 
136 Lawrence Atsegbua, “Acquisition of Oil Rights under Contractual Joint Ventures” (1993) 37:1 J Afr L 10 at 21 
[Atsegbua]. 
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is no commercial discovery within the initial term of the contract, the contract is terminated and 
the exploration costs are lost.138 
Even though the SCs were designed for the purpose of improving PSCs, the SCs differ from PSC 
in some respects.139 The major distinctions are the duration and the modes of recovery of costs 
and remuneration under the two arrangements. Generally, SC arrangements are usually for shorter 
durations than the PSC arrangement.140 In terms of recovery of costs and remuneration, contractors 
under SCs are remunerated in cash (a fixed amount) derived from the sale of the concession’s 
available oil unlike PSC contractors that are remunerated with crude oil.141 However, there may 
be provisions under the SC allowing the contractor to receive remuneration or recoup the capital 
expenditure and other operating costs in crude oil.142 In addition, the terms of a SC may also give 
a contractor “the first option to purchase the crude oil produced”.143 Nevertheless, the contractor 
does not have a participation share and does not acquire any title to the crude oil produced under 
the SC.144 
As regards taxes, the contractor is treated differently under the SC as opposed to the JVs and PSCs. 
The contractor is not liable to tax under the PPTA because PPT is only payable by a company 
engaged in petroleum operation which is defined as “[t]he winning or obtaining … of petroleum 
in Nigeria … by a company on its own account…”.145 Given that the oil company under the SC 
does not hold any participating interest in the concession, it does not win, or obtain the petroleum 
“on its own account”.146  Thus, the oil company’s status as a contractor is underscored and the oil 
company is liable to tax on its remuneration under the CITA at the rate of thirty percent (30%).147 
However, the NNPC is liable to pay PPT as well as all royalties due on the contract area since it 
holds the concession for the petroleum operations.148  
                                                          
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. PSCs in Nigeria are usually for a term of 20 years while the term for SCs is about 5 years.  
141 Atsegbua, supra note 136 at 20-1. 
142 Omorogbe, Legal Frameworks, supra note 95 at 281-82. 
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144 Atsegbua, supra note 136 at 22. 
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In addition to oil companies under SC arrangement, companies operating in the downstream and 
services sector of the Nigerian petroleum sector are also assessed to income tax at the rate of thirty 
percent (30%) of their chargeable profit under the CITA. Furthermore, activities of upstream 
companies (such as under JVs and PSCs arrangements) that are not covered under “petroleum 
operations” are also taxable under the CITA.149  
Where an oil and gas corporation is a resident company in Nigeria, the corporation is liable to tax 
on its worldwide income which includes profits accruing in, derived from, brought into or received 
in Nigeria.150 On the other hand, a non-resident oil and gas corporation is liable to tax at the rate 
of thirty percent (30%), only on the income derived from its operations in Nigeria.151 To determine 
the income attributable to a non-resident corporation’s “operations in Nigeria”, a deemed profit 
rate of 20% is applied on the corporation’s total revenue derived from Nigeria in a particular tax 
year,152 thus, resulting in an effective tax rate of 6% of turnover for non-resident companies. 153 
Even though companies taxed under the CITA also have deductible expenses for determination of 
taxable income, the range of such expenses is not as wide as deductible expenses under PPTA. 
However, the CITA compensates for the limited deductible expenses through its lower tax rate 
and its wide range of fiscal incentives for gas utilization projects. For instance, downstream 
companies involved in gas utilization have a tax holiday period for an initial three years which can 
be extended for an additional two years subject to performance of the business. 154 In addition to 
the tax holidays, companies involved in gas utilization projects also have an investment capital 
allowance at a rate of 15% for qualifying capital expenditure (QCEs).155 
                                                          
149 KPMG Brief, supra note 76 at 12 
150 CITA, supra note 73 at s. 105 defines a “Nigerian company” as any company incorporated under the CAMA while 
a “foreign company” is defined as any company that is established under any law in force in a territory or country 
outside Nigeria. These foreign companies are generally referred to as non-resident entities. See also, CAMA, supra 
note 73 at s 54. 
151 CITA, supra note 73 at s. 55. 
152 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Taxation of foreign companies operating in Nigeria”, online: PricewaterhouseCoopers 
< http://www.pwc.com>. That is, there is a presumption that the company’s deductible expenses and capital allowance 
amounts to 80% of its turnover. 
153 CITA, supra note 73, s 30. That is, 30% (CIT rate) on 20% deemed profit results in an effective tax rate of 6% of 
turnover of the non-resident company. 
154 CITA, supra note 73 at s 39. 
155 Ibid. 
 43 
 
2.2.2 Royalties and Other Applicable Taxes 
In addition to the taxes above, royalty payments are levied on corporations involved in petroleum 
operations upon commencement of production.156 The applicable rate of royalty depends on the 
water depth in which the upstream corporation carries out its petroleum operations. The highest 
applicable rate for royalty in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry is 20% for on-shore production and the 
lowest rate is 0% for water depths in excess of 1,000 metres.157 As mentioned earlier, royalties are 
paid under PSC arrangements by allocating royalty oil to the federal government through the 
NNPC.158  
In addition to corporate taxes and royalty payments, oil and gas companies are subject to certain 
indirect taxes and levies. The major indirect taxes include Tertiary Education Tax (TET), 
Withholding Tax (WHT), Value Added Tax, Niger-Delta Development Commission levy and 
import duties to mention a few.159 
Resident oil and gas corporations are liable to pay TET on assessable profits in each tax year.160 
However, non-resident corporations and unincorporated entities are exempted from TET. This tax 
is assessed at 2% of a company’s assessable profits in addition to the PPT or corporate income tax 
liability of a company. However, this tax is an allowable deduction for purposes of arriving at 
adjusted profits for companies liable to tax under the PPTA. 
Another indirect tax is the WHT. WHT is an advance payment of tax levied on certain income for 
which payers are entitled to demand a withholding tax credit note. Such income include dividends, 
interest, fees, commissions and certain payments in respect of contracts.161 Resident and non-
resident companies that make a payment of an eligible income to another party are required by 
law to deduct withholding tax (WHT) from the payment and remit the sum to the relevant tax 
authority.162 The applicable WHT rate is either five percent (5%) or ten percent (10%) depending 
on the type of payment (i.e., the nature of transaction) and whether the beneficiary of such payment 
                                                          
156 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, LFN 1990, c 350, reg 61 [PDRR] and buttressed by s 9 of PPTA. 
157Ibid. 
158 Supra note 121. 
159 This list above is not exhaustive and only includes the most common taxes and levies. 
160 This is levied pursuant to Nigerian Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment) Act, LN 2011, s 1. 
161 The legal basis of the imposition of this tax include Withholding Tax Regulations being s 78-81 of CITA as well 
as PPTA, supra note 69 at s 56 for upstream companies. 
162 PPTA, ibid. 
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is a natural or artificial person.163 However, a reduced WHT rate of seven point five (7.5%) is 
applicable to non-resident companies where Nigeria has a double tax treaty with the recipient 
country.164 The WHT deducted at source from non-resident companies in respect of interest, rent, 
dividend, and royalty constitutes the final tax liability due from such companies.165 However, 
WHT is not applicable to dividends that are declared from profits on which PPT has been paid as 
such income is regarded as franked investment income.166  
Value added tax (VAT) is also applicable to the oil and gas corporations at the rate of 5% on 
taxable goods and services.167 Like the GST applicable in Canada, some supplies are VAT exempt 
while some have a 0% tax rate.168 For instance, oil exports, supply of plant, machinery and 
equipment that are purchased within or outside Nigeria for gas utilization in the downstream 
petroleum operations are exempted from VAT.169  
Additionally, oil and gas corporations are also liable to pay the Niger-Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) levy. Due to the environmental degradation in the Niger-Delta (the major 
oil producing area of Nigeria), the NDDC imposes a levy of 3% on the total annual budget of all 
onshore and offshore oil producing companies as well as gas processing companies operating in 
the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria.170 The objective of the levy is to compensate the residents of the 
Niger Delta area for the environmental degradation caused by oil exploration activities. 
2.2.3 Oil and Gas Tax Administration in Nigeria 
Nigeria’s tax administration for oil and gas corporations maintains a single tax administrative 
structure for corporate taxes as the state revenue agencies do not have jurisdiction over corporation 
                                                          
163 CITA, supra note 73 at s 78(2); KPMG Brief, supra note 76 at 13. Where the beneficiary is natural person, the 
WHT is payable to the State Inland Revenue Service while those for artificial persons like corporations, are payable 
to the Federal Inland Revenue Service. 
164 Even though the Tax Treaties (with the exception of the Tax Treaties with South Africa and China) have not been 
formally amended to reflect the reduced rate of 7.5% specified in the 1999 Budget pronouncement, the tax authorities 
have been implementing it in Nigeria. See KPMG, “Nigeria Fiscal Guide 2014/2015” (December 2014), online: 
KPMG Nigeria <http://www.kpmg.com> at 5.  
165 CITA, supra note 73 at s 23 (1) (k), see also, s 78 (4), s 79 (4), s 80 (4). 
166 CITA, supra note 73 at s 78 (3), s 79 (3), s 80 (3). 
167 VAT Act, supra note 75 at s 2. 
168 Ibid, see 1st Schedule, Part III. 
169 Ibid, see item 1st Schedule, Part I. 
170 Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment etc) Act, LN 2000, s 14 [NDDC Act]. 
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taxes.171 Although the federal government participates as a major stakeholder in the general 
administration of oil and gas resources through various agencies,172 tax administration is carried 
out exclusively by the federal government through the FIRS.173 The FIRS is the national tax 
authority charged with the responsibility for assessment, collection and general administration of 
the direct and indirect taxes in Nigeria’s petroleum industry.174 These taxes include PPT, CIT, 
VAT, WHT, TET and royalties.  
Like the Canadian self-assessment system of taxation, Nigerian oil and gas corporations that are 
taxed under the CITA also have the responsibility to complete and file income tax returns with the 
FIRS.175 However, companies involved in upstream petroleum operations that are taxed under the 
PPTA are required to submit audited financial statements and tax computations to the FIRS for 
review. Upon review of these documents, the FIRS issues notices of assessment to the upstream 
petroleum companies. Where there is any dispute relating to assessment under any of the two 
regimes, the Tax Appeal Tribunal has the responsibility to settle such tax disputes.176  
2.2.4 Imminent Tax Reforms in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry 
An overview of Nigeria’s petroleum industry is incomplete without the mention of the major 
imminent reforms in this industry. This is becasue these imminent reforms are reflective of the 
need and desire for oil and gas reforms in Nigeria. Given the reformative agenda of the Petroleum 
Industry Bill (“PIB”),177 this bill has been described as the most notable among the imminent 
reforms in Nigeria’s petroleum industry. For instance, some stakeholders have referred to this bill 
                                                          
171 Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act, LN 2007, s 2 [FIRSEA]; Federal Inland Revenue Service, 
“Tax Types”, online: Federal Inland Revenue Service < http://www.firs.gov.ng > [FIRS, Tax Types]. 
172 The federal government participates through the national oil company called the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC). Other stakeholders include the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources, the Department of 
Petroleum Resources, Ministry of Mines and Steel Development, as well as the Ministry of Environment. 
173 FIRS, Tax Types, supra note 171 
174 FIRSEA, supra note 171 at s 2. The various State Internal Revenue Service (SIRS) and the Local Government 
Revenue Committees are saddled with the responsibility of assessment and collection of taxes at the state and local 
government levels respectively. 
175 1999 Constitution, supra note 60, s 24 (f); FIRS, “Self-Assessment Regulations”, online: Federal Inland Revenue 
Service < http://www.firs.gov.ng>. 
176 FIRSEA, supra note 171 at s 59(2). 
177 SB 205, Petroleum Industry Bill 2012, 7th Sess, National Assembly June 2011- June 2015, (second reading 7 
March 2013) [PIB]. If passed into law, the omnibus feature of the PIB is expected to repeal certain principal petroleum 
statutes including the Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Profit Tax Act. If passed into law, this bill is expected to 
positively impact the industry by restructuring existing legislation and establishing new institutions to govern the 
operations of the petroleum sector. 
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as the “most authentic piece of legislation that would overhaul the petroleum industry” while 
others have described the bill as Nigeria’s first major attempt at oil and gas reforms since its 
commencement of oil exploration.178 Given that this bill is expected to introduce substantial 
changes to the Nigerian oil and gas fiscal regime in the immediate future, the bill is noteworthy in 
any discourse relating to the current state of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
Based on the draft provisions of the PIB, there is a remarkable level of optimism for its passage 
as the bill is expected to effect major changes in the oil and gas industry. For instance, the 
transitional provisions of the current version of the bill is set to repeal certain principal petroleum 
statutes including the Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Profit Tax Act in order to consolidate 
Nigeria’s petroleum laws.179 In addition to repealing these Acts, some of the other tax related 
changes proposed in the PIB include an introduction of a self-assessment regime for upstream 
companies180 and a replacement of the PPT with Nigerian Hydrocarbon Tax (NHT).181 For 
instance, sections 299 and 313 of the bill imposes NHT on profits of any company engaged in 
upstream operations at the rate of “50% for onshore and shallow water areas”; and “25% for 
bitumen, frontier acreages and deep water areas” during each accounting period.182 Where a 
company’s petroleum operations falls in both onshore and deep water geographical areas that are 
subject to different tax rates (50% and 25%), then, the NHT is to be levied on the proportionate 
parts of the profits arising from such operations.183 In addition to the introduction of the NHT, the 
PIB also proposes to make upstream companies liable to tax under the CIT at the rate of thirty 
percent 30%.184 By implication, the PIB proposes to replace Nigeria’s current single tier tax 
system (PPT) applicable to upstream companies with a two tier tax regime (NHT and CIT). 
Therefore, upstream companies under the PIB regime will be liable to pay resource tax and 
                                                          
178 Jonathan Nda-Isaiah, “Seventh Senate on the Threshold of History” Leadership (7 January 2015), online: 
<http://leadership.ng>. This article notes that upon the passage of the PIB, the bill will be the “master reference law” 
that governs the Nigerian petroleum industry; Marie Müller, “Revenue Transparency to Mitigate the Resource Curse 
in the Niger Delta? Potential and reality of NEITI”, online: (2010) Occasional Paper V, Bonn: Bonn International 
Centre for Conversion < https://www.bicc.de> Müller referred to the PIB as the first major oil and gas reform in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry since its commencement of exploration 
179 PIB, supra note 177, s 354 (1). 
180 Ibid, s 327 
181 Ibid, s 299 
182 Ibid, s 299 and s 313 
183 Ibid, s 313 (2). 
184 PIB, supra note 177 at s 353 (1). 
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corporate income tax as opposed to the current regime where they are liable to pay only resource 
tax (PPT). 
In terms of objectives, there are eleven (11) major objectives of the PIB.185 Some of these key 
objectives include the creation of a conducive business environment for petroleum operations, 
establishment of efficient and effective regulatory institutions for petroleum operations and 
promotion of the Nigerian content in the petroleum industry.186 This omnibus nature of the PIB 
has been noted as the PIB’s most promising and problematic feature as it has resulted in years of 
disputes between federal lawmakers, the petroleum ministry and other major stakeholders in 
Nigeria’s petroleum industry.187 For instance, the PIB proposes to replace and remove certain 
incentives that are applicable to oil companies under the current tax regime. Under the current 
regime, oil companies under the PSC arrangement with the federal government are entitled to 
investment tax credits (ITC) and investment tax allowances (ITA) at 50% of asset costs which act 
to reduce, respectively, the tax or taxable profits paid by those companies.188 Similarly, companies 
under JV arrangements are also entitled to Petroleum Investment Allowance (PIA) which is also 
aimed at reducing the taxable profits under JV arrangements.189 However, the PIB intends to 
replace the ITCs and ITAs with a General Production Allowance (GPA) without a corresponding 
replacement for PIA even though JV operations are currently entitled to this incentive under the 
PPTA.190 Other proposed changes in the bill include the reduction of penalty for non-payment of 
tax from the current 200% which is applicable under the PPTA to 10% under the PIB.191 The PIB 
also proposes the creation of two new regulatory agencies called the Upstream Petroleum 
Inspectorate (UPI) and the Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Agency (DPRA), both organized 
as government owned corporate entities192  
                                                          
185 Ibid, s 1. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Weneso Orogun, “Petroleum Industry Bill: Issues Delaying Its Passage (1)” Leadership (23 September 2014), 
online: <http://leadership.ng>. 
188 PPTA, supra note 69 at s 22. The incentive is called an “investment tax credit” if the PSC is a pre-1 July 1998 PSC 
and an “investment tax allowance” if the PSC is a post-1 July 1998 PSC. 
189 Ibid, 2nd Schedule, para 5. 
190 PIB, supra note 177 at 5th Schedule, para 1 (c) (i-ii). 
191 Ibid, s 336 
192 Ibid, ss 13, 43.  
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Even though the text of the PIB suggests a positive and upward potential for growth in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry, the uncertainty about the delayed passing of the bill has capped investment in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry under the current regime.193 Given that predictability of the 
regulatory and fiscal regime of any industry is needed to generate new investment, the delayed 
passage of the PIB discourages investment in the oil and gas industry.194 In order to determine 
future foreign investment into the Nigerian petroleum sector, certainty of the regulatory and fiscal 
terms proposed in the PIB is, to a large extent, very important. For instance, certainty of the 
regulatory and fiscal regime is required for new “deep water” investment – which is the production 
region with potentially the most scope for further oil exploration in Nigeria.195 Consequently, a 
number of upcoming projects which may be worth billions of dollars will be delayed until the 
passage of the PIB.196  
Apart from the delayed passage of the PIB, its passage into law also has some potential concerns 
for stakeholders in the oil and gas industry. For instance, some stakeholders have noted that some 
propositions in the current version of PIB could stifle future investments in Nigeria’s oil and gas 
industry. One of the major IOCs in Nigeria noted that the some of the fiscal terms in the bill could 
translate to a loss of about $185 billion in new projects for the Nigerian petroleum industry.197 The 
primary reason that has been cited for the potential loss of investment by most stakeholders is the 
potential increase in government take under the PIB regime. A projection by the NNPC indicates 
that the PIB aims “to boost accruals to government coffers from the deep water offshore operations 
from the current level of 32 percent to 72.3 percent”.198 Perhaps, the proposed increase in taxation 
under the PSC is instructive in buttressing the NNPC’s projection. This is because deep water 
PSCs that currently pay PPT at the rate of fifty percent (50%) will be liable to NHT and CIT at a 
cumulative tax rate of about fifty-five percent (55%) under the PIB.199 That is, NHT for deep water 
                                                          
193 KPMG, “Oil and Gas In Africa: Africa’s Reserves, Potential and Prospects” (2013), online: KPMG Nigeria <  
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PSCs at the rate of twenty-five percent (25%) plus CIT at the rate of thirty percent (30%) results 
in a five percent (5%) increase in tax under the PIB regime.200  
In addition to an increase tax rate, current stakeholders in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry have 
argued that the PIB will create “one of the world’s harshest production sharing contract” as the 
fiscal regime under the bill indicates that the Nigerian government’s take comprising of royalties, 
taxes and NNPC’s profit oil will amount to a total of ninety-six percent (96%) - which is one of 
the highest in the world.201 In addition to the regime for PSCs, some stakeholders have observed 
that the proposed terms for JVs under the PIB are also considerably onerous to international oil 
companies (IOCs).202  This relative increase in government intake under the proposed PIB regime 
is likely to leave investors with limited profit incentive for further investment.  
However, the claims by the IOCs that Nigeria’s take under the PIB is one of the highest in the 
world have been considered an exaggeration based on findings that indicate that government’s 
take for PSCs is within the world average.203 This is particularly noteworthy because a critical 
appraisal of the PIB indicates that some of these fiscal provisions also provide certain fiscal 
benefits for the IOCs. For instance, the replacement of the PPT with NHT and CIT under the PIB 
is also beneficial to the IOCs (and not only the NNPC) because IOCs operating in deep water 
PSCs would no longer be liable to pay PPT at fifty percent (50%) on gross revenue but will be 
liable to pay only NHT at twenty-five percent (25%) on gross revenue and thirty percent (30%) 
CIT on net profits.204 In real terms, this would result in an effectively lower tax liability for the 
IOCs. Similarly, IOCs operating in onshore or shallow PSCs that are currently liable to PPT at 
eighty-five (85%) will have a five percent (5%) reduction in their tax rate because they will be 
liable to a cumulative tax rate of eighty percent (80%) under the PIB.205 That is, NHT for onshore 
or shallow PSCs at fifty percent (50%) and CIT at the rate of thirty percent (30%). Consequently, 
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the slight increase in government take (from 50% under PPTA to 55% under PIB) in relation to 
the deep PSCs has a corresponding decrease of 5% (from 85% under PPTA to 80% under PIB).  
Even though some of the proposed terms in the PIB may mitigate the problems discussed in 1.3.1 
above, the aforementioned concerns in the current provisions of the PIB and the absence of tailor-
made solutions to some of the previously identified problems could endanger the achievement of 
the wider objectives of this proposed legislation. In order to fully realize the objectives of the PIB, 
the current version of the PIB ought to be reviewed to ensure that its terms are flexible enough to 
encourage investment while guaranteeing optimal returns for the government. 
2.3 Legal Considerations for the Proposed Reforms 
Given the unique features of oil and gas taxation in Canada and Nigeria, it is useful to examine 
some aspects of both tax systems that can limit or improve the prospects of successful reforms. 
Recognizing the material distinctions between the two jurisdictions could serve as a metric for 
identifying areas where modification may be required and the extent of such modification to 
improve the chances for a successful transfer of Canadian tax measures into Nigeria’s tax 
system.206 For the purpose of this thesis, the extent of government participation in the ownership 
of mineral rights as well as the system of making laws in both countries will be examined. 
2.3.1 Ownership of Mineral Rights and Government Participation 
Under the Constitution Act, 1867, both the federal government and the provincial or territorial 
governments regulate mining activities in Canada.207 The majority of mineral rights in Canada are 
owned by the province, territorial or federal governments while the remainder of the mineral rights 
are held by individuals.208 As a result, corporations that wish to carry out petroleum prospecting 
                                                          
206 Alan Watson, “Comparative Law and Legal Change”, (1978) 37 Cambridge LJ 313. Watson rightly notes that 
substantial modifications are necessary for proper integration of foreign laws in the recipient country. 
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L Rev 472; William D Moull, “Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867” (1983) 61 Can Bar Rev 715. For the 
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Hart, “Introduction to Legal Framework for Mining in Canada”, (18 July 2012), online: <http://www.miningwatch.ca> 
208 Ownership of mineral rights in aboriginal lands have subsequently been vested in the aboriginal peoples by virtue 
of Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 3, ss 25,35. See also John Dobra, “Divergent Mineral Rights Regimes: A Natural 
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or exploration activities are required to obtain an exploration licence and other necessary permits 
from the relevant owner of the mineral rights.209 That is, the respective governments retain the 
ownership of the oil and gas resources but grant development rights to corporations for exploration 
or prospecting activities. In regulating the development rights, the federal, provincial and 
territorial governments have distinct authority to issue licences, permits or grant leases to 
corporations that wish to explore or prospect for oil on their respective lands.210 
In contrast to the Canadian ownership structure, the Nigerian constitution vests absolute title of 
all mineral resources in the federal government of Nigeria.211 As a result, there is no private or 
state ownership of petroleum resources.212 The federal government grants oil exploration, oil 
prospecting licence and oil mining leases to corporations intending to carry out such activities in 
Nigeria.213 Although the state governments eventually get some part of the revenue derived from 
oil and gas operation, the federal government retains exclusive ownership of mineral rights in the 
Nigerian petroleum industry.214  
Another major distinction between Nigeria and Canada’s petroleum industries is the existence or 
non-existence of a state-owned national oil company. As earlier mentioned, Nigeria has a state-
owned national oil company (NNPC) through which the federal government conducts commercial 
activities in the petroleum industry.215 In contrast, Canada does not have a state-owned national 
oil company. Even though Canada once had a state-owned national oil company called Petro-
                                                          
Experiment in Canada and the United States Yields Lessons”, online: (2014) Fraser Institute 
<http://www.fraserinstitute.org>; EY, Tax Guide, supra note 9 at 94. 
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Canada between 1975 and 1990, this company was partly privatized in 1991 and became fully 
privatized in 2004.216  
2.3.2 Legislative and Taxing Powers 
The Parliament is the supreme legislative authority in Canada, consisting of the Crown (who is 
represented by the Governor General), the Senate and House of Commons.217 Legislative powers 
required for the control of mineral rights is constitutionally vested in the federal government and 
the provincial governments.218 Even though the federal government has broad constitutional 
powers with respect to direct and indirect taxation, the Constitution Act, 1982 also grants the 
provincial legislatures specific taxing powers with respect to natural resources in the respective 
provinces.219 
However, the process for passing bills into laws (including tax laws) at the provincial and federal 
levels of the Canadian governments are quite different. At the federal level, Canada operates a 
bicameral legislature such that bills must pass through the Senate and House of Commons before 
it becomes law.220 Canadian provinces, on the other hand, operate a unicameral legislature such 
that passage of bills are done by one legislative branch.221 
Like Canada, the federal government of Nigeria also operates a bicameral legislature.222 The 
highest law making body is the National Assembly, which consists of the Senate and House of 
Representatives. 223 Similarly, the state governments also operate a unicameral legislature like 
Canadian provinces as passage of bills are within the purview of the House of Assembly alone.224 
However, the federal government has exclusive legislative powers in relation to taxation of oil and 
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gas corporations. This is because control of such resources is on the exclusive legislative list, 
thereby vesting legislative capacity on all matters relating to the petroleum industry in the National 
Assembly.225 Unlike provincial governments in Canada, the state governments in Nigeria do not 
have any constitutional powers to make laws (including tax laws) for Nigeria’s petroleum industry. 
Despite the exclusivity of legislative capacity for petroleum resources in Nigeria, Canada and 
Nigeria appear to have similar law making powers and procedures. Consequently, the distinctions 
between the two legislative structures are very important but not necessarily significant to pose 
substantial challenges to the proposed tax reforms. Since both governments operate a bicameral 
legislature at the federal level, the Canadian legislative model provides a rich perspective for the 
Nigerian government to follow in terms of implementing the proposed recommendations. 
The importance of considering the key distinctions between these two jurisdictions before 
proposing recommendations for reforms from Canada to Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. 
Given that Nigeria has a state-owned oil company and does not have a similar structure for 
ownership of mineral rights, the prospective administrative measures derived from Canada’s 
system must be modified such that the dominant role of the federal government is considered. 
Similarly, the legislative aspects of the proposed tax measures also need to acknowledge the 
absence of a corresponding provincial taxing power for state governments in Nigeria. Given the 
distinctions between the oil and gas industry in the two jurisdictions, the next chapter explores the 
possibility of transplanting laws from Canada into Nigeria’s legal system.
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGAL TRANSPLANT THEORIES: AN APPROACH TO OIL AND GAS REFORMS 
IN NIGERIA 
Comparative law theorists have consistently emphasized that, “[d]omestic law cannot always 
adequately deal with problems in its own legal system”. 1 Many of these theorists contend that 
exploring laws in other legal systems enlarges the “supply of solutions” available to solve a 
particular legal problem.2 Even though the possibility of exporting laws across jurisdictions is a 
highly contested issue in several comparative law scholarship, 3 the rate of globalisation in the 
world today reveals an unavoidable mobility of laws among jurisdictions. The aspect of 
comparative law that considers the transfer of legal rules from one system to another is intricately 
linked to the concept of “transplants”.  According to Alan Watson, the process of borrowing legal 
rules from one legal system to another is called “legal transplants”.4 Watson – the foremost 
exponent of legal transplants, explains that legal borrowing may be from within the same legal 
system, for instance from negligence in torts to negligence in contract, or the borrowing may be 
from another legal system entirely, as contemplated in this thesis.5  
Since this thesis intends to explore possible “supply of solutions” for Nigeria’s oil and gas reforms 
by looking at Canada’s petroleum industry, it is important to explore the views of scholars and 
                                                          
1 Kai Schadbach, “The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View” (1998) 16 BU Int’l L J 331 at 
350 [Schadbach]. 
2 Ibid at 350. 
3 See generally, Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 2nd ed. (Atlanta: University of 
Georgia Press, 1993) [Watson, Legal Transplants]; Alan Watson, “Legal Transplants and Law Reform” (1976) 92 
Law Q Rev 79 [Watson, Law Reform]; Alan Watson, “Comparative Law and Legal Change”, (1978) 37 Cambridge 
LJ 313 [Watson, Comparative Law]; Alan Watson, “The Birth of Legal Transplant” (2013)  41:3 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp 
L 605 [Watson, The Birth]; Otto Kahn-Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37 Mod L Rev 1 
[Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses]; Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’” (1997) 4 Maastricht J 
Eur & Comp L 111  [Legrand, Impossibility]; Pierre Legrand, “What ‘Legal Transplants’?” in D. Nelken and J. Feest 
(eds.) Adapting Legal Cultures (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) [Legrand, What Legal Transplants?]; Anthony 
Forsyth, “The 'transplantability' Debate in Comparative Law and Comparative Labour Law: Implications for 
Australian Borrowing from European Labour Law”, (2006) Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, 
online: <http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au>; William Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal 
Transplants” (1995) 43 Am J Comp L 489. 
4 Watson, Legal Transplants, ibid at 21. 
5 Alan Watson, “Aspect of Reception of Law” (1996) 44:2 Am J Comp L 335 at 335. See also Jonathan B Weiner, 
“Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and Evolution of Global Environmental Law” (2001) 
27 Ecology L Q 1295 at 1297. Weiner describes borrowing within the same legal system as horizontal legal borrowing 
while he describes the borrowing from national to international law or vice-versa as vertical legal borrowing.   
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theorists that discuss the prospects of transferring laws from one jurisdiction to another. Since the 
focus of this thesis is corporate taxation in the oil and gas industry, this chapter looks at legal 
transplants in the context of tax law and also considers the three major schools of thought on legal 
transplant theories to determine the possibility of transfer of laws between Nigeria and Canada. 
3.1 Legal Transplant Theories 
The concept of transplanting laws from one place to another is not a new phenomenon but has 
been explored long ago in the writings of legal scholars like Baron De Montesquieu, Roscoe Pound 
and Albert Kocourek.6 While the development of theories of comparative law may not have been 
the central purpose of these scholars’ writings, their work discussed different aspects of the 
transference of law between states and have become part of legal transplant scholarship. The 
earliest among these writings is the work of Montesquieu who explored the relationship between 
local conditions and imported law.7 Montesquieu considered legal transplants of national laws as 
unusual because each country has its own unique features which suits its people.8 He noted that 
“[l]aws should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that 
laws of one nation can suit another”.9 Even though Montesquieu’s view has become a premise 
upon which some of the later legal transplant scholars (such as Kahn-Freund) have based their 
work, other schools of legal transplant theories have emerged over the years.10 
There are three major competing views on the transferability of laws across jurisdictions. These 
are the views of Alan Watson, Pierre Legrand and Otto Kahn-Freund. While Watson holds an 
optimistic view that legal transplants are a feasible and efficient method of law reforms,11 Legrand 
takes an extreme pessimistic position and contends that laws cannot be transferred from one 
jurisdiction to another.12 Kahn-Freund leads the third school of thought and this school contends 
that even though legal transplants are possible, the knowledge of the social, economic and political 
                                                          
6 Charles De Secondat Baron De Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, translated by Thomas Nugent, revised by JV 
Pritchard (London: G Bell & Sons Ltd, 1914) [Montesquieu]; Roscoe Pound, “The Theory of Judicial Decision” 
(1923) 36:6 Harv L Rev 641; Albert Kocourek, “Factors in the Reception of Law” (1935-1936) 10 Tul L Rev 209. 
7 Montesquieu, ibid at ch 3. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid at 8. 
10 For a brief literature review on legal transplant, see Thi Mai Hanh Do, “Transplanting Common Law Precedents: 
An Appropriate Solution for Defects of Legislation in Vietnam (Part 2)” (2014) 7:26 Eur Sci J 48 at 52-3 [TMH Do] 
11 Watson, Legal Transplants supra note 3 and Watson, Law Reforms, supra note 3. 
12 Legrand, Impossibility, supra note 3. 
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context of the foreign law can influence the success of the transplant in the recipient jurisdiction. 
In applying these views to the principal argument in this thesis, Watson’s views suggest that 
Canadian laws can be transferred into the Nigerian legal system with relative ease while Legrand 
implies that such borrowing of laws is an impossibility. Perhaps, Kahn-Freund would argue that 
transfer of laws are possible between the two jurisdictions only to the extent that the law reformer 
acknowledges the social, economic and political context of the prospective Canadian measures 
before attempting to adopt Canadian laws in Nigeria. Given these competing views on the legal 
transplant approach for reforms being contemplated in this thesis, it is crucial to examine these 
three schools of thought in order to identify the premise for the arguments made by each school 
and weigh the strength and weaknesses of their arguments. 
3.1.1 Alan Watson’s School of Thought 
According to Watson, “laws” are made for the purpose of addressing the society’s needs.13 Even 
though these laws guide social activities in a particular society, Watson cautions that “law does 
not reflect totally the society in which it operates. Instead, much of it is borrowed from other 
systems.”14 In explaining his view, Watson states that, “the two most startling, and at the same 
time most obvious, characteristics of legal rules are the apparent ease with which they can be 
transplanted from one system-or society to another, and their capacity for long life.”15 In citing 
historic examples of the transplant of laws from one society to another, Watson draws on the “great 
legal export” of the common law of England to different parts of the world including United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, India and large parts of Canada.16 
Watson discussed the ease with which legal transplants can occur and centred his arguments on 
three major premises. First, Watson asserts that, “law possesses a life and vitality of its own”.17 
Secondly, Watson states that in addition to legal rules being part of the social structure of a society, 
legal rules “also operate on the level of ideas”.18 Thus, laws are borrowed because a recipient 
jurisdiction has identified the apparent benefits in the idea of a particular foreign legal rule and 
                                                          
13 Watson, Comparative Law, supra note 3 at 313. He use the term “society” to refer to the persons who inhabit a 
particular territory. 
14 Watson, The Birth, supra note 3  at 607 [emphasis added]. 
15 Watson, Comparative Law, supra note 3 at 313. 
16 Ibid at 314. 
17 Ibid at 315. 
18 Ibid. 
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not because the rule “was an inevitable consequence of the social structure” of the donor’s 
jurisdiction.19 The third premise of Watson’s argument is hinged on the first two premises. Watson 
contends that the best approach to understanding and knowing “laws”, their purpose and the 
demands on them, is through the history of the legal rules, their origin, their development, their 
transformation and ultimately, their application in different legal systems.20  
According to Watson, borrowing of laws from one jurisdiction to another, “helps the new law to 
become acceptable because it has a recognized pedigree” derived from its application in its 
jurisdiction of origin.21 To Watson, the relationship between one legal system and another as a 
result of borrowing is the “heart of comparative law”.22 Watson’s views on legal transplants 
suggest that certain laws within the Canadian legal system can be transferred with relative ease 
into Nigeria’s legal system regardless of the peculiarities that may exist between both jurisdictions.  
3.1.2 Pierre Legrand’s School of Thought 
In sharp contrast to Watson, who believes in the possibility of legal transplants, Legrand argues 
that laws cannot be transferred across jurisdictions because every law has a cultural identity. 
Specifically, Legrand states that, “[r]ules are just not what they are represented as being by 
Watson. And, because of what they effectively are, rules cannot travel. Accordingly, ‘legal 
transplants’ are impossible”.23 In Legrand’s opinion, a rule is not entirely self-explanatory but 
derives its meaning from the way its interpreter understands the context within which the rule 
arises.24 Therefore, the meaning of a rule is a “function of the interpreter’s epistemological 
assumptions which are themselves historically and culturally conditioned.”25  
Since the meaning of a rule (as decided by an interpreter) is an indispensable element of the rule 
or law, Legrand states that no form of words purporting to be a rule can be completely devoid of 
                                                          
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid at 316. 
21 Watson, The Birth, supra note 3 at 607. 
22 Watson, Comparative Law, supra note 3 at 316. 
23 Legrand, What Legal Transplants?, supra note 3  at 57 
24 Ibid at 58. 
25 Ibid; see also Legrand, Impossibility, supra note 3 at 114. Here, Legrand reiterates that “rules” as a concept, are 
never devoid of their social and cultural connections because the interpreters who give meaning to these rules have 
their social and cultural prejudices. 
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semantic content.26 Therefore, Legrand argues that “there is nothing to show that the same 
inscribed words will generate the same idea in a different culture” when such rules are 
transplanted.27 In order to transport a rule or word from one jurisdiction to another without any 
form of distortion, Legrand contends that the entire language around such rule must be transported 
as well.28  In quoting another author (Hoffman), Legrand notes that, “in order to transport a single 
word without distortion, one would have to transport the entire language around it”.29 So for a rule 
to maintain its original meaning in a host (receiving) jurisdiction, the words should have the same 
significance they had in the donor jurisdiction from which the law was borrowed. This is because 
“[a]s the understanding of a rule changes, the meaning of the rule changes. And, as the meaning 
of the rule changes, the rule itself changes.”30 Consequently, Legrand contends that one cannot 
effectively say that legal transplant has occurred unless the words in a rule have the same 
significance they had in the donor jurisdiction.31 In simple terms, Legrand suggests that legal 
transplants are impossible because legal transplantation can only occur if the audience in the donor 
legal system are transported to the host’s legal system. 
To Legrand, the “transplant” does not happen because the meaning of the rule, which is a key 
element of its identity “stays behind” in the jurisdiction from which the rule was borrowed.32 Thus, 
Legrand states that, “[a]t best, what can be displaced from one jurisdiction to another is, literally, 
a meaningless form of words”.33 Legrand concludes that, “law is a part of the symbolic apparatus 
through which entire communities try to understand themselves better…unless the comparatist 
can learn to think of law as a culturally-situated phenomenon … comparison rapidly becomes a 
pointless venture”.34 As a corollary to Legrand’s point of view, the rules governing Canada’s oil 
and gas industry are culturally-situated even though such rules seem technical and devoid of any 
apparent socio-cultural undertone. Consequently, the effects of such borrowed rules in Nigeria 
may differ given the dichotomy between the two jurisdictions. In effect, Legrand suggests that the 
                                                          
26 Legrand, Impossibility, supra note 3 at 114. 
27 Legrand, What Legal Transplants? supra note 3 at 61. 
28 That is, given the subjectivity in the interpretation of a rule, the context of the rule in the jurisdiction of origin is 
essential if the rule is to maintain its identity. Legrand, Impossibility, supra note 3  at 117. 
29 Ibid at 117. Here, Legrand quotes Eva Hoffman, Lost in Translation (London: Minerva, 1991) at 175. 
30 Legrand, Impossibility, supra note 3 at 117; Legrand, What Legal Transplants? supra note 3 at 61. 
31 Legrand, Impossibility, ibid. 
32 Legrand, What Legal Transplants?, supra note 3  at 61. 
33 Legrand, Impossibility, supra note 3 at 120 [emphasis in original]. 
34 Legrand, What Legal Transplants?, supra note 3  at 68. 
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“meaning” of Canadian tax laws or measures cannot survive the journey into Nigeria’s legal 
system; thus, transplantation is impossible.  
3.1.3 Otto Kahn-Freund’s School of Thought 
The third school of thought is that of Kahn-Freund, whose work centered on the use of comparative 
law as a tool for law reform.35 In providing context for his propositions, Kahn-Freund identified 
three objectives “pursued by those who use foreign patterns of law in the process of law making”, 
namely: (i) the objective of “preparing the international unification of law”;36 (ii) the objective of 
“giving adequate legal effect to a social change shared by a foreign country with one’s own 
country”;37 and (iii) the objective of “promoting at home, a social change which foreign law is 
designed either to express or produce”.38 This thesis concerns itself with the third objective 
advanced by Kahn-Freund.  
The major proposition of Kahn-Freund’s views on legal transplant is that “there are degrees of 
transferability”.39 In explaining the concept of “transplantation”, Kahn-Freund uses the metaphor 
of the transfer of a kidney to a human host and the transfer of a carburettor to another vehicle.40 
He states that one may reasonably inquire whether the kidney can be adjusted to the new body 
(host) or whether the new body will reject it, however, “to ask these questions about the carburettor 
is ridiculous”.41 Using this metaphor, Kahn-Freund suggests that there are some rules which are 
mechanical in nature and are therefore easier to transplant than others. On the other hand, some 
other rules are more organic in nature and are therefore more difficult to transplant. He postulates 
the existence of a continuum where rules are easier or more difficult to transplant depending on 
how deeply rooted they may be in the donor’s jurisdiction.42 He considers the organic and 
mechanical categories as the terminal points of the continuum and notes that the transfer of legal 
rules does not belong to either of these (extreme) terminal points.43 However, the rules which are 
                                                          
35 Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses, supra note 3 at 1. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid at 6. 
40 Ibid at 5-6. 
41 Ibid at 6. 
42 Ibid at 13. 
43 Ibid at 6. 
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closest to the “organic” end of the continuum are rules that are designed for the purpose of 
allocation of power, rulemaking, decision making, and most importantly, policy making power.44  
Drawing on the work of Montesquieu, Kahn-Freund partially agrees with Montesquieu that the 
geographical, cultural, climatic and environmental differences among jurisdictions would make it 
“un grand hazard” (a great coincidence) if laws can be transplanted between countries.45 However, 
Kahn-Freund posits that the question of “whether” or “how far” rules and institutions are 
transferable “have changed since Montesquieu's day, but any attempt to use a pattern of law 
outside the environment of its origin continues to entail the risk of rejection”. 46 He adds that, 
“[t]he consciousness of this risk will not, I hope, deter legislators … from using the comparative 
method” because one “cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable”.47  
In his arguments, Kahn-Freund rightly notes that the obstacles of transplantation are formidable 
and proposes certain measures to reduce the risks of “rejection” in the transplant process.48 In his 
view, the use of comparative method in the legislative process “requires a knowledge not only of 
the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all its political, context”.49 In emphasizing the 
political element, Kahn-Freund notes three major features of political differentiation that directly 
impacts the viability of legal transplants: (i) political interests (for instance, the differences 
between the communist and non-communist world and that between dictatorships and 
democracies in the capitalist world); (ii) disparities in the forms of democratic government such 
as the presidential and parliamentary variants (particularly because separation of powers among 
the legislative, executive and judicial arms of government under these variants are different); and 
(iii) the influence of organized groups in the making and maintenance of legal institutions.50 Given 
this background, Kahn-Freund’s views suggest that the knowledge of the social and more 
importantly, the political context of Canadian laws by comparison to the Nigerian context is the 
key element for transferability. The failure to acknowledge these contexts could “entail the risk of 
                                                          
44 Ibid at 17. 
45 He referred to Montesquieu’s “The Spirit of Law”. See Montesquieu, supra note 6. See Kahn-Freund, Uses and 
Misuses, ibid at 6-8.  
46 Ibid at 27. 
47 Ibid at 20. 
48 Ibid at 27. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid at 11-2. Here, Kahn-Freund cites the example of the legal profession’s rejection of the English jury system 
which was proposed for adoption in certain European countries in the 19th century. 
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rejection” of such laws in Nigeria’s legal system. Thus, his conclusion indicates that the fate of 
the prospective recommendations are hinged on their social and political elements. 
3.1.4 The Transferability Debate 
From the prospective arguments above, one can deduce that Watson implicitly believes in the ease 
of legal transplants, Legrand insists on the impossibility of legal transplants while Kahn-Freund 
concedes that there are degrees of transferability. It is apparent that the three schools of thought 
have different notions of “success” of legal transplants.51  Between Watson and Kahn-Freund, the 
major difference of opinion appears to be one of “degree” of transferability rather than 
“possibility” of transplant.  In his reaction to Kahn-Freund’s arguments, Watson argues that 
neither the similarities between the donor and recipient countries nor the political context 
embedded in a particular law have any significant impact on its transferability.52 In Watson’s view, 
the success of a legal transplant is basically dependent on the desire of the recipient country for 
such reform.53 Watson opines that a legal reformer should focus on the suitability of a foreign idea 
in meeting the needs of his country rather than “political, social or economic context of the foreign 
law.”54  
In contrast to the above, the Watson/Legrand divergence of opinion appears to be hinged on their 
perspectives of the basic conception of the law. Legrand identified Watson’s failure to distinguish 
between the concept of laws and legal rules as a major flaw in Watson’s argument.55  Legrand also 
notes that Watson appears to have an unrealistic view of the “ease” with which laws can be 
transplanted. However, a strong and compelling rebuttal to Legrand’s contention is that Watson 
acknowledges that substantial modifications are necessary for proper integration of foreign laws 
                                                          
51 For a robust discussion on assessing success of legal transplants. See John Gillespie, “Towards a Discursive 
Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia" (2008) 40 NYU J Int'l L & Pol 657 at 688. 
52 Watson, Law Reforms, supra note 3 at 83. In this article, Watson illustrates the practical aspect of legal 
transplantation using the adoption of the Roman law by the Western Europe in the Middle Ages. He states that despite 
the divergence of legal systems, the transplantation was successful. Thus concluding that “systematic knowledge” of 
the “donor system” is redundant. 
53 Ibid. Watson illustrates this point using Japan’s adoption of German succession and family law and finds that the 
success of the legal transplant was hinged on Japan’s desire for such laws rather than their knowledge of the political 
context of German rules. 
54Watson, Legal Transplants, supra note 3 at 17 and Watson, Law Reforms supra note 3 at 79. Particularly, Watson 
states that, “[s]uccessful borrowing could be achieved even when nothing was known of the political, social or 
economic context of the foreign law.” 
55 Legrand, Impossibility, supra note 3 at 111-13. 
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in the recipient country. In addition, Watson’s views also considers the viability of a prospective 
rule as dependent on (1) the desire of the recipient country for reforms and (2) the suitability of 
the foreign idea in meeting the needs of the recipient country. Thus, one can reasonably argue that 
Watson’s arguments are more concerned about the “idea of the law” rather than the concept of 
“laws” or “rules” in the strict sense as contemplated by Legrand. 
Legrand, in his own arguments seems to imply that the major purpose of transplanting laws is 
because “law reformers on occasion find it convenient, presumably in the interest of economy and 
efficiency, to adopt a pre-existing form of words which may happen to have been formulated 
outside of the jurisdiction within which they operate”.56 Not only is this contention erroneous, it 
also limits the arguments made by Legrand. Since laws are borrowed across jurisdictions for 
several reasons, his contention limits his arguments to only transplants that are carried out for 
“economy and efficiency” reasons. Also Legrand appears to contradict his own arguments on the 
“impossibility” of legal transplants when he concludes (and quotes Kahn-Freund) that “[t]he use 
of comparative law for practical purposes becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic 
spirit which ignores this context of the law”.57 The implication of Legrand’s conclusion is that 
comparative law for practical purposes is not an abuse if it is informed by a legalistic spirit and 
acknowledges the context of law. Thus, the use of comparative law is not entirely “impossible” as 
suggested in Legrand’s arguments. 
Like the first two schools (Watson’s and Legrand’s), the third school has also been subject to 
criticism, with the most notable critique coming from Alan Watson. In challenging Kahn-Freund’s 
reliance on Montesquieu’s views, Watson states that “Montesquieu badly – very badly – 
underestimated the amount of successful borrowing which had been going on, and was going on 
in his day”.58 As an example, Watson cites the reception of Roman law in Western Europe and 
notes that one cannot simply accept Montesquieu’s claim that it is a great coincidence (un grand 
hazard) if the rules of one nation suits another.59 Contrary to Kahn-Freund’s assumptions, Watson 
reiterates that a reformer should focus on the apparent benefits of the foreign idea.60 Watson adds 
                                                          
56 Ibid at 121. 
57 For Kahn-Freund, see Kahn-Freund, Uses and Misuses, supra note 3 at 27; For Legrand, see Legrand, Impossibility, 
supra note 3 at 124. 
58 Watson, Law Reforms, supra note 3 at 80. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Watson, Comparative Law, supra note 3 at 313. 
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that even if the reformer gets the foreign law wrong, such error or omission does not adversely 
affect the usefulness of the idea.61 
From the arguments of the three schools of thought, there appears to be a general consensus that 
these three schools acknowledge that a “transplanted law” will not have the exact identity it had 
in its originating jurisdiction given certain modifications that will occur in the process of 
borrowing laws from one legal system to another. While the nature and extent of “modification” 
may be the dilemma of a prospective law reformer, such factors could also determine, to a large 
extent, the fate of any legal transplant process.  
Like the concept of legal transplant itself, the debate on legal transplant theories is also not a new 
phenomenon. Several authors and scholars have also explored the transferability debate in their 
work. For instance, Professor Stein analysed the debate between Watson and Kahn-Freund.62 He 
suggested that the difference in their perspectives on the ease of legal transplant is in the “eye of 
the beholder”.63 Shen conducted a brief analysis of Kahn-Freund and Watson’s view on legal 
transplants in relation to a proposition by Chinese scholars and officials that China can borrow or 
transplant Hong Kong laws regarding market economy.64 He concluded by acknowledging the 
possibility of such transplant and noted that the proposed transplant is “China’s own will” for the 
purpose of the country’s modernisation.65 Perju looked at legal transplants in the context of 
constitutional law and concluded that “comparative constitutional law as a field can benefit from 
engaging with transplant debate in comparative law”.66 Waller in his work on neo-realism and the 
international harmonization of law looked at the transferability of law from one nation and culture 
to another particularly in relation to competition laws in the United States and the European 
Union.67 Waller concluded that “[e]ach society should implement its unique version [of 
competition laws] with a set of carefully considered indigenous laws, not a set of rules that 
                                                          
61 Ibid at 315. 
62 Eric Stein, “Uses, Misuses – and Nonuses of Comparative Law” (1977) 72:2 Nw UL Rev 198. 
63 Ibid at 203. 
64 Zongling Shen, “Legal Transplant and Comparative Law”, (1999) 51:4 RIDC 853. 
65 Ibid at 857. 
66 Vlad Perju, “Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing and Migrations” (2012) Boston College Law School Faculty 
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67 Spencer Weber Waller, “Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization Law: Lessons from Anti-Trust”, (1994) 
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represents the vision and voice of another”.68 Thi Mai Hanh Do evaluated the transplant of 
common law precedents as a solution for defects in Vietnamese legislation and concluded that 
“borrowing common law precedents can convincingly be an effective solution for addressing the 
gaps of Vietnamese legislation”.69  
In bringing the antecedents of the use and interpretation of legal transplant theories closer to the 
present context, the works of Owusu and Odumosu are instructive. Specifically, these two writers 
considered legal transplant theories in the context of oil and gas industries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Owusu explored legal transplant in relation to regulation of operational pollution from oil and gas 
activities in Ghana.70 He argued that “[t]ransplanted rules or concepts have flourished particularly 
in the oil and gas context”.71 He noted that a “supply of solutions” for the regulation of operational 
pollution can be transferred from Norway to Ghana.72 Odumosu, on the other hand, compared 
Nigeria’s gas flaring regulations with that of Alberta, Canada.73 In arguing for the “possibility of 
some beneficial transfer”, Odumosu noted that “[e]ven if the regulatory framework for gas flaring 
reductions employed in Alberta cannot be transferred to Nigeria … the problems that have arisen 
and the mechanisms applied in problem solving [in Alberta]… would provide possible solutions 
in Nigeria”.74 
While the aforementioned conclusions from the proposed use of legal transplants in Sub-Saharan 
Africa appear optimistic, the different conclusions on legal transplant in other parts of the world 
make it apparent that there is no singular or straight forward approach to applying legal transplant 
theories to the different areas of law. Based on the diverse interpretations and conclusions in the 
preceding paragraphs, one can reasonably conclude that the recognition of the areas of law for 
which legal transplant is possible or factors that can influence the success, failure or the 
receptiveness of such borrowed law is not an exact science. Consequently, an assessment of the 
legitimacy of legal transplants as a tool for reform should be performed on a case-by-case basis. 
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Based on this reasoning, this thesis explores the viability of legal transplants for Nigeria’s 
petroleum sector reforms. Rather than attempting to develop a grand or universal theory of 
transplantation, the thesis concedes that there is no such thing as an easy or straightforward 
transplant. Therefore, this thesis adopts a pragmatic approach by considering the different schools 
of thought and applying them to the proposed transplant between Canada and Nigeria. In order to 
put the aforementioned transplant theories into practical context, the next section explores the 
viability of legal transplants for Nigeria’s oil and gas reforms.  
3.2 Exploring the Viability of Legal Transplants for Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Reforms 
In assessing the possibility of exporting Canadian laws to Nigeria for the purpose of oil and gas 
reforms, the evolution of Nigeria’s legal system is very instructive. This is because the reception 
of the English common law into Nigeria’s legal system in 1863 lends credence to the viability of 
legal transplant between both countries.75 By virtue of colonization, the Nigerian legal system has 
its origin in the English Common Law and legal tradition.76 Ever since, the development of 
Nigeria’s post-colonial legal system has been significantly influenced by its colonial history. Even 
though some have argued that the laws in operation during the colonial era were given to Nigeria 
by virtue of colonialism, there is a consensus that “the common law, doctrines of equity, and 
statutes of general application in England on January 1st 1900” were in essence received into the 
Nigerian legal system and were applicable in Nigeria because of Nigerian legislation to that 
effect.77 Nevertheless, not all aspects of English law were seamlessly received into Nigeria. 
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to the provisions of this section and except in so far as other provision is made by any federal law, the common law 
of England and the doctrines of equity, together with the statutes of general application that were in force in England 
on the 1st 
 
day of January, 1900, shall be in force in Lagos and, in so far as they relate to any matter within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the Federal legislature, shall be in force elsewhere in the Federation.”  See especially Edefe 
Ojomo, “Sources of Law: The Application of English Law in Nigeria” (April 2014) online: 
<http://www.yararena.org> at 2-3 for the contention that the law was “given” to Nigeria.  
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Notably, certain aspects of Nigeria’s family and succession customary laws which lacked 
conformity with received English law were met with some resistance and are currently still in 
operation despite the existence of alternative received English law in these specific areas of law.78 
Despite the existence of some resistance to received English law, Nigeria’s English law reception 
statute – the Interpretation Act79 - indicates that Nigeria’s legal system supports the notion of 
borrowing legal rules from external legal systems. Section 32 of this legislation not only affirms 
the continued relevance of received English law in Nigeria’s legal system, it also clarifies the 
scope of application of English law given the pluralistic nature of Nigeria’s legal system.80 Even 
though the Interpretation Act came into being as a result of colonization – which in the strict sense 
involved the transfer of laws between a host and a recipient jurisdiction – such legal transfers 
resulting from colonization were imposed during the occupation of the colonized countries. Thus, 
legal transfers resulting from colonization are distinct from legal transplant which is a product of 
voluntary reform process such as the kind contemplated in this thesis.  
In addition to the Interpretation Act, a number of foreign laws have not only played significant 
roles in policy making in other sectors of the Nigerian economy but have also been successfully 
applied in these industries. For instance, a recent study that looked into the application of legal 
transplants in Nigeria’s telecommunications sector noted that “the transplantation of rules, law 
and regulations from one country to another is possible and has occurred in the context of the 
Nigerian telecommunications sector”.81 This indicates that the use of legal transplant as an 
approach to policy making is not alien to Nigeria’s legal system.  
From the foregoing, it is perhaps arguable that the current petroleum regulations in Nigeria’s oil 
and gas industry are also a product of legal transplant. Based on the precedents set out in the 
preceding paragraphs, this thesis contemplates that legal transplants can continue to “occur” in the 
                                                          
78 For instance, the customary law of succession is currently still applicable to men married under customary laws 
that die intestate. See Nwabueze, supra note 75 at 185-6. 
79 This aforementioned reception provision is now cited as Interpretation Act, LFN 2004, c I23, s 32 with some 
modifications.  
80 The current statute provides that, “[s]ubject to the provisions of this section and except in so far as other provision 
is made by any Federal law, the common law of England and the doctrines of equity, together with the statutes of 
general application that were in force in England on the 1st day of January, 1900, shall, in so far as they relate to any 
matter within the legislative competence of the Federal legislature, be in force in Nigeria.” 
81 Chukwudiebube B Opata, “Contextual Transplants in the Regulation of Nigerian Telecommunications Sector”, 
(2012) SSRN 1 at 54.  
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context of the Nigerian oil and gas industry. In addition to the instances above, the prospects for 
“continued” legal transplants in the oil and gas industry are particularly high because the 
prospective rules originate from Canada - which shares some socio-political similarities with 
Nigeria. Even though the two jurisdictions operate two variants of democratic systems of 
government, both jurisdictions have elements of federalism in their systems of government.82 
Specifically, the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 states that the provinces of Canada are 
“federally united” under the Crown.83 As a result, the responsibility for governance is shared by 
the federal, provincial and municipal governments.84 This federal nature of the Canadian system 
of government is very similar to Nigeria’s federalism. Being a federal republic, Nigeria also has 
“federal state” features that are similar to the Canadian structure.85 Thus, certain roles performed 
by provincial governments can be substituted for state governments subject to statutory restrictions 
present in Nigerian oil and gas legislations and Nigeria’s legal system as a whole. Furthermore, 
the similarities between the Canadian and Nigerian oil and gas industry as discussed in 1.3.2 also 
lend additional credence to the possibility of transplants occurring in the context of Nigeria’s oil 
and gas industry. Thus, this thesis contends that the knowledge of how the Canadian oil and gas 
industry resolves certain matters in its petroleum industry can be transplanted to enable Nigeria to 
develop more effective concepts for resolution of similar problems in its oil and gas industry. 
Given that the thesis proposes the use of the tax system for reforms, the next section looks at tax 
transplants as a category of legal transplants. 
3.3 Tax Transplants Literature 
The term “tax transplant” has been used in describing the application of legal transplants to tax 
law. The concept of legal transplant as an approach for policy making has been discussed by 
different scholars and applied in comparative tax law scholarship.86 In terms of definition, tax 
                                                          
82 Canada operates a parliamentary democracy while Nigeria operates a presidential democracy. See Constitution Act, 
1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5, s 17 [Constitution Act, 1867] for Canada and 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, LFN 2004, c C23, s 130 (2) [1999 Constitution] for Nigeria. 
83 Constitution Act, 1867, ibid at Preamble. 
84 Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, ss 91, 92. [Constitution Act, 
1982]. 
85 Nigeria is divided into 36 states and 1 territory. 
86 Carlo Garbarino, “Tax Transplants and Circulation of Corporate Tax Models”, (2009) Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research at 1 (for alternative citation see also (2011) 2 Brit Tax Rev 159) [Garbarino, Tax Models]; Jinyan Li, “Tax 
Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and Canadian GAAR." (2010) 11:2 Theor Inq L 
655 [Li, Tax Transplant]; Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, “Legal transplants and comparative law” (2004) 2 J 
Int’l L 261. 
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transplants refer to the process of “transplantation of tax laws from one country to another.”87 
Despite the apparent discursive failure in comparative tax law, the concept of tax transplants have 
been explored in various sources of comparative tax scholarship.88 Carlo Garbarino’s contribution 
to this field of comparative tax law is particularly instructive because he examines legal transplants 
in the context of corporate taxes as contemplated in this thesis.89  
According to Carlo Garbarino, there are two major types of corporate transplants – simple 
corporate tax transplant and hybrid corporate tax transplant.90 Garbarino describes the simple 
corporate tax transplant as “tax transplants in the strict sense.”91 According to him, this type of 
transplant occurs where the prospective law retains its function in the recipient country such that 
the operative rule in both countries are identical.92 An example of a simple tax transplant is the 
tax exemption of cross-border corporate dividends and capital gains among European Union (EU) 
member states.93 In this case, the tax exemption rule maintains its function in the EU Member 
states because the rule exempts the (same) tax liability that would otherwise have been payable on 
corporate dividends and capital gains in each of these member states. Therefore, the operation of 
the rule in these states are uniform and identical.  
On the other hand, the hybrid corporate tax transplant occurs when a new function is generated as 
a result of substantial modification of the prospective law by the recipient country. Gabarino 
describes hybrid corporate tax transplant as when the “imported operative rule is modified 
                                                          
87 Li, Tax Transplant, ibid at 655. 
88 Marian Y Omri, “The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law”, (2010) 58:2 Am J Comp L at 1. The author 
states that scholarship on comparative tax laws “fail to produce even the faintest form of paradigmatic discourse” 
because comparative tax scholars have “refrained from addressing theoretical assertions made by their colleagues.” 
Thus, he attempts to construct a framework for comparative tax law debates based on existing scholarship. For sources 
of tax transplant scholarship, see supra note 86. 
89 Garbarino, Tax Models, supra note 86 at 2-3; Carlo Garbarino, “An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative 
Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research”, (2009) 57:3 Am J Comp L at 677; Carlo Garbarino, “Comparative 
Taxation and Legal Theory: The Tax Design Case of the Transplant of General Anti-Avoidance Rules”, (2010) 11:2 
Theor Inq L 765 [Garbarino, Comparative Taxation]. 
90 Garbarino, Tax Models, supra note 86 at 14. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. Gabarino illustrates using county A, B and C. In his illustration, a simple corporate tax transplant occurs when, 
“when a corporate tax mechanism is imported from country C (exporting country) for example, into country A and 
country B (importing countries). The mechanism imported in country A and country B has a common origin as it 
comes from country C, and has the same function as it retains the function originally found in country C. In this 
situation, after the transplant the operative rule in the different countries is the same.” 
93 Ibid.  
 69 
 
substantially in the process of being transplanted.”94 He clarifies that the modification can be as a 
result of direct change or subsequent change.95 Direct change occurs when the prospective law is 
received subject to substantial modifications.96 An example is the American Controlled Foreign 
Corporation (CFC) rules which have been adopted by some EU Member States with modifications 
as to the type of income or companies subject to the CFC rules. On the other hand, subsequent 
change occurs when (despite literal implantation of the prospective law) there is a different 
operative rule as a result of “local interpretation by administrative agencies or courts.”97 An 
example of “subsequent change” is the adoption of progressive system of taxation by East 
European countries and the (subsequent) consequential implementation of flat taxes in East 
European countries due to inadequacies of tax administration in those countries.98 This thesis 
contemplates a substantial adoption of hybrid corporate tax transplants and a very limited adoption 
of simple tax transplants in proposing recommendations for Nigeria’s oil and gas sector reforms.  
Given the legal transplant approach to reforms discussed above, the next chapter of this thesis 
discusses the preferred tools for the proposed transfer of laws between Canada and Nigeria. 
Specifically, chapter four examines the use of the tax system for non-tax policy implementation 
and policy measures that increase the likelihood of success of tax transplants between the two 
jurisdictions.
                                                          
94 Ibid at 16. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. Gabarino opines that direct change “occur[s] when there is reception by a country of a statutory mechanism 
through the importing and implementation of same/similar legislation but with significant modifications.” 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
USING THE TAX SYSTEM AS A TOOL FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
Over the years, the most celebrated set of criteria for evaluating tax policy and the preferred 
starting point when evaluating tax principles are the canons of equity, certainty, convenience and 
economy put down by Adam Smith.1 While these canons of taxation have been universally 
accepted and acknowledged in various discussions and tax literature; some scholars have simply 
adopted these principles in the strict sense, some others have modified certain aspects of these 
principles while others have come up with additional principles for evaluating a good tax system.2 
For instance, the Carter Commission, which has been noted as the “best blueprint” for evaluating 
“normative tax theory”3 identified equity, neutrality, certainty, simplicity, flexibility, transparency 
and accountability as the criteria for an efficient tax system.4 Similarly, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its report that discussed “Tax Framework 
Conditions” identified neutrality, efficiency, certainty, simplicity, effectiveness, fairness and 
flexibility as criteria for evaluating a good tax system.5 In addition to the above, contemporary 
scholars such as Professors Hogg, Magee and Li, recognize the principles of equity, neutrality, 
simplicity as the traditional criteria in evaluating tax policy.6 Even though the criteria adopted in 
the aforementioned scholarship are at variance given the specific principle(s) included in each 
                                                          
1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol 2 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press., 1976) [Smith] at 825-27; For identification of the principles as the most celebrated and a good starting point 
for evaluation, see generally Philip D Oliver, Tax Policy: Readings and Materials, 2d (New York: Foundation 
Press/Thomson West, 2004) at 2; ACCA, “Tax Principles from Adam Smith to Barack Obama”, (2009) Association 
of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) Policy Paper, online: <http://www.nctbpu.org>. 
2 For a general discussion on the canons of taxation that have been modified, accepted or generated, see Clinton Alley 
& Duncan Bentley, “A Remodeling of Adam Smith's Tax Design Principles", (2005) 20 Austl Tax F 579 at 586-8 
[Alley & Bentley]. 
3 Stanley L Winer & Walter Hettich, “The Structure of the Sieve: Political Economy in the Explanation of Tax Systems 
and Tax Reform" (1988) 26:2 Osgoode Hall L J 409 at 417. 
4 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) Vol 2 [Carter Commission] 
ch 1. 
5 OECD, Taxation and Electronic Commerce: Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions, Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs, (Paris: OECD, 2001) at 230. 
6For example, see Peter W Hogg, Joanne E Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 8th ed 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 40-45; Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, “Tax Principles: Building Blocks of 
a Sound Tax System”, online: (August 2011) <http://www.ieanea.org> at 1; Eden Lorraine, “Equity and Neutrality in 
the International Taxation of Capital”, (1988) 26:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 367-408; Tamara Larre, “Taxing Personal Injury 
Damages: Tax Policy Analysis from the Canadian Perspective”, (2010) 58:3 Can Tax J 577 at 587 refers to these three 
concepts as the “traditional criteria”; David Duff, “Recognizing or Disregarding Close Personal Relationships Among 
Adults? The Report of the Law Commission of Canada and the Federal Income Tax”, (2002) 50:3 Can Tax J 1021 at 
1023, Duff refers to them as the “technical tax policy criteria”. 
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grouping, it is apparent that there is a considerable overlap among the principles for taxation 
provided in these references and among other tax literature in general. However, if the number of 
times the principles relating to equity, neutrality, certainty, convenience, economy are quoted is 
any guide, one can reasonably conclude that adherence to these principles influence, to a large 
extent, the realisation of the objectives of a good tax system.  
In terms of equity, the Carter Commission considered the equitable distribution of the burden of 
taxation as the primary objective of the tax system.7 An equitable distribution of tax burdens is 
one that shows some degree of progressivity with respect to income such that taxpayers with 
higher incomes pay more taxes in proportion to their income.8 That is, the burden of taxation in a 
tax system should be equally distributed among taxpayers.9 According to Adam Smith, tax liability 
should be proportionate to a taxpayer’s income so that there is equality of sacrifice among the 
taxpayers. Smith states that “[t]he subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support 
of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in 
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.”10  
Conceptually, there are two basic principles that can be used to determine how equitably tax 
systems perform.11 The first is the principle of horizontal equity and the second is vertical equity.12 
Horizontal equity simply states that taxpayers with the same income should pay equal taxes.13 
That is, taxpayers with equal income status should pay the same amount of taxes.14 On the other 
                                                          
7 Carter Commission, Vol 2, supra note 4 at 17; Alley & Bentley, supra note 2 at 600. 
8 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, “Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax System”, online: (2001) Int’l 
Center for Pub Pol’y <https://ideas.repec.org> [Martinez - Vazquez]. 
9 Smith, supra note 1. 
10 Ibid at 825. 
11 Carter Commission, Vol 1, supra note 4 at 4-5; Martinez-Vazquez, supra note 8. 
12 Carter Commission, ibid. 
13 Carter Commission, ibid at 4. 
14 Joseph J Thorndike & Dennis J Ventry, eds Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate (Washington D.C, United States: 
The Urban Institute, 2002) at 258 [Thorndike & Ventry]; Alvin Rabushka & Niels Veldhuis, “A Flat Tax for Canada”, 
online: (2007) Fraser Institute at 148 <www.fraserinstitute.org>; Jane G Gravelle & Sean Lowry, “Restrictions on 
Itemized Tax Deductions: Policy Options and Analysis”, online: (2013) at 36-7 <http://graphics8.nytimes.com>. 
Assuming equal status is defined by income, then, horizontal equity has been achieved when taxpayers with the same 
“before-tax income” also have the same “after-tax income”. However, it has been noted that horizontal equity may 
be compromised due to the existence of tax breaks such as deductions and incentives which could result in similar 
taxpayers having different tax liabilities. For instance, similar companies many have different tax liability if one 
engages in research and development and takes advantage of applicable research and development tax credits. Thus, 
allowing certain deductions or giving certain incentives by the government can result in a difference in tax payments 
between two taxpayers who may otherwise be considered economically similar. However, these deductions and 
incentives are not necessarily problematic if they are tools used to achieve certain government policy objectives. 
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hand, vertical equity states that tax liability of taxpayers in a good tax system should increase 
when income increases and decrease when income decreases.15 This vertical distribution of tax 
burdens can be progressive, regressive, or proportional in nature with respect to the income of the 
taxpayer.16 While the index used to measure the concept of “equality” or “inequality” of horizontal 
and vertical equity has been a subject of debate in several literature, such debate is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.17 However, it is important to note that these concepts of vertical and horizontal 
equity are not mutually exclusive.18 The two concepts are inextricably linked because “[v]ertical 
equity … cannot be defined without horizontal equity norms, as it must deal with differential 
treatment of people who, to begin with, have been grouped on horizontal equity grounds.”19  
The criterion of neutrality is closely related to the principle of equity discussed above. Neutrality 
of the tax system means that, “taxes should avoid distorting the workings of market 
mechanisms”.20 Basically, the criterion suggests that the tax system should strive to be neutral so 
that decisions are generally made on their economic merits and not necessarily for tax reasons.21 
However, there are instances (as will be discussed in the next section) where departure from the 
principle of neutrality in the tax system is inevitable and intentional for the purpose of achieving 
government objectives.22 For instance, the government may deliberately create distortion by taxing 
                                                          
15 Carter Commission, Vol 1, supra note 4 at 4-5; Martinez-Vazquez, supra note 8. 
16 Martinez-Vazquez ibid; For classification of vertical equity under proportional, progressive and regressive, see Paul 
R McDaniel & James R Repetti, “Horizontal and vertical equity: the Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange” (1992) 1 Fla Tax 
Rev 607 at 610 [Musgrave/Kaplow]. A taxpayer’s tax burden is proportional when the taxpayer’s liability increases 
directly with income. For instance, a 10% increase in the taxpayer’s earnings will result in a 10% increase in tax 
liability. On the other hand, tax burdens are regressive when tax rates decrease as the income of the taxpayer decreases. 
For instance, a 10% decrease in the taxpayer’s earnings will result in a 10% decrease in tax liability. A taxpayer’s 
burden is considered progressive when the tax system adopts tax brackets such that taxpayers pay taxes based on the 
tax bracket into which their income places them. Each tax bracket will have a different tax rate, with higher income 
brackets paying the highest percentages or rate of tax. 
17 Musgrave/Kaplow, ibid; Thorndike & Ventry, supra note 14; Marcus C Berliant & Robert P Strauss Horizontal 
Equity, Uncertainty and Economic Well-being (London: University of Chicago Press, 1985) at 179-214; Musgrave A 
Richard, “Et, Ot and Sbt” (1976) 6:1 J Pub Econ 3 at 3-16 [Musgrave]. 
18 Thorndike & Ventry, supra note 14 at 9; Musgrave/Kaplow supra note 16 at 608. 
19 Musgrave, supra note 17 at 4. 
20 Neil Brooks, “The Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accommodating the Rich” (1993) 31:1 
Osgoode Hall Rev 138 at 184 [Brooks]. 
21 For instance, in a good tax system, taxpayers would choose between regular milk and skimmed milk based on their 
personal preferences and the cost of these dairy products. If legislators impose a tax on regular milk but not on 
skimmed milk, there is a high probability that people would factor the additional cost implication of the taxes into 
their choice about which type of milk to consume. This may result in such consumers opting for a less desirable type 
of milk because it was cheaper. In this case, it means that the tax system may have influenced the decisions of 
consumers of such dairy products. 
22 United Kingdom, Parliament of United Kingdom, “Principles of tax policy”, Parliament of UK website, (15 March 
2011) online: < http://www.publications.parliament.uk> [UK, Principles]. 
 73 
 
polluting industries more heavily than other industries in order to correct certain behaviours.23 
Consequently, the practical implication of the principle of neutrality is that the only distortions in 
the tax system should be a conscious and intentional act of the government. 
In addition to equal distribution of the tax burden and avoiding distortions, the criterion of 
certainty simply asserts that the imposition of taxes ought to be definite and not arbitrary such that 
taxpayers have sufficient information on their rights and obligations, under the relevant tax law.24 
According to Smith, “[t]he tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not 
arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be 
clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person.”25 This need for certainty in the tax 
system was echoed in the Carter Commission report which stated that the “taxpayer should be able 
to determine promptly, with great certainty and at modest cost, the tax consequences of a proposed 
course of action before making a decision”.26 This means that in a good tax system, the scope of 
taxes should be clear and the taxpayers must be able to determine the exact amount they ought to 
pay as well as the time and method for payment. In addition, the certainty of taxes reduces the 
possibility of exploitation of the tax system by both the taxpayer and the government.27 
The criterion of certainty is a crucial attribute of a tax system and is sometimes considered in the 
same context as the concept of stability while evaluating the cornerstones of a good tax system.28 
This is because a tax system that is certain is most likely also considered stable. The stability of 
the tax system directly affects the confidence of investors in government policy, particularly in 
the petroleum industry where long-term projects are the norm.29 Likewise, a tax system that 
changes frequently or changes in an unpredictable manner may seriously affect future 
development projects in the industry. It has been argued that a tax system that is subject to frequent 
changes “tends to increase political risk and reduce the value placed by investors on future income 
                                                          
23 UK, Principles, ibid. 
24 Smith, supra note 1 at 825-26. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Carter Commission, Vol 2, supra note 4 at 14 [emphasis added]. 
27 SN Chand, Public Finance, Vol 1 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors (P) Ltd, 2008) at 100. Chand 
states that the certainty of taxes ensures that the taxing authority cannot exploit the taxpayer. 
28 Carole Nakhle, Petroleum Taxation: Sharing the Oil Wealth: A Study of Petroleum Taxation Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow (New York: Routledge, 2008) at 13-14 [Nakhle]; Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 
“Certainty in Tax”, ACCA website, online: <http://www.accaglobal.com> at 1. 
29 Nakhle, ibid. 
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streams.”30 Thus, a stable tax system results in the reduction or elimination of a risk factor as the 
certainty and stability of the tax system gives existing and prospective investors one less variable 
to worry about.  
The canon of convenience considers the interest of the taxpayer with respect to tax compliance. 
The mode and timings of tax payment in a good tax system should be convenient to the taxpayer. 
According to Smith, “[e]very tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner in which it is 
most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.”31 Thus, this canon suggests that payment 
of taxes should not be structured in a manner that will cause unnecessary hardship to the taxpayers. 
For instance, tax liability on rental income should be payable at the time the taxpayer is expected 
to receive the rental income.32 
The canon of economy implies that the administrative costs of tax collection should be kept at a 
minimum level. Smith stresses that, “[e]very tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and 
to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the 
public treasury of the state.”33 This suggests that tax administration and compliance should be 
cost-effective for both the government and taxpayers. This principle is closely related to the 
principle of certainty because uncertainties or complexities in tax laws could increase the 
compliance costs for taxpayers in the determination of their tax liability. In the same vein, 
uncertainties in the tax system could also increase the cost of tax administration for the government 
with respect to the verification of amounts stated by the taxpayer. 
4.1 The Concept of Tax Expenditures 
While a good tax system should substantially conform to the above canons of taxation, there are 
circumstances where deviation from such principles are necessary for the purpose of achieving 
some government policy objectives.34 Brooks rightly notes that, “[p]resumably, most people 
would agree that the fairest, most neutral, and simplest tax system would be no tax system at all”.35 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Smith, supra note 1 at 826. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid at 827. 
34 Eric J Toder, Bernard Wasow & Michael P Ettlinger, Bad Breaks All Around: The Report of the Century Foundation 
Working Group on Tax Expenditures (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2002) at 35 [Toder, Wasow & 
Ettlinger]. 
35 Brooks, supra note 20 at 180. 
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This is because the tax system is an instrument for achieving certain social and economic policy 
objectives in addition to its principal function of revenue generation.36 As mentioned in the 
preceding section, these social and economic policy objectives are realised through the tax system 
by applying preferential tax treatments which are designed to favour certain industries, activities 
or categories of persons.37 According to Surrey, these preferential tax measures could be in 
different forms such as “permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities, 
credits against tax, or special rates.”38 Such measures are often described as tax subsidies, tax 
incentives or tax expenditures (TEs).39 This is because the objectives of such policies are achieved 
at the cost of lower tax revenue to the government.40 Thus, the term “expenditure” is premised on 
the fact that the opportunity cost of using the tax system as a public policy tool is the revenue 
forgone by the government.41  
As pointed out in preceding paragraphs, consistent conformity with the aforementioned principles 
of taxation is impossible and policymakers have to accept a certain level of distortion as inevitable. 
This is because conformity with certain canons of taxation may be undesirable if policymakers 
intend to promote specific objectives or goals like encouraging charitable contributions or other 
activities that aim to promote the welfare of the society. Examining ways that the tax system 
approaches or departs from these canons can be a helpful lens for arriving at balanced solutions to 
the range of tax policy and economic problems identified in Nigeria’s petroleum sector. 
                                                          
36See generally, Mark Horton & Asmaa El-Ganainy, “Fiscal Policy: Taking and Giving Away”, online: (2012) 
International Monetary Fund Publication <http://www.imf.org> at 2; Leonard E Burman, “Is the Tax Expenditure 
Concept Still Relevant?” (2003) 56:3 Nat’l Tax J 613 at 613. 
37 Stanley S Surrey & Paul R McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 3 
[Surrey, Tax Exp]. 
38 Surrey, Tax Exp, ibid at 3. See also, Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger supra note 34 at 37. 
39 Surrey, Tax Exp, ibid at 27; B Anderson, “Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries” (PowerPoint presentation 
delivered at the Asian Senior Budget Officials meeting, January 2008) at 10-11 [Anderson]. 
40 OECD, Choosing a Broad Base - Low Rate Approach to Taxation, Tax Policy Studies No. 19, (Paris: OECD, 2010) 
[OECD, Choosing]. 
41 OECD Choosing, ibid at 76.  
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4.1.1 Positive Aspects of Tax Expenditures as a Tool for Law Reform 
The use of the tax system as a tool for achieving social and economic objectives as opposed to 
alternative policy tools42 has been a topic of debate in economic and tax scholarship.43 Some 
scholars have stated that using the tax system is advantageous because (i) it is more 
administratively efficient and cost-effective for achieving government objectives;44 (ii) it limits 
the probability for abuse or fraud;45 and (iii) it promotes private decision making as opposed to 
government decision making.46  
In terms of administrative efficiency, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) noted that, “where relevant information is already reported by the taxpayer 
through the tax system, that information can be used at lower marginal administrative cost than 
through duplicated reporting to a spending agency”.47 In terms of limited probability for abuse or 
fraud, it has also been argued that TEs maximize access to the eligible beneficiaries and minimize 
potential fraud in the achieving policy objectives.48 Some have also noted that the availability of 
existing information in the tax system helps in confirming eligibility as opposed to other 
verification mechanisms of direct spending programs.49 Another argument in favour of TEs as an 
approach for achieving government objectives is that it is less prescriptive than government 
                                                          
42 These tools can be in form of direct spending programs which can be structured as direct government grants, 
subsidies, loans, etc. See Surrey, Tax Exp, supra note 37 at 3; Stanley S Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The concept 
of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973) at 129 [Surrey, Pathways]; they could also be 
in form of regulations, see United States, Government Accountability Office, “Tax Expenditures: Background and 
Evaluation Criteria and Questions”, (January 8 2013) online: <http://www.gao.gov> 
43 See generally, Lisa Phillips, Neil Brooks & Jinjay Li eds, Tax Expenditures: State of the Art: Selected Proceedings 
of the Osgoode 2009 Conference on Tax Expenditures and Public Policy in Comparative Perspective (Toronto, Ont: 
Canadian Tax Foundation, 2009); Surrey Pathways, supra note 42 at 129-54; Canada, Office of the Parliamentary 
Budget Officer, “Federal Tax Expenditures: Use, Reporting and Review” by Jacques Jason (2011), online: 
<http://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca> [Jacques]; Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger, supra note 34 at 37; Hanna Polackova Brixi, 
Christian MA Valenduc & Zhicheng Li Swift Tax Expenditures--Shedding Light on Government Spending through 
the Tax System: Lessons from Developed and Transition Economies (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 
2004) at 3-6 [Brixi, Valenduc & Swift]. 
44 Jacques, ibid at 2; OECD, Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries, Budgeting and Public Expenditures, (Paris: 
OECD, 2010) at 24 [OECD 2010]; Anderson, supra note 39 at 8.  
45 OECD 2010, ibid; Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger, supra note 34 at 58 states that TE maximizes access and minimizes 
fraud. 
46 Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at 3; Anderson, supra note 39. Anderson states that TE can provide a wide 
range of taxpayer choice, with limited bureaucratic interference. 
47 OECD 2010, supra note 44 at 24-31 [emphasis added]; Jacques, supra note 43 at 2; Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra 
note 43 at 59 states that “tax incentives are a preferable means of subsidy if eligibility criteria are linked to data already 
reported on tax returns”. 
48 Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at 58; OECD 2010, supra note 44 at 25 
49 Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, ibid; OECD 2010, ibid. 
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programs because it accommodates individual preferences especially in relation to specific 
economic and social goals.50 Perhaps this is why the OECD stated that “there are conditions under 
which tax expenditures are most likely to be successful, or even the best, policy tools to achieve 
[government] objectives”.51 
4.1.1.1 Unfavourable Aspects of Tax Expenditures as a Tool for Law Reform 
Despite the positive aspects mentioned above, there are some unfavourable aspects of using the 
tax system as a tool of public policy.52  For instance, some scholars have countered that using TEs 
can increase tax administrative and compliance costs.53 Specifically, the report of the Century 
Foundation Working Group on Tax Expenditures54 argued that TEs make the tax laws complex 
because they require “numerous distinctions” with respect to qualifying activities or taxpayers.55 
The group found that such complexity in the tax laws not only raises compliance costs for 
taxpayers but also makes it more difficult and costly for the tax authorities to administer tax laws.56 
Similarly, some scholars have also stated that TEs reduce the fairness of the tax system because 
they are usually regressive in nature.57 Others have also noted that the reason why TEs are 
politically attractive alternative is because they are not subject to regular scrutiny58 and are 
difficult to estimate as opposed to direct spending programs.59 As a result of the conflict between 
these arguments and the arguments in favour of TEs identified above, it is instructive that a legal 
reformer explores established framework for verifying whether the tax system is the best approach 
for achieving the intended policy objectives. 
4.1.2 Methods of Evaluating Tax Expenditures 
Perhaps, the major conclusion that can be drawn from the benefits and drawbacks of TEs discussed 
above is that there are conditions under which TEs are the best policy tool and others where TEs 
                                                          
50 OECD 2010, ibid at 25. 
51 Ibid at 24. 
52 See generally, Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger, supra note 34 at 12; OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 75; Jacques, 
supra note 43. 
53 For increased administrative and compliance costs, see OECD Choosing, ibid at 76. 
54 Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger, supra note 34 at page 12. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. It was also stated that despite the possibility of using tax software by taxpayers, the multiplicity of the special 
provisions makes it more difficult for taxpayers to understand how their tax liability have been computed. 
57 Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger, supra note 34 at 12; fairness is also cited in OECD 2010, supra note 44 at 25-6. 
58 Anderson, supra note 39 at 8; Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at 2. 
59 Anderson, ibid; OECD 2010, supra note 44 at 27. 
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are the least viable tool for achieving government objectives. Thus, for effective utilization of TEs, 
there is a need to assess program objectives on a case-by-case basis.60 A 2014 European 
Commission report on the use of TE in European Union (EU) member states suggests that an 
evaluation of the efficiency of TEs requires identifying different policy areas and assessing “how 
tax expenditures could – or not – help meet given economic objectives in these areas.”61 Since this 
thesis contemplates implementing the proposed reforms through the tax system, it is particularly 
important to evaluate the propriety of using TEs for petroleum sector reform in Nigeria. 
Due to the fact that the parameters for appraising TEs are numerous and multidimensional, the 
task of evaluating TEs is a very challenging one.62 According to the OECD, the “evaluation of tax 
expenditures may be difficult, but a more serious problem may be the failure to try.”63 The OECD 
suggests that a thorough assessment of TEs should consider its efficacy, effectiveness, 
distributional impact as well as its compliance and administrative costs in relation to possible 
policy alternatives that could achieve the same social and economic objectives.64 The OECD 
classified the framework for evaluating TEs into two broad categories – ex-ante assessments and 
ex-post evaluations.65 The ex-ante assessment is described as the evaluation that takes place before 
the introduction of a TE while the ex-post evaluation is conducted after the TE has been in 
operation for a number of years.66 These two categories involve the evaluation of TE in terms of 
various parameters including, but not limited to, the revenue costs or value of the TE to the 
government,67 its performance in terms of meeting policy objectives,68 and its economic 
relevance.69  
                                                          
60 Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger supra note 34 at 66; David A Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, “The Integration of Tax and 
Spending Programs”, (2003) 113 Yale LJ 955 at 961 [Weisbach & Nussim]. 
61 A A Kalyva et al, “Tax Expenditure in Direct Taxation in EU Member States”, (2014) European Economy 
Occasional Papers 207, Brussels, online: < http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance> at 17 [EU Member]. 
62 EU Member, ibid at 12; Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at ch 2; OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at chp 3; 
Toder, Wasow & Ettlinger, supra note 34 at 60. 
63 OECD 2010, supra note 44 at 29. 
64 OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 92. 
65 Ibid at chp 3. 
66 Ibid at 76; Ireland, Department of Finance, “Report on Tax Expenditure with Guidelines: Incorporating Department 
of Finance Guidelines for Tax Expenditure”, (October 2014) online :< http://www.budget.gov.ie> at chp 3 [Ireland]. 
67 In this regard, the OECD suggests (i) the revenue forgone method, (ii) the revenue gain method and (iii) the outlay 
equivalence method. See generally, EU Member states, supra note 61 at 12; Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 
at 7; OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at chp 3. 
68 Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at ch 2. 
69 EU Member states, supra note 61 at 3. 
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The ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations conducted in this thesis draws on the key 
evaluation questions suggested in the recent guidelines developed by the Ireland Department of 
Finance.70 Given the numerous methods available for TE evaluation, the Irish Department of 
Finance (like other scholars) recognized the challenges in finding a comprehensive framework for 
such exercise and sought to fill this gap in literature by developing a concise framework in terms 
of key evaluation questions to be asked during the ex-ante and ex-post process of evaluation.71 
These guidelines were developed based on a review of several economic literature on tax 
expenditures as well an analysis of international approaches to tax expenditure evaluation.72 Since 
these guidelines also draw on the OECD’s parameters for evaluation of tax expenditures in 
different countries including Canada, United States and Germany, the guidelines provide a robust 
and comprehensive criteria for evaluating TEs.73 While a detailed assessment on all possible 
dimensions of TE evaluation is beyond the scope of this thesis, this thesis explores the major 
elements of the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation methods.  
4.1.2.1 Ex-ante Assessment 
The ex-ante assessment considers whether or not to introduce a new TE into a tax system and 
focuses on the rationale behind the government’s intervention in a particular area of public policy, 
the planning of the policy as well as the design of the policy.74 Thus, this assessment is a very 
useful tool for evaluating Canadian fiscal measures before they are introduced into the Nigerian 
legal system. According to the OECD, the ex-ante assessment involves three stages. The first stage 
relates to examining the need which the new TE intends to address and the suitability of using the 
tax system for that particular objective. The second stage deals with identifying and setting the 
objectives of the proposed TE. The last stage relates to appraising the use of the tax system as the 
tool for achieving the objectives against other alternative policy options.75  
In order to address the above considerations, there are five (5) major areas which should be 
assessed before the introduction of a new TE.76 These areas relate to the objective of the TE, the 
                                                          
70 Ireland, supra note 66 at 8. 
71 Ibid at 2 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid at 30-5. 
74 Ireland, ibid; OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 76. 
75 OECD Choosing, ibid at 76-7. 
76 Ireland, supra note 66 at 8-10. 
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market failure the TE proposes to address, the efficacy of the TE in achieving the policy objectives, 
the likely economic impact of the TE as well as the expected cost of the TE.77 These are discussed 
further in the subsequent paragraphs. 
i. What objective does the TE aim to achieve? 
Prior to introduction of a TE, the desired outputs, outcomes and possible targets which the 
government intends to address through the tax system should be very clear.78 For instance, the 
objective of the proposed TE can be to increase research and development in the oil and gas 
industry or to assist the small and medium scale enterprises in the oil and gas sector. Ideally, the 
objectives of a TE should be “specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound 
(SMART)”.79 This is because such objective(s) provide a benchmark with which to assess the 
proposed TE after its implementation. These objectives are also instrumental for identifying the 
alternative policy options that may be available to the government to deliver the policy 
objectives.80 The failure to identify clear objectives at this introductory stage makes it difficult to 
describe, examine and assess the consistency of the proposed policy with other government 
policies.81  
ii. What market failure is being addressed?  
In addition to identifying the objectives of the proposed TE, it is also necessary to justify the 
government’s intervention in relation to the policy objective.82 In other words the ex-ante 
assessment should examine: (i) whether there is a need for government intervention in the area of 
the proposed policy83 and (ii) why and how a tax break would address that need.84  Thus, an ex-
ante assessment must confirm that the proposed TE addresses an actual need which is consistent 
with the government’s policy priorities.85 
iii. Is a TE the best approach to address the market failure?  
                                                          
77 Ibid at 8-9. 
78 OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 76 
79 Ibid. 
80Ibid. 
81 Ireland, supra note 66 at 8. 
82 Ibid. 
83 OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 76. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at 19. 
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Even though the existence of a market failure could provide a strong justification for the 
government’s intervention in the area of the proposed policy, it does not imply that the tax system 
is the most efficient means to remedy the market failure.86 This is because there could be other 
alternative policy options available to the government for addressing the market failure.87 Thus, 
the ex-ante assessment must consider whether a TE is the most appropriate method of government 
intervention.88 This can be done by comparing the benefits and limitations of TEs with alternative 
delivery options.89 The comparison can be done in terms of accessibility of the proposed TE to 
beneficiaries, administrative cost of implementing the policy as well as the similarity of the TE 
with existing policy intervention in order to avoid duplication of policy measures.90 
iv. What economic impact is the TE likely to have? 
Upon identifying the objective(s), the market failure and the suitability of the proposed TE, it is 
important to assess the expected impact of the TE.91 This can be done by looking at the design of 
the TE in terms of meeting the policy objectives as well as the influence the TE will have on 
connected sectors of the economy.92 Such an evaluation can be conducted by drawing on the result 
of impact assessments conducted on similar (existing) TEs within or outside the jurisdiction in 
which the proposed policy is to be implemented.93 This stage of the ex-ante assessment should 
also “set out criteria against which the impact and efficiency of the scheme will be evaluated at 
the ex-post stage.”94 This is particularly important so that arrangements for the collection of the 
necessary data that will be used in the ex-post stage can be put in place at the introductory stage 
of the TE program.95 
v. How much is the TE expected to cost? 
                                                          
86 Ireland, supra note 66 at 9. 
87 Supra note 42. 
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An ex-ante assessment should also examine the opportunity cost of implementing the policy 
through the tax system.96 According to the OECD, the “revenue foregone” method is the most 
practical approach for estimating the expected costs of the proposed TE.97 This revenue forgone 
method considers the cost of the TE in monetary terms.98  The calculation in monetary terms is 
based on the assumption that the behaviour and revenues from other taxes remain constant.99 Even 
though the calculation fails to acknowledge the behavioural aspects of the tax incentive and any 
likely interactions the TEs may have with other TEs, it provides an estimate of the revenue lost or 
voluntarily waived by the government as a result of departure from the normal system of taxation. 
100 However, a cost-analysis of tax measures that will be proposed in this thesis is a highly specific 
exercise which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, the thesis would place more reliance on 
first four questions in evaluating the suitability of the proposed tax measures in Nigeria’s legal 
system. 
4.1.2.2 Ex-post Evaluation 
As earlier mentioned, ex-post evaluations are the assessments that review the efficacy of an 
existing TE.101 These ex-post evaluations are conducted after a particular TE has been in operation 
for a number of years.102 This thesis uses the ex-post evaluation to assess (existing) Canadian 
measures in order to determine their efficacy within Canada’s legal system before transplanting 
to Nigeria. The primary focus of the ex-post evaluation is to assess the impact and continuing 
relevance (or otherwise) of the TE.103 A major connection between the ex-post and ex-ante 
evaluations is that “the more effort that went into the ex-ante evaluation in terms of identifying 
methods for the ex-post evaluation and setting up the necessary data collection processes, the 
easier it will be to undertake the ex-post evaluation.”104 Therefore, an ex-post analysis is less 
complicated where the necessary ex-post evaluation framework was considered during the ex-ante 
assessment of the TE. 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid at 18. 
99 Ibid at 11. 
100 Ibid.  
101 OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 76. 
102 Ireland, supra note 66 at 12. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
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There are four (4) key themes in the review of the existing TEs under the ex-post assessment.105 
These themes are relevance, cost, impact and efficiency of the TEs.106 Similar to the ex-ante 
assessment, the Irish report also came up with questions that are instrumental in conducting an ex-
post evaluation of TEs in Canada’s oil and gas tax system.107  
i. Is the TE still relevant? 
An ex-post evaluation provides an opportunity to assess the consistency of the TE with 
government policy priorities to determine if the TE realistically addresses an actual need.108  One 
of the steps in evaluating the continued relevance of a TE entails looking at the primary 
objective(s) of the TE and taking into account the social and economic conditions or current policy 
priorities of the government.109 Such primary objectives of the TEs are usually set out in policy 
documents including budget papers, news releases or minutes of legislative committee meetings 
and debates etc.110  Evaluating these objectives is instrumental for verifying whether the TE 
remains valid given changes in the economy, relevant market, industry or the government’s policy 
priorities, since the introduction of the TE.111   
In addition to the above, an ex-post assessment may also consider other policy interventions such 
as direct expenditures or regulations that may have been initiated since the inception of the 
particular TE that is being reviewed.112 This is because the existence of alternatives that address 
the policy objectives of the TE under review could call into question the need for the scheme.113 
Thus, the changes in the external environment of a TE should also be taken into account in 
assessing the continued relevance of such expenditure.114 
ii. How much did the TE cost?  
                                                          
105 Ibid at 12-14. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at 19. 
109 Ibid at 20. 
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According to the OECD, there are three methods for calculating costs associated with TEs namely, 
the revenue forgone method, the revenue gain method and the outlay equivalence method.115  The 
revenue forgone method estimates the cost of the TE in terms of the monetary amount the TE is 
recorded as costing to the government.116 It calculates the loss in government revenue incurred, as 
a result of the TE while holding all other factors constant.117 The cost of a particular tax credit 
using the revenue forgone method will be the actual monetary amount of the tax credit. For 
instance if the amount of a particular tax credit claimed is $10, the cost of the tax credit to the 
government is also $10 using the revenue forgone method. Therefore, a tax credit’s estimated cost 
is the figure derived from the actual take-up of the expenditure.118 With respect to a tax deduction 
the revenue forgone is dependent on the take up rate and the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer.119 
However, the assumption of unchanged behaviour and unchanged revenues from other taxes 
makes the revenue forgone method theoretically inadequate to provide an accurate cost estimation 
of a TE.120 This is because the estimation “ignores the behavioural aspects of a tax incentive and 
ignores any possible interaction with other tax expenditures.”121  
Alternatively, the cost of TEs could be measured by the amount of the revenue gained when 
repealed.122 This estimation method is called the final revenue loss (gain) method and it calculates 
the potential increase in tax revenue if certain TEs are discontinued.123 Unlike the revenue forgone 
method, this method considers the behavioural effects arising from the discontinuation of such 
TE.124 Specifically, it considers the behavioural effects on the taxpayers, the potential impact the 
discontinuance may have on the overall level of economic activity as well as the effects (of the 
discontinuance) on revenues from other taxes.125 Thus, the method is expected to accurately reflect 
the amount of revenue that would be raised by the government if a TE is removed from the tax 
system.126   
                                                          
115 Ibid at 19; OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 46. 
116 Ireland, supra note 66 at 18. 
117 OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 46 [emphasis added]. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid; Ireland, supra note 66 at 18. 
121 Ireland, ibid. 
122 Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at 163. 
123 Ibid at 185. 
124 Ibid; Ireland, supra note 66 at 18. 
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The third estimation method, called the outlay equivalent method, attempts to estimate an existing 
TE based on the cost of a direct expenditure which would achieve the same policy objectives.127 
That is, it considers the cost of the TE in terms of the cost of delivering the same policy objectives 
outside the tax system.128 
Despite the shortcomings of the revenue forgone approach discussed above, this estimation 
method is still considered the most attractive approach for many governments for practical 
reasons. This is because most governments consider the approach as a relatively simple estimation 
method that does not require the process of collecting individual or government behavioural 
responses.129 Considering that Canada uses the revenue forgone approach,130 the thesis will adopt 
this same approach for evaluating the relevant TEs in Canada’s tax system. However, the thesis 
acknowledges the (aforementioned) limitations to the accuracy of the revenue forgone estimates 
in evaluating the selected Canadian tax measures.131  
iii. What was the impact of the TE?  
Evaluating an existing TE also entails ascertaining the impact of the TE. The measure of the impact 
of a TE can be determined by “establishing whether a tax expenditure has been successful in 
changing behaviour, improving performance or increasing economic activity over what would 
otherwise have been the case.”132 It is important to note that the impact of a TE is closely related 
(but not synonymous) with its effectiveness. For instance, if a research and development (R&D) 
tax credit in the petroleum industry has a very high take-up rate amongst R&D active companies 
then such tax credit could be described as an effective scheme but for the tax credit to have an 
economic impact, the tax credit should have encouraged previously non-R&D active companies 
                                                          
127 Ibid. 
128 OECD Choosing, supra note 40 at 47. 
129 Ibid at 46. 
130 See especially, Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Report 3 - Tax-Based Expenditures” (Ottawa: 
Auditor General of Canada 2015) at 3; Canada, Department of Finance, “Archived - Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 
2010” (Ottawa: Department of Finance 2010); Brixi, Valenduc & Swift, supra note 43 at 107; OECD 2010, supra 
note 44 at 77. 
131 That is, it acknowledges the failure to measure behavioural impact and the assumption that other tax expenditure 
provisions remain constant. 
132 Ireland, supra note 66 at 12. 
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to engage in R&D and for existing R&D active companies to have increased levels of R&D 
investment.133  
However, identifying the impact of a TE can be challenging because the situation that would have 
prevailed in the absence of TE is unknown.134 Even though the TE beneficiaries can be asked 
through surveys whether their behaviour or activity (relating to the policy objective) changed as a 
result of the TE, such information cannot always be relied upon.135  
iv. Was the TE efficient? 
The question of efficiency of a tax measure focuses on the manner in which resources are allocated 
in an economy.136 A particular economy is said to be operating efficiently when “resources are 
fully employed and [are] producing as much output as possible.”137 While a TE may have been 
successful in terms of meeting its objectives, the success has to be set against the costs of the TE 
to determine its efficiency.138 The measure of the efficiency of a TE should also be compared to 
the potential efficiency of other policy alternatives available to the government.139 
Given the nature of reforms contemplated in this thesis, it is imperative to evaluate the prospective 
Canadian measures in terms of the ex-post assessment before recommending such measures for 
petroleum sector reforms in Nigeria. Similarly, it is also beneficial to examine the prospective 
measures in light of ex-ante evaluation in order to assess the propriety of introducing such 
measures into Nigeria’s legal and tax system. Based on the foregoing, the next chapter puts the 
ex-ante and ex-post assessments into practical use by adopting these methods to evaluate the 
recommendations for the proposed transplants.
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138 Ireland, supra note 66 at 13. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROPOSING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR 
REFORMS 
In the preceding chapters, this thesis identified the need for petroleum sector reforms in Nigeria 
and highlighted the role of the tax system in the reform agenda of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. 
In addition to justifying the preference for Canada’s oil and gas tax system as a comparator, this 
thesis also presented the views of three major legal transplant theorists and argued that there can 
be successful transfer of laws between Nigeria and Canada. While the proposed recommendations 
in this thesis are not necessarily the only transplants that could be useful for Nigeria’s petroleum 
sector reforms, these measures have been selected because the examination of all the possible 
recommendations or alternatives will be beyond the scope of this thesis. More importantly, these 
measures have been chosen because they appear to address the problem areas in Nigeria’s 
petroleum industry and are wholly or partly absent in Nigeria’s current petroleum tax system. 
While the thesis does not suggest that the proposed recommendations are self-sufficient in 
addressing Nigeria’s oil and gas industry inefficiencies, the thesis argues that the proposed 
measures are useful in mitigating these inefficiencies and have the potential to ultimately improve 
certain aspects of oil and gas tax administration in Nigeria. 
This chapter identifies five measures in Canada’s oil and gas tax regime that have the potential to 
specifically address the industry inefficiencies in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. To increase the 
likelihood of success of the proposed transplants, this chapter draws on the aforementioned ex-
ante and ex-post TE assessments for each of the proposed fiscal measures to determine their 
viability to address the previously identified problems in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. This 
chapter also recognizes the distinctions identified in 2.3 above so as to make the recommendations 
more suitable for Nigeria’s tax and legal system.   
Even though the proposed recommendations are modified to increase the prospects for success, it 
is particularly problematic and difficult to make exact or accurate projections of the fate of these 
transplants due to paucity or unavailability of necessary data.1 However, one can reasonably 
                                                          
1 This lack of available date is partly due to non-existence of the required data and/or the aforementioned poor 
management of available tax data in Nigeria. 
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speculate from the ex-post and ex-ante assessments that the proposed recommendations would 
have a reformative effect on the petroleum industry if properly adapted into Nigeria’s legal and 
tax system.  
The choice of the fiscal and administrative recommendations provided in this chapter are informed 
by the aforementioned inefficiencies in Nigeria’s petroleum industry. Specifically, this chapter 
looks at: (i) the Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax credit to address 
the problem of recurrent fuel shortages and inadequate technology; (ii) the Clean Energy 
Generation Equipment – Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance to promote the use of cleaner 
technology and reduce the adverse effects of oil exploration activities; (iii) Pollution Tax to 
address environmental degradation and its consequent effects; (iv) Informants Lead Program to 
address the problem of tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance; and (v) Mandatory Reporting 
Standards for the Extractive Sector to address the problem of lack of transparency and 
accountability in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. These fiscal and administrative recommendations 
are currently applicable to oil and gas corporations in Canada and have considerable potential for 
reforming Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. 
5.1. Fiscal Measures for Nigeria’s Petroleum Sector Reforms 
Drawing on the framework for assessing TEs provided in chapter four above, this section evaluates 
the first three fiscal measures (SR&ED, the Clean Energy Generation Equipment - Accelerated 
Capital Cost Allowance and Pollution Tax) to highlight the benefits and drawbacks of these 
measures within the Canadian tax system in order to provide suitable modifications before 
introducing the measures into Nigeria. Specifically, this section conducts ex-post evaluation on 
the fiscal recommendations to assess the efficacy of these expenditures within Canada’s tax system 
and determine the viability of these TE in Nigeria’s tax system by using the ex-ante assessment. 
5.1.1. Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) Tax Credit 
The SR&ED is federal tax incentive that was initiated in 1985 with the aim of encouraging 
research and development in all sectors of the Canadian economy.2 It is administered by the CRA 
                                                          
2 Canada Revenue Agency, “Scientific Research and Experimental Development Tax Incentive Program” (19 
September 2014), online: Canada Revenue Agency < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>. 
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and applicable to all Canadian businesses regardless of business size.3 The broad categories of 
works that are eligible for this credit include basic research, applied research and experimental 
development.4 However, a vast majority of claims by businesses are for “experimental 
development”.5 Experimental development is described under the ITA as “work undertaken for 
the purposes of achieving technological advancement for the purposes of creating new, or 
improving existing, materials, devices, products or processes, including incremental 
improvements thereto.”6 Specifically, some expenses that will qualify for the SR&ED tax credit 
are salaries or wages of employees directly engaged in SR&ED activities, the cost of materials for 
SR&ED activities such as scrapped parts, prototypes consumed while performing SR&ED, lease 
costs (excluding building leases or rent) incurred solely for the performance of SR&ED as well as 
eligible SR&ED expenditures incurred by contractors or other third parties performing SR&ED 
directly on behalf of the taxpayer.7 
The benefits for eligible SR&ED expenditures are two-fold as eligible SR&ED work can be 
treated as an income tax deduction and also as an investment tax credit.8 As an income tax 
deduction, the SR&ED tax credit allows immediate expensing of all allowable expenditures while 
as an investment tax credit (ITC), it can be used to reduce federal income tax liability.9 Even 
though a corporation can claim both the income tax deduction and the investment tax credit on the 
same SR&ED expenditures, there are some specific differences in the computing the two 
components of the tax incentive.10  
In terms of tax treatment for the ITC aspect of the program, ITCs are calculated by multiplying 
the amount of qualifying expenditure by the specified percentage. The applicable ITC rate for tax 
years that end after 2013 is 15% on qualified SR&ED expenditure while 20% is the applicable 
                                                          
3 Canada Revenue Agency, “SR&ED Investment Tax Credit Policy” (18 December 2014), online: Canada Revenue 
Agency website, online: < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>. 
4 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c1, s 248 (1) (5th Supp) [ITA]; Canada Revenue Agency, “What work qualifies for 
SR&ED tax incentives?” (18 December 2012), online: < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>. 
5 CPA Canada, “Appealing an SR&ED claim”, online: (2011) <http://www.camagazine.com>. 
6 ITA, supra note 4, s 248(1). 
7 Canada, Finance Canada “Consultation Paper: Tax Incentives for Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development” (October 2007), online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca> [Finance Canada]. 
8 Ibid; Canada Revenue Agency, “Claiming SR&ED Incentives”, (3 June 2014) Canada Revenue Agency website, 
online: <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>.  
9 Finance Canada, supra note 7 at 3. 
10 Ibid. 
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rate for tax years that end before 2014.11 Small businesses that do not exhaust their ITC can get a 
refund of their balance.12 For other businesses, the ITC can be carried backward for up to 3 years 
and forward for up to 20 years, while unused income tax deduction can be carried forward 
indefinitely.13 
5.1.1.1. Ex-Post Evaluation 
The ex-post evaluation of the SR&ED program in this section is based on the relevance, cost, 
impact and effectiveness of the program as discussed in the preceding sections of this thesis.  
According to Canada’s Department of Finance 1983 paper entitled “Research and Development 
Tax Policies”, the main objectives of the SR&ED tax incentive program are to (i) “encourage 
research and development by the private sector in Canada”;14 (ii) “promote research and 
development activities that conform to sound business practices”;15 (iii) “provide tax incentives 
for research and development that, as much as possible, are for immediate benefit to businesses”;16 
and (iv) “provide tax incentives for research and development that are as simple to understand and 
comply with and as certain in application as possible”.17 
In recent times, it has been argued that the SR&ED program has “become overly complicated and 
is no longer delivering incentives in a predictable, timely and cost-effective manner.”18 It has also 
been noted that the scope of the eligible expenditures for the SR&ED had significantly narrowed 
and the program has become less suited for achieving its primary objectives.19 Another argument 
that has been made with respect to the program is that the CRA’s focus appears to be more on 
compliance in terms of “interpretive positions and operational practices – rather than delivering 
incentives”.20  
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Kenneth J Murray, “Scientific Research and Experimental Development: A Program in Crisis?” (1995) 43:5 Can 
Tax Found J 1265 at 1266-7 [Murray]. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Canadian Chamber of Commerce, “The Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) Tax 
Incentive Program: Policy Brief”, (2011) by Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Ottawa, Canada at 9 [CCC] 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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Perhaps the most notable review of Canada’s SR&ED program in recent times is contained in the 
report of the expert panel led by Thomas Jenkins in 2011.21 This panel was set up by the Canadian 
government in an effort to assess the effectiveness of its research and development programs as 
well as make recommendations that will promote research and development in Canada.22 With 
specific reference to the SR&ED program, some of the shortcomings the panel noted include: (i) 
the government’s spending on the program is not effectively targeted because the focus of the 
program was too narrow23 and (ii) the government pays the SR&ED tax-credit benefits on a wider 
range of expenditures (such as labour, materials, contracts, equipment and overhead) compared to 
most other countries;24 (iii) the SR&ED program is complex and the complexity results in 
excessive compliance costs;25 (iv) the qualification for the tax-credit is uncertain and firms having 
to resort to retaining consultants diminishes the intended benefit of the program.26  
Given the aforementioned criticisms, one might reasonably question the usefulness or efficacy of 
the SR&ED program. While this thesis acknowledges the uncertainty, complexity and other 
criticisms of the SR&ED tax incentive, the thesis also notes that there is a widespread consensus 
that the SR&ED tax incentive program should be maintained. Some reports on the SR&ED 
program which have criticized the program maintain that the SR&ED program is valuable and 
important because it encourages businesses to be innovative.27 For instance, the aforementioned 
expert panel led by Thomas Jenkins stated that “[d]uring our extensive consultations, we learned 
about many Canadian success stories and heard from numerous entrepreneurs who said that [these] 
federal programs have served them well.”28 Perhaps this is why, rather than suggesting the 
elimination of the program, the panel made the following recommendations that aim to promote 
the effectiveness of the SR&ED program in Canada: (i) creating an Industrial Research and 
Innovation Council (IRIC) to deliver the federal government's business innovation programs; (ii) 
                                                          
21 Canada, Public Works and Government Services Canada, “Innovation Canada: A Call to Action: Review of Federal 
Support to Research and Development”, (Ottawa: Publishing and Depository Services, 2011) [Jenkins Report]. 
22 Ibid at E-7. 
23 Ibid at 6-12. 
24 Ibid at 6-10. 
25 Ibid at 6-8. 
26 Ibid. 
27 CCC, supra note 18 at 11; Certified General Accountants, “The Certified General Accountants Association of 
Canada’s Submission to the Department of Finance and the Canada Revenue Agency”, (Discussion Paper dated 
October 2012) online: < http://www.cga-canada.org> at 8; John Visser, “Are You Leaving Money On The Table? 
Understanding the SR&ED Tax Credit” (14 April 2014), online: <http://go.galegroup.com.> [Visser]. 
28 Jenkins Report, supra note 21 at E-2. 
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simplifying the SR&ED program by basing the tax credit for small and medium-sized businesses 
on labour-related costs; (iii) making business innovation a core government procurement 
objective; (iv) transforming the institutes of the National Research Council into a series of large-
scale, collaborative centers involving business, universities and the provinces; (v) helping high 
growth, innovative firms access the risk capital they need through the Business Development Bank 
of Canada; and (vi) establishing a clear federal voice for innovation and work with the provinces 
to improve co-ordination and impact of R&D programs.29 
Moreover, there have been recent attempts by the CRA to address certain administrative 
inefficiencies that have had adverse effects on the take up of the program. In 2014, it was reported 
that the CRA had demonstrated “a renewed commitment to the longevity of the [SR&ED] program 
and as such, to promoting Canada as a world-leader in scientific innovation and technological 
advancement.”30 Particularly, certain initiatives recently introduced by the CRA were noted to 
provide additional support for taxpayers in benefitting from the program.31 Specifically, it was 
noted that the CRA provided “additional guidance around eligibility requirements via online 
resources and pilot projects to help identify opportunities to improve efficiencies of the program 
and predictability for claimants.”32 In addition to the online resources provided by the CRA, the 
CRA also has an income tax rulings and interpretation procedure through which the Income Tax 
Rulings Directorate unit of the CRA can issue advance income tax rulings and technical 
interpretations on which taxpayers can rely.33 Therefore, the incidence of uncertainty in terms of 
eligibility for the SR&ED program is substantially mitigated as interested taxpayers can request 
for tax rulings and technical interpretations and also have access to these resources to predict their 
eligibility for the program.34  
Drawing on the discussion in chapter four, the determination of the cost-effectiveness of the 
SR&ED is dependent on whether the increase in SR&ED investment (attributable to the SR&ED 
ITC or deduction) exceeds the amount of tax revenue forgone by the government. Using the 
                                                          
29 Ibid at E-9 to E-13. 
30 Visser, supra note 27. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Canada Revenue Agency, Interpretation Circular IC70-6R6, “Advance Income Tax Rulings and Technical 
Interpretations”, (29 August 2014), online: Canada Revenue Agency website, online: < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca>. 
34 Ibid at para 12-8. 
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revenue forgone approach, a 2007 analysis noted that the program had a modest (but encouraging) 
return of “about 11 cents per dollar of revenue forgone.”35 Furthermore, the program has also had 
significant impact on businesses. For instance, the SR&ED program was reported to have provided 
over $3.6 billion in tax assistance to over 23,000 taxpayers in 2012 alone.36 In 2014, Canadian 
Manufacturers and Exporters – a body that promotes the interests of manufacturing and exporting 
firms in Canada noted that “the low level of corporate spending in research and development 
(R&D) … is not entirely unexpected given the significant cuts to the Scientific Research and 
Experimental Development (SR&ED) program in recent years”.37 Thus, the reduction in the 
program which was followed by decline in research and development investment by corporations 
suggests that the program has considerable influence on corporate spending on research and 
development. In addition to the above, the Jenkins report also acknowledged the usefulness of the 
SR&ED program by stating that, “[t]he program lowers the cost of R&D for firms, promotes 
greater investment in R&D, and makes Canada a more attractive place to locate R&D activity.”38 
5.1.1.2. Ex-Ante Assessment 
In deciding whether or not to introduce a program like the SR&ED program into Nigeria, the 
OECD identified three stages of the ex-ante assessment namely, an examination of the need which 
the SR&ED program would address, the proposed objectives of the program in Nigeria as well as 
the use of the tax system as the tool for achieving the objectives of the SR&ED program as opposed 
to using alternative policy options.  
While the adoption of the SR&ED program for all the sectors in the Nigerian economy could be 
beneficial for promoting corporate research and development across the country, such application 
is likely to be more costly and challenging for the federal government as opposed to implementing 
the program in the oil and gas industry alone. As discussed in chapter one, recurrent fuel shortages 
as well as inadequate technology for oil exploration and tax administration are major challenges 
                                                          
35 Canada, Department of Finance, “An Evaluation of the Federal Tax Credit for Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development”, by Mark Parsons & Nicholas Phillips (September 2007), online: < http://www.fin.gc.ca>. 
36 Canada Revenue Agency News Release, “Canada Revenue Agency supports business innovation with new SR&ED 
tools and services” (6 Feb 2014), Government of Canada website online: < http://news.gc.ca>. 
37 Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters, “2014-15 Federal Budget Recommendations” (August 2014), online: 
<http://cme-mec.ca> at 4 [2014-15 Federal Budget]; Statistics Canada, “Spending on research and development, 
2014 (intentions)” (17 October 2014) online: < http://www.statcan.gc.ca>. 
38 Jenkins Report, supra note 21 at E-9. 
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to the development of the petroleum industry in Nigeria. Incentivizing research and experimental 
development (technology) would be a positive influence in addressing these particular 
inefficiencies in the petroleum industry.  
In terms of recurrent fuel shortages, this problem persists because Nigeria currently lacks the 
refinery capacity to meet fuel demand.39 In practical terms, this lack of capacity results in Nigeria 
exporting about ninety percent (90%) of its crude oil and importing finished petroleum products 
at international prices.40 Given the increased price of the imported finished products, the 
government sells the petroleum products to consumers at subsidized prices and reimburses the 
price difference to importers.41 Thus, Nigeria is almost wholly reliant on imports of petroleum 
products despite its abundance of crude oil.  
A combination of bureaucracy, corruption, mismanagement and chronic disrepair have been 
identified as some of the reasons for the failure of existing refineries.42 Another reason that has 
been attributed for the failure of the refineries is the protection of the interests of powerful fuel 
importers – some of who are allegedly involved in a subsidy scam costing Nigeria billions of 
dollars a year.43 Additionally, the unpredictability of the regulatory framework and political 
instability are also limiting factors to investment in new refineries.44 Successive governments have 
attempted to tackle this problem by improving the capacity utilization of the four state-owned 
refineries but none of them have succeeded in doing so.45 In addition to government efforts, the 
private sector have also made attempts to address this problem of low capacity utilization which 
is prevalent in Nigeria’s oil refineries. However, some of the efforts of private companies to build 
and operate privately owned refineries have often been delayed or cancelled partly because of 
                                                          
39 Ludovica Iaccino, “Nigeria: Three out of Four Oil Refineries Resume Production As President Buhari Urged to 
End Fuel Subsidy”, International Business Times (30 July 2015), online: <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk>. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Simon Allison, “Profit in Paradox: Why Dangote’s New Oil Refinery Makes Sense for Him, and Nigeria”, Daily 
Maverick (3 March 2014), online: < http://www.dailymaverick.co.za>. 
43 “Nigeria’s Dangote Signs Deal to Build Oil Refinery”, Editorial, BBC News (4 September 2013), online: 
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44 Ibid. 
45 “Towards a Private Oil Refinery Market in Nigeria”, Editorial, Business Day (8 July 2014), online: 
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uncertainties surrounding government’s plans to deregulate the downstream sector of the 
petroleum industry.46  
Understandably, there have been concerns that privatisation of refineries could result in the 
concentration of wealth in a small subset of the country and could ultimately aggravate an already 
apparent income gap in the population.47 However, the current arrangement equally reveals that 
the government-owned and operated refineries is costing Nigerians colossal amounts of money in 
foreign exchange to the detriment of budget allocation for education, healthcare and other public 
goods.48 For instance, it has been noted that “in 2011 alone, Nigeria reportedly spent $ 760 million 
on refinery maintenance, and the operational capacity of the refineries hardly changed”.49 
Fortunately, there have been attempts by the NNPC to undertake public-private partnership 
projects to increase local refining capacity. Even though the public-private partnership 
arrangement may still be vulnerable to some of the problems that plague existing refineries, this 
thesis contends that incentivizing such public-private partnership arrangements through R&D 
incentives could increase their probability of success.50  
While the problem of low refining capacity in Nigeria is much more complicated than issuance of 
tax incentives, this thesis recognizes that incentivizing R&D for the purpose of expanding local 
refining capacity is likely to fast-track the implementation of new refining projects while 
rehabilitating existing local refineries in Nigeria. Thus, this thesis contemplates that encouraging 
scientific research and development could improve the poor state of the oil refineries in Nigeria 
as the program has the potential of attracting and encouraging the investments that are necessary 
to renovate the poor condition of Nigeria’s local refineries. Particularly, the proposed 
implementation of a SR&ED program can encourage local production and ultimately increase 
local availability of petroleum products.51 That is, the tax relief that would be derived from the 
introduction of the SR&ED is likely to encourage existing oil investors to increase their investment 
in R&D and also attract prospective oil investors to invest in Nigeria’s local refineries. As earlier 
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47 Mathias Chika Mordi, “Nigeria Refineries: The Case for Privatization”, Business Day (10 April 2014), online: 
<http://businessdayonline.com>. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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discussed, scarcity of petroleum products has adverse effects on the different sectors of the 
Nigerian economy. Therefore, a program that has the potential for increasing or incentivizing local 
production of petroleum products is likely to be a positive influence that will ultimately reflect on 
all sectors of the economy.  
In terms of the tax transplantation of the SR&ED program into Nigeria’s legal system, this thesis 
recommends a hybrid tax transplant such that the objectives of the SR&ED program under the 
Canadian tax system are slightly modified to reflect only the targeted needs of Nigeria’s petroleum 
industry.52 Specifically, this thesis suggests that the objectives of the SR&ED variant in Nigeria’s 
tax system should be: (i) to encourage research and development in the upstream sector of 
Nigeria’s petroleum industry; (ii) to promote research and development activities for the local 
refining of petroleum products in Nigeria; (iii) to provide tax incentives for research and 
development that are for immediate benefit to all businesses in the petroleum industry; and (iv) to 
provide tax incentives for research and development that are as simple to understand and comply 
with and as certain in application as possible. Also, this thesis suggests that the program should 
have a specified duration within which its major objectives can be substantially achieved and its 
usefulness should be reviewed periodically to ensure its continued efficacy. It is expected that 
these objectives will encourage investment in research and development of Nigeria’s petroleum 
industry.  
On a related note, the recent introduction of automated tax filing indicates that businesses in the 
petroleum industry will require adequate technology in order to take advantage of the ITAS 
program. Perhaps the third objective stated above will incentivize oil and gas businesses to acquire 
the necessary resources and skills for compliance with the electronic filing system. 
In terms of the best approach to promote R&D, there have been arguments in favour of direct 
funding of R&D programs through grants and loans as opposed to TEs. For instance, Surrey 
argued that TEs are an inferior method of implementing policy because TEs tend to have diverse 
features that lead to poor implementation.53 Surrey was also of the view that TEs are upside-down 
subsidies because the value of the tax deductions increases in proportion to the marginal tax rate, 
                                                          
52 Murray, supra note 14. 
53 Stanley S Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The concept of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1973) at 134-8 [Surrey, Pathways]. 
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thus, wealthy individuals get more benefits than the poor.54 It has also been argued that TEs place 
no limits on the amount of benefits a taxpayer may receive and tend to have loose eligibility 
requirements since taxpayers self-declare their eligibility and are mostly challenged only if they 
happen to be audited.55 In addition to these arguments, the Jenkins report also stated that, “many 
leading countries in innovation rely much less than Canada on indirect tax incentives as opposed 
to direct measures”.56 Thus, the panel assessed the two approaches for implementation of R&D 
programs.57 With respect to direct spending programs, the panel noted that the principal advantage 
of implementing R&D programs as direct spending program is that direct spending programs can 
be channelled to specific projects, industries or regions.58 However, the report also noted that 
direct spending programs (i) involve more rigorous selection and evaluation process; (ii) can result 
in higher administration costs for government and compliance costs for beneficiaries; and (iii) can 
raise concerns about the propriety of governments “picking winners” among the corporate 
applicants.59 While TEs were noted to be less amenable to being channelled to specific policy 
objectives, the Jenkins report noted that TEs were advantageous because: (i) they are non-
discriminatory and widely available across different sectors, industries and activities; (ii) they are 
generally easier and cheaper to implement. 
In addition to the advantages of TEs that were noted in the Jenkins report, the perceived flaws of 
TEs for implementing government objectives of this nature can be overcome by designing tax 
expenditures to be implemented as direct expenditures.60 In countering Surrey’s arguments, it has 
been noted that TE programs have different features from direct expenditure programs and should 
not be compared as if they were identical.61 In response to the flaws of TEs, Weisbach and Nussim 
noted that “[i]f a tax expenditure has the same content as a direct spending program, it will not 
have the upside-down subsidy effect, it will not be open-ended, its eligibility criteria will be the 
same as those of a direct expenditure, and it will not be more complex than the direct spending 
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program”.62 According to Weisbach and Nussim, the choice of the tool with which to provide the 
R&D subsidy is a question of institutional design.63  
By implementing the SR&ED program through a direct spending program, there is an advantage 
of a specialized agency that will approve a business plan and/or choose eligible projects.64 Since 
tax authorities may not have the required specialization for verifying eligible projects, some have 
argued that TEs are not as viable as direct spending programs for subsidies of this nature.65 
Although direct spending programs have the advantage of targeting specific objectives and 
industries as contemplated in the proposed SR&ED program in Nigeria, tax authorities can also 
administer the SR&ED program through TEs. Where the program is structured like that of Canada 
whereby the TE is granted based on the company’s R&D expenditure, tax authorities can 
seamlessly administer the program since they already receive, monitor and verify such expenses 
from eligible companies when reviewing their tax returns.66  
In addition to the above, the task of effectively addressing the problem of inadequate technology 
or poor refining capacity of refineries in Nigeria using a direct expenditure program is likely to be 
a resource intensive project. While this thesis acknowledges that greater expertise in the oil and 
gas industry or relevant fields could be beneficial for assessing eligibility for the program (as may 
be applicable under direct spending program), this thesis contends that it makes more economic 
sense for tax authorities to hire people with such expertise for this aspect rather than setting up a 
separate agency for administration of the program.67 Furthermore, Nigeria also has a tax law 
interpretation procedure (similar to the Canada’s tax ruling and interpretation system) such that 
taxpayers can employ such resources whenever they have uncertainties as to their eligibility for 
the program, especially at the pilot stage of implementation.68  
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64 Noam Noked, “Integrated Tax Policy Approach to Designing Research & Development Tax Benefits”, (2014) 34:1 
Va Tax Rev 109 at 153 [Noked]. 
65 Ibid. 
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While this thesis does not suggest that TE is the perfect approach for implementing SR&ED in 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, the thesis considers the tax system as a more viable tool to 
administer the program in Nigeria rather than a direct spending program.69 Since the proceeds 
from oil revenue over the years have not been channeled to address the industry inefficiencies that 
the SR&ED program aims to address, it is very unlikely that the government will initiate a direct 
spending program with similar objectives like the SR&ED. Secondly, the impact of the high tax 
rate of 85% imposed on companies engaged in upstream petroleum operations under the PPTA 
can be ameliorated to some degree if eligible companies claim the SR&ED incentive. A third 
reason for suggesting the implementation of the program through TEs is that the administration of 
the program through the tax system is cost-effective and administratively efficient since the FIRS 
can administer the program rather than creation of a new agency under the direct spending 
program. Given the federal government’s dominant role in the industry, a direct spending program 
could equally raise concerns as to the government “picking winners” during the approval process. 
If properly implemented, the SR&ED program would also make Nigeria internationally 
competitive as many developed countries also utilize similar programs to stimulate research and 
development.70  
As earlier mentioned, an accurate evaluation of the cost of this incentive in terms of revenue 
forgone approach is highly specific and beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this thesis 
contemplates that the program can induce capital investment which will ultimately increase 
government revenue in the long run. Based on the ex-post and ex-ante assessments of the SR&ED 
program above, this thesis considers that it is beneficial for Nigeria to adopt the idea behind the 
SR&ED program in order to enjoy the apparent benefits the program has to offer in the oil and 
gas industry. 
For the purpose of clarity, it is very important to identify the specific idea or apparent benefits 
that are contemplated by this particular recommendation. This is because there are existing fiscal 
terms under Nigerian law that incentivize R&D in Nigeria. For instance, there are provisions that 
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indicate that up to a hundred and twenty percent (120%) of R&D expenses are tax deductible 
provided that such research and development is carried out in Nigeria.71 Given that such provisions 
already grant tax deductions for R&D expenses, one may reasonably question which particular 
idea is being contemplated in this thesis or whether the apparent benefits of a SR&ED program 
will be of any additional benefit to Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.  
In addressing the aforementioned concerns, the following points are instructive. First, the idea 
being proposed in this thesis goes beyond the general notion that a “R&D program should be 
transplanted to Nigeria” (since Nigeria already has one), rather, it is the more specific idea that 
“the objectives of this particular R&D program (SR&ED) should be transplanted into Nigeria’s 
petroleum industry”. That is, this thesis looks at the possibility of adopting the specific objectives 
of the Canadian SR&ED program in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry as opposed to possibility of 
implementing a general R&D program in Nigeria. Secondly, this thesis contemplates that such 
supplementary R&D program is likely to be of additional benefit for Nigeria’s oil and gas industry 
for a number of reasons – (i) the objectives of the proposed program are industry specific and can 
be tailored to meet the current needs and structure of the oil and gas industry; (ii) the program is 
recommended as a temporary and short term measure, therefore, the government can fully realize 
the revenue forgone in the long run; and (iii) a specific incentive, albeit, supplementary, which is 
targeted at the problem of fuel shortages may be useful in offsetting the financial drain or 
mitigating the high risk with which such oil and gas investments are characterized.  
5.1.2. Clean Energy Generation Equipment - Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance 
The Clean Energy Generation Equipment - Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance was introduced 
into Canada’s income tax system in 2010.72 This program encourages businesses to invest in clean 
energy generation and energy efficiency equipment by providing an accelerated capital cost 
allowance (CCA) on eligible expenses.73 Generally, corporations are allowed to deduct CCA in 
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respect of the capital cost of depreciable property when computing their business income.74 The 
general CCA claim for a class of depreciable property is based on a prescribed rate that is usually 
based on the useful life of such depreciable property. However, the clean energy generation 
program offers corporations that incur eligible assets an accelerated rate of depreciation of such 
property in order to promote the diversification of energy supply.  
Under Canadian tax laws, the eligible clean energy generation assets are categorized under classes 
43.1 and 43.2. Class 43.1 allows the cost of eligible assets to be deducted at an accelerated rate of 
30% per year on a declining balance basis for properties acquired after February 21, 1994.75 The 
Class 43.2 allows the cost of eligible assets to be deducted at a rate of 50% per year on a declining 
balance basis for properties acquired after February 22, 2005 and before 2020.76 These qualifying 
assets include a variety of stationary equipment that generate energy by using renewable energy 
sources or fuels from waste, or equipment that make use of fossil fuels efficiently.77 It is 
noteworthy that all businesses in all the sectors of Canada’s economy that invest in specified clean 
energy generation and energy efficiency projects are eligible for this incentive.78 However, for an 
asset to qualify for this incentive, the asset must be acquired, used and located in Canada.79 
5.1.2.1. Ex-Post Evaluation 
Similar to the ex-post evaluation of the SR&ED program, the ex-post evaluation of the clean 
energy generation program will be based on the relevance, cost, impact and effectiveness as 
discussed in the preceding chapter of this thesis. According to Canada’s Department of Finance, 
the purpose of the clean energy generation incentive is to promote investments in equipment “that 
can contribute to a reduction in harmful emissions and diversification of the energy supply.”80 
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The aim of the government is to improve the after-tax rate of return on these investments by 
allowing the corporations to write-off the capital cost of the eligible assets at an accelerated rate 
as opposed to the costs being written-off over the useful life of the assets.81 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to estimate how much the government spends on the clean energy 
generation program because verifiable data on cost of the program is very limited (perhaps due to 
the relative newness of the program). The 2014 report of TEs and evaluations prepared by 
Canada’s Department of Finance which provides estimations and projections on TEs also confirms 
the paucity of data on the cost of the program.82 The report indicates that there is no data available 
to support a meaningful estimate or projection for the clean energy generation program for that 
year.83 However, Canada’s budget plan for 2012 projected that the program would cost $3 million 
and $4 million in the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 budget years respectively.84 According to 
Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2014, it is estimated that the clean energy generation program 
“will reduce federal revenues by a small amount in 2014–15 and by $1 million in 2015–16”.85 
Even though there is insufficient data to determine the cost of the program, the 2015-2016 
projection potentially results in a $3 million surplus for the government based on the 2012 and 
2014 projections.  
With respect to the impact and effectiveness of the clean energy generation program, Canada’s 
Chamber of Commerce has noted that an accelerated capital cost allowance (ACCA) should be in 
place for at least five (5) years in order to give companies time to revise their business plans as 
well as make the investments to take advantage of the incentive.86 Specifically, the Chamber of 
Commerce noted that “when limited to a short term, an ACCA is not as useful as it will do little 
to encourage investments that have long-term time horizons or complex environmental approvals 
processes.”87 Even though the efficacy of the program is expected to be measurable in the near 
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future, it has been noted that the clean energy generation program provides direct environmental 
benefit by increasing the production and use of clean and renewable energy.88  
5.1.2.2. Ex-Ante Assessment 
Similar to Canada’s ACCA, the Nigerian oil and gas tax system also has a capital allowance 
system. Under the current oil and gas tax regime in Nigeria, capital allowance can be claimed on 
four categories of assets or qualifying capital expenditure (QCE) items, namely – (i) capital 
expenditure on plant, machinery and fixtures; (ii) capital expenditure on pipelines and storage 
tanks; (iii) capital expenditure on building construction or works of permanent nature on buildings; 
and (iv) capital expenditure on drilling activities.89 The type of capital allowance that is granted 
to corporations on these QCEs vary based on the objectives of the government in granting the 
incentives to the corporations. For instance, the “annual allowance” is granted on QCE to 
encourage crude oil exploration90 while the “petroleum investment allowance” is a one-off 
allowance granted to corporations that acquire QCEs which are solely for petroleum operations.91 
In spite of the variety of capital allowance incentives available in Nigeria’s current tax regime, 
there is the need to specifically incentivize the use of clean energy in all the sectors of Nigeria’s 
petroleum industry.  
Given that there are existing gas utilization incentives in Nigeria, it is possible to question the 
extent to which the ACCA for clean energy will be beneficial for Nigeria. Such concerns can be 
addressed by emphasizing the distinguishing feature of the proposed clean energy program. While 
the objectives of the program has substantial similarities with those of the existing measures, the 
scope of the clean energy program is significant. In specific terms, the clean energy ACCA is a 
unique measure which does not focus solely on utilization of gas but also extends to incentivizing 
the general use of clean energy in the petroleum industry whether or not the equipment is for gas 
                                                          
88 Ibid at 5. 
89 Petroleum Profits Tax Act, LFN 2004, c P13 Schedule II, para 1 (b) [PPTA]. 
90 Ibid at Schedule II, para 6. 
91 Ibid at Schedule II, para 5. Other similarly structured programs that are relevant to the oil and gas industry include: 
investment tax credit (ITC) which is a tax-offset that is deductible from assessable tax and applicable to corporations 
under the PSC arrangement that signed their contract agreements prior to 1st July 1998; investment tax allowance 
(ITA) which is similar to the ITC but granted to corporations that signed their PSC after 1st July 1998 and deducted 
from assessable profit; and balancing allowance which is an allowance granted to petroleum corporations if the tax 
written down value of a QCE asset exceeds the income received by the company on the disposal of the OCE asset. 
See generally, Schedule II for details of other capital cost allowances. 
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utilization. Furthermore, the adoption of the clean energy ACCA is also useful for the reduction 
of associated gas flaring because they further incentivize the creation of outlets for gas utilization. 
Thus, the thesis considers the clean energy generation program as a viable recommendation for 
this purpose and recommends a similar program for Nigeria’s oil and gas reforms. 
In assessing the introduction of the clean energy generation program into Nigeria’s tax system, 
this section also draws on the three stages identified by the OECD namely the need that the clean 
energy generation program would address, its proposed objectives in Nigeria and the propriety of 
the tax system as the tool for achieving the objectives of the clean energy program as opposed to 
using alternative policy options.  
As discussed in chapter one, the problem of environmental degradation caused by oil exploration 
activities are major inefficiencies in Nigeria’s petroleum industry. This thesis contemplates that 
the clean energy generation program can be instrumental in the reduction of gas flaring activities 
and environmental degradation in Nigeria. If properly implemented in Nigeria, the program will 
be an excellent tool for promoting technology investments and encouraging local development 
and commercialization of new and “clean” technologies for the utilization of associated gas in oil 
exploration.  
Similar to the SR&ED program above, this thesis suggests the modification of the objective of the 
clean energy generation program prior to its introduction into Nigeria’s legal system. Thus, the 
proposed objective of the program would be to encourage corporations to invest in equipment in 
the oil and gas industry “that can contribute to the reduction in harmful emissions as well as assist 
with diversification of the energy supply in the oil and gas industry.”92  
In terms of approach, TEs are more cost-efficient for delivery of programs of this nature because 
they adopt an established mechanism for allocating economic resources and for communicating 
information about government policy.93 Additionally, the ACCA method allows the oil and gas 
corporations to write off eligible assets faster in the earlier years (as opposed to the regular 
                                                          
92 Canada, Supplementary RPP, supra note 78 
93 See especially, David G Duff & E Ian Wiebe, “Tax expenditures to Limit the Growth of Carbon Emissions in 
Canada: Identification and evaluation” at 8:15 in Lisa Phillips, Neil Brooks & Jinjay Li eds, Tax Expenditures: State 
of the Art: Selected Proceedings of the Osgoode 2009 Conference on Tax Expenditures and Public Policy in 
Comparative Perspective (Toronto, Ont: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2009) [State of the Art]. 
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depreciation of assets) and smaller amounts in the later years. In addition to the above, there are 
other significant tax advantages for implementing a clean energy program as a TE. Since Nigeria 
has an established administrative mechanism for capital allowance programs (as discussed above), 
such mechanism provide a model for the implementation of the ACCA for clean energy.   
 
While one may legitimately question the fairness, equity or the need for additional capital 
allowance program in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, this thesis contends that Canada’s ACCA 
program presents a viable approach to address the problems of gas flaring and oil spillages in oil 
producing communities in Nigeria. Drawing on the views of non-beneficiaries and accounting 
professionals in Canada to a similar CCA program which is applicable to the Canadian 
manufacturing industry, the perception of unfairness and inequity for such incentive is absent.94 
Specifically, it appears that such preferential tax treatments are commonly accepted as being 
essential for certain industries especially in special circumstances such as the economic recession 
that was plaguing the manufacturing industry at that time.95 Thus, it is highly plausible (albeit not 
certain) that a similar perception will be held by Nigerians in respect of the ACCA for clean energy 
program given the extent of environmental degradation in the oil producing communities in 
Nigeria. 
Even though the current capital cost allowance programs in Nigeria’s petroleum industry already 
incentivize the purchase of (general) plants and equipment by petroleum corporations, these 
incentives do not directly address or promote the purchase of clean energy equipment. Therefore, 
this thesis recommends the ACCA as a complementary mechanism to the existing measures to 
encourage the use of clean energy for crude oil production in oil producing communities. 
Alternatively, the government can restructure the current annual allowance program for the 
purpose of achieving this objective. In addition to promoting clean energy in the petroleum 
industry, it is expected that the adoption of Canada’s ACCA deduction for eligible equipment 
would be a valuable and effective tool for reducing the tax liability resulting from the higher tax 
rates that is applicable to upstream oil and gas corporations. 
                                                          
94 Odette Pinto, “Issue in Focus”, (2013) Certified General Accountants Association of Canada Report, online: 
<http://ppm.cga-canada.org> at 11. 
95 Ibid. 
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Apart from obtaining an accelerated rate of depreciation on eligible equipment this thesis argues 
that implementation of this program would have a ripple effect on the economy as the increase in 
demand for clean energy generation machinery will also increase the profit margin for the 
equipment manufacturers of products such as solar panels and wind turbines.96 Thus, 
implementing ACCA in Nigeria also has potential multiple benefits for the different sectors of the 
economy. 
5.1.3. Pollution Tax 
Given the adverse effects on the environment as well as the financial loss caused by gas flaring 
and oil spillages (pollutants) discussed in chapter one, the Nigerian federal government has made 
several attempts in the past to discourage the flaring of natural gas on the one hand as well as 
incentivize the utilization of associated gas derived during oil exploration activities on the other 
hand. For instance, the Associated Gas Re-Injection Act97 imposes certain fines and penalties for 
flaring of gas and specifically prohibits the flaring of associated gas without the written permission 
of Nigeria’s Minister for Petroleum Resources. Similarly, the Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations under the Petroleum Act98 makes it mandatory for oil producing 
companies to submit detailed plans for gas utilization within their first five years of operation in 
order to ensure that these companies have cogent plans for utilization of gas during exploration 
activities.  
In addition to these administrative and legal requirements, there are also fiscal incentives available 
to companies that utilize gas rather than flare them into the atmosphere. For instance, corporations 
engaged in gas utilization projects that were previously taxed under the PPTA at eighty-five 
percent (85%) are now taxed under the CITA at the rate of 30%.99 Additional incentives available 
to such companies also include a three-year tax holiday which is renewable for an additional two 
                                                          
96 CCC, Powering, supra note 86 at 5. 
97 See Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, LFN 2004, c A25 s 3(1) for the requirement for written permission from the 
Minister. This section prohibits, without lawful permission, any oil and gas company from flaring gas in Nigeria while 
s 4 stipulates the penalty for breach of permit conditions; Niger-Delta Development Commission (Establishment etc) 
Act, LN 2000, s 14 [NDDC Act]. Under the NDDC Act, the NDDC has a duty to liaise with oil and gas companies 
and advice stakeholders on the control of oil spillages, gas flaring and other related forms of environmental pollution. 
98 Petroleum Act, LFN 2004, c P10, [Petroleum Act]. Regulation 43 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations under this Act provides for mandatory submission of feasibility study from licensees and lessees for the 
utilization of natural gas (both associated and non-associated gas). 
99 Petroleum Profits Tax Act, LFN 2004, c P13 [PPTA] and Companies Income Tax Act LFN 2004, c. C21 [CITA]. 
 107 
 
years subject to satisfactory performance and tax-free dividends during the tax-holiday period. 
Such companies are also eligible for accelerated capital allowances at the rate of ninety percent 
(90%) in the first year of production for investment in plant and machinery with ten percent (10%) 
retention in the books after the tax holiday, fifteen percent (15%) additional investment capital 
allowance as well as royalty and tax exemption for the gas transferred from natural gas liquid 
facility (NGL) to the gas to liquid facility (GTL).100  
As noted in chapter one, these incentives and other measures that have been adopted by the 
government to discourage pollution resulting from oil exploration activities have not had the 
desired effect. For instance, the 2010 Sustainability Report for Royal Dutch Shell Plc (a major oil 
company in Nigeria) noted that the oil company’s gas flaring had a thirty-two percent (32%) 
increase from 2009 to 2010.101 Despite the huge investment being made by the federal government 
in gas infrastructure, the most recent statistics indicate that the government’s efforts have only 
resulted in an eight percent (8%) increase in domestic gas production between 2013 and 2014.102 
While this modest performance is encouraging, it is not commensurate to the huge investment 
being made by the government to curb the environmental degradation caused by oil exploration 
activities. In terms of sustainability of the current measures, some have noted that the fines and 
penalties are too light to act as a deterrent,103 while others have expressed concerns as to the 
                                                          
100 Kayode Oladipo & Yuli Eyesan, “Unlocking Nigeria’s Gas Potential” (16 March 2015) King & Wood Mallesons 
Publication at 29, online: <http://www.savca.co.za> [Oladipo & Eyesan]; For the legislative provisions, see especially 
Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation Provisions) Decree No 18 of 1998 for the tax holidays, tax free dividends during 
the tax holiday, accelerated capital allowance for investment in plant and machinery, value added tax exemptions for 
plant and equipment; Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation Provisions) (No 2) Decree No 19 of 1998 for allowable 
deduction on interest on loan. Such interest is tax deductible subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance; Finance 
(Miscellaneous Taxation Provisions) Decree No 30 of 1999 for royalty and tax exemptions for gas transferred from 
NGL to GTL; Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Decree, 1990 
also makes provisions for tax holidays as well as other guarantees and assurances to encourage utilization of associated 
gas and liquefied natural gas in Nigeria. Currently, all the incentives for associated gas production are now also 
applicable to non-associated gas. 
101 Integrated Regional Information Networks, “Nigeria: Gas Flares still a Burning Issue in the Niger Delta”, IRIN 
Website (8 March 2012), online: < http://www.irinnews.org> [IRIN]. This article also notes that the Shell’s report 
attributed this poor index to the increase in oil exploration owing to a reduction in militant activities in the Niger Delta 
in that period. It was also noted that there was a 50% decrease in flaring from 2002 to 2010 but notes that this was 
also partially due to a decrease in oil extraction owing to militant activities; See also, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, 
“Sustainability Report 2010”, online: < http://reports.shell.com> at 29. 
102 NNPC, “2014 Annual Statistical Bulletin”, 2nd ed, (2014) NNPC Public Relations, Table 13.02.01 at 35-6, online: 
< http://www.nnpcgroup.com> 
103 IRIN, supra note 101. 
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preservation of these incentives under the PIB when it is passed into law.104 Given the current 
uncertainty and the perceived ineffectiveness of these measures, this thesis recommends pollution 
tax as a predictable, definitive and uniform alternative to address the issue of environmental 
degradation resulting from oil exploration activities in Nigeria. Even though this thesis does not 
suggest that pollution tax is an infallible alternative to the current measures that are directed at the 
reduction of environmental degradation in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, the thesis notes that the 
pollution tax can be an effective component of Nigeria’s clean energy policies. 
Like the name implies, pollution taxes are charges levied on “polluters for the damages their 
actions cause the environment and others”.105 A prominent tax scholar – Stanley Surrey - also 
described pollution tax as “a charge imposed for every unit of pollutant discharged into the 
environment”.106 In terms of the adoption of pollution tax for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs), many industrialized countries favour imposition of carbon taxes to discourage such 
emission and promote clean energy.107  Since GHGs are also one of the by-products of gas flaring 
in Nigeria, this thesis recommends the use of pollution taxes as a deterrence to GHG emissions 
and by extension, other pollutants in oil exploration in Nigeria.  
Although Canada’s current federal approach to climate change as a whole is perceived to be 
deficient domestically and internationally,108 some provinces in Canada have been lauded for 
implementing pollution taxes in the form of carbon tax to reduce the release of carbon dioxide 
                                                          
104 SB 205, Petroleum Industry Bill 2012, 7th Sess, National Assembly June 2011- June 2015, (second reading 7 
March 2013) [PIB]. For instance, the PIB intends to repeal the Associated Gas Re-injection Act which contains some 
of these incentives. Deloitte, “Doing Business in the Nigerian Oil & Gas Industry – Fiscal Compliance & Incentive 
Considerations (2)” (2014), Deloitte Inside Tax Week 48 Publication, online: <www.deloitte.com/ng> 
105 Nova Scotia, Finance and Treasury Board, “Charting a Path for Growth”, Tax and Regulatory Review (Nova 
Scotia: November 2014), online: <http://www.novascotia.ca>. 
106 Surrey, Pathways, supra note 5342 at 156. 
107 World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing, Projects and Operations, (US, Washington D.C: International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2014) at 76-86 [World Bank, Carbon Pricing]; Centre for 
Energy and Climate Economics, “Considering a Carbon Tax”, (December 2012), Resources for the Future Website, 
online: < http://www.rff.org> at 6-7 [CECE, Carbon Tax]. 
108 Nicholas Rivers, “The Case for a Carbon Tax in Canada”, Canada 2020 Publication (11 November 2014) online: 
< http://canada2020.ca> at 12 [Rivers]. The author states that the international environmental community currently 
views Canada as an impediment to achieving a more robust international agreement on mitigating emissions due to 
its recent withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty linked to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which commits its Parties by setting internationally binding 
emission reduction targets. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
UNFCC, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, (1997); 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
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(CO2) into the atmosphere.
109 Noteworthy is the province of British Columbia (B.C.), which has 
been commended in several quarters for the success of its carbon tax administration. Specifically, 
prominent economic authorities such as the World Bank, OECD as well as business and 
environmental leaders have called [BC’s carbon tax] “one of the world’s best climate policies: an 
environmental and economic success.”110 
In July 2008, B.C. became the first jurisdiction in North America to adopt a revenue-neutral carbon 
tax.111 The tax is considered “revenue-neutral” because the funds generated by the tax are returned 
to citizens through reductions in other taxes such as tax cuts in personal and corporate tax 
liability.112 In emphasizing the benefits of the revenue-neutral aspect of the tax to taxpayers, the 
B.C. government noted that the carbon tax has been “revenue negative” because the tax cuts and 
credits returned to the taxpayers have exceeded the revenue from the tax.113 In addition, the 
forecasts of the B.C. budget up to 2016/17 indicate that carbon tax will continue to remain revenue 
negative.114 That is, the tax cuts given to taxpayers is projected to continue to cancel out the 
revenues collected from the carbon tax in the coming years.  
At inception, B.C.’s carbon tax was imposed at a rate of $10 CAD per metric ton (“tonne”) of 
carbon dioxide (CAN$10/tCO2e) with a gradual increase of $5/tonne annually and reaching its 
current level of $30 per tonne of CO2 (CAN$30/tCO2e) in July 2012.
115 In terms of scope, the 
carbon tax applies to the purchase or use of fuels within the province.116 It covers nearly all 
                                                          
109 CECE, Carbon Tax, supra note 107 at 7. This article notes that British Columbia and Quebec have implemented 
carbon taxes. 
110 World Bank, Carbon Pricing, supra note 107 at 79; British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, “Myths and Facts about 
the Carbon Tax” (BC: 28 April 2013), online: <http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca> [BC, Facts]; Stewart Elgie & Richard 
Lipsey, “B.C.’s Carbon Tax Shift Works” Financial Post (22 January 2015), online: < 
http://business.financialpost.com>; For a detailed overview of the measure, see David G Duff, “The Reality of Carbon 
Taxes in the 21st Century: Carbon Taxation in British Columbia” (2008) 10 Vt.J. Envtl. L. 87.   
111 Stewart Elgie & Jessica McClay. “BCs Carbon Tax Shift: The First Four Years”, Sustainable Prosperity Policy 
Commentary, (27 June 2012), online: < http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca> at 5 [Elgie & McClay, 2012]. 
112 Ibid at 5; B.C. Facts, supra note 110. 
113 British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, “Budget and Fiscal Plan – 2014/15 to 2016/17 Carbon Tax Report and 
Plan” (February 2014) online: < http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca> at 65; World Bank, Carbon Pricing, supra note 107 
at 86. 
114 World Bank, Carbon Pricing, supra note 107 at 79. 
115 Carbon Tax Act, SBC 2008, c 40 s 1 [BC Carbon Tax Act]. See generally, Part 3 which provides for the imposition 
of the tax as well as directions as to how the tax rate is determined. See also, World Bank, Carbon Pricing, supra note 
107 at 86. 
116 BC Carbon Tax Act, ibid. The parties described in this definition section indicates that the parties subject to the tax 
are within BC.  
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emissions caused by burning fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) in B.C., which amounts to a 
total of over 70 percent (70%) of the province’s carbon pollution.117 Since its introduction, it has 
been reported that “the carbon tax has returned $500 million more to taxpayers in tax reductions 
than it has raised in revenue”.118  
While carbon taxes are not TEs, one can reasonably evaluate carbon taxes using the generic ex 
post and ex ante assessments parameters because of certain similarities that exist between the 
revenue neutral carbon taxation and tax expenditures. Some of these similarities include: (i) carbon 
taxes, like TEs, are government policy tools aimed at reducing carbon emissions by influencing 
taxpayers’ behaviour through the tax system; (ii) carbon taxes are similar to negative tax 
expenditures in that they increase taxpayers liabilities relative to the benchmark (as opposed to 
reducing the liabilities under positive tax expenditures); (iii) the revenue neutrality of carbon 
taxation makes it revenue negative, which has the effect of reducing government revenue in the 
same way TEs reduce the revenue accruing to the government. Despite these similarities, the ex 
post evaluation of B.C.’s carbon tax in this thesis is two-fold. First, the thesis conducts the ex post 
evaluation of the carbon tax in terms of specific criteria for evaluating environmentally related 
taxation. Thereafter, the thesis also assesses carbon taxation using the generic ex post assessment 
criteria for TEs. Given the nature of carbon tax as an environmental tax and the similar features 
carbon taxation shares with tax expenditures, it is important to evaluate the tax from the 
aforementioned perspectives for the purposes of completeness and uniformity.  
5.1.3.1. Specific Ex- Post Evaluation for Environmentally Related Taxation 
According to the OECD, there are specific criteria that are relevant for evaluating environmentally 
related taxes.119 The OECD recommends that environmentally related taxes should be evaluated 
on the basis of their (i) environmental effectiveness; (ii) dynamic effects; (iii) economic efficiency; 
(iv) administrative costs; and (v)compliance costs.120 The generic ex post evaluation criteria for 
TEs on the other hand, requires an assessment of the relevance, cost, impact and efficiency of the 
                                                          
117 World Bank, Carbon Pricing, supra note 107 at 78 
118 BC, Facts, supra note 110. 
119 OECD, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries: Issues and Strategies (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2001) 
at 45 [OECD, 2001]. This OECD report documents the growing evidence of the environmental effectiveness of 
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TEs.  Given that the OECD criteria (iii) – (v) overlap with themes in the generic ex post evaluation, 
this section discusses only the OECD criteria (i) and (ii) which are peculiar to environmental 
related taxation.  
In terms of environmental effectiveness, the OECD states that the environmental effect of the tax 
can be determined by measuring “the extent to which the tax delivers its environmental 
objectives.121 According to the B.C. Ministry of Finance, the objective of carbon taxation is to put 
a price on carbon in order to: (i) encourage individuals, businesses, industry and others to use less 
fossil fuel and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions; (ii) send a consistent price signal; and (iii) 
ensure that those who produce emissions pay for them; and (iv) make clean energy alternatives 
more attractive. For B.C.’s carbon tax to meet the criterion of environmental effectiveness, the tax 
must have successfully met these objectives by altering taxpayers’ behavior to generate an 
improved environmental outcome. A general consensus based on the review of the carbon tax by 
several scholars indicates that the carbon tax has been highly environmentally effective in terms 
of its objectives.122 Noteworthy is the periodic research conducted by Sustainable Prosperity (SP), 
a national green economy think tank at the University of Ottawa on the efficacy of B.C.’s carbon 
tax.123 This group has been tracking the impacts of the carbon tax in B.C. since its introduction in 
2008.124 In addition to the reviews relying on figures provided by Statistics Canada,125 these 
periodic reports have also been adopted by the World Bank in discussing and evaluating the B.C. 
carbon tax, thereby adding credibility to its adoption in this thesis.126   
According to the 2013 SP review, fuel consumption in B.C. has reduced since the introduction of 
carbon tax while fuel use in the rest of Canada has increased. In evaluating the environmental 
effects of the tax, the report compared the consumption of only those fuels that are subject to the 
                                                          
121 Ibid. 
122Nicholas Rivers & Dave Sawyer, “Pricing Carbon: Saving Green: A Carbon Price to Lower Emissions, Taxes and 
Barriers to Green Technology”, (2008), Suzuki Foundation, online: < http://www.davidsuzuki.org>  at 20-21; Pierre 
Sadik, “Essentials of a Carbon Tax for Canada”, (2015), Eco Justice website, online: http://www.ecojustice.ca> at 10;  
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carbon tax in BC to their corresponding consumption in the rest of Canada, on a per capita basis.127 
The comparison was based on the period immediately preceding the introduction of carbon tax in 
B.C. (between July 1 2007 – June 30 2008) and the period within which the tax had been 
introduced and implemented (July 1 2008 – June 30 2012).128 The review found that  “BC’s fuel 
consumption per person has fallen every year since the carbon tax came in; overall, it declined by 
17.4 percent from the 2007/08 base year to 2011/12”.129 In comparison to the rest of Canada, it 
was noted that B.C.’s fuel consumption “declined 18.8 percent more than in the rest of Canada 
during this four year period – a remarkably large difference”.130 
Dynamic efficiency is another useful criterion suggested by the OECD for evaluating 
environmentally related taxes. The OECD notes that environmentally related taxation ought to 
incentivize the taxpayers to adopt cheaper and innovative techniques and technology for 
abatement.131 In the case of B.C., it is apparent that the increase in gasoline prices due to the 
taxation on carbon has influenced consumers to purchase more fuel efficient vehicles.132 
Specifically, relevant data indicate that, “[t]he market share of subcompact and compact passenger 
car sales has increased steadily while the market share of larger cars, SUVs, pickups and minivans 
has declined.”133 Even though this change in consumer behaviour can be as a result of multiple 
factors, the B.C. Ministry of Finance as well as reports from other writers suggest that carbon tax 
played a dominant role in affecting consumers’ behaviour in choosing a cleaner energy alternative 
in the purchase of vehicles in the B.C. province.134  
In terms of innovation of technology, studies conducted on certain communities in B.C. indicate 
that the carbon tax has encouraged the development of clean energy projects in most of those 
                                                          
127 See especially, Elgie & McClay, 2013, supra note 123 at 2 (footnote 3). The fuel used in the analysis se include 
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128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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131 OECD, 2001, supra note 119 at 46.  
132 B.C. Facts, supra note 110. 
133 Ibid. 
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The Globe and Mail, (9 July 2014), online: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com> 
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communities.135 Specifically, interviews were conducted on twelve local governments in B.C. by 
Pembina Institute, an organisation that promotes clean energy solutions through research, 
education, consulting and advocacy.136 The findings of the Institute revealed that seven of the 
twelve communities that were interviewed indicated the carbon tax “as having either a very or 
somewhat positive role in building the business case for projects they had implemented.”137 The 
remainder of the communities interviewed noted that carbon tax had a neutral impact on the 
business case for their projects because the tax rate “is too low to significantly influence their 
investment decisions”.138 Based on these interviews, it is evident that a higher percentage of these 
communities perceive a positive impact of carbon tax in making decisions for clean energy 
innovation, especially as there was no “negative impact” recorded in the interviews. In one of the 
reports, Sarah Webb, a Climate Action program manager in the Capital Regional District was 
quoted as saying that, “[t]he tax was an external mechanism that helped [the district] quantify the 
economic differences between ‘business as usual’ and green infrastructure innovation. While we 
recognize there are some limitations of the carbon tax, it is a step in the right direction to more 
holistic accounting.”139  
Based on the above, one can reasonably conclude that the B.C. carbon tax has been substantially 
successful in terms of its environmental effects and dynamic efficiency as it stimulates clean 
energy awareness and technological progress in the area of clean energy innovation. Nevertheless, 
the next section in this thesis also assesses the carbon tax in terms of its continued relevance, costs 
and administrative efficiency in order to provide a comprehensive ex post evaluation of this tax.  
5.1.3.2. Generic Ex-Post Evaluation 
While the aforementioned positive reports on the B.C.’s carbon tax is reflective of its continued 
relevance in addressing the objectives of the tax, the initial public opinion on the tax was not as 
favourable. It was noted that the initial reaction to the carbon tax in B.C. was quite controversial 
                                                          
135 Kevin Sauve & Matt Horne, “Lessons from B.C.’s Carbon Tax”, Corporate Knights, (8 November 2014) online: 
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as “public support [for carbon tax] dropped as low as 40 percent when the policy was 
implemented”.140 However, public support for the tax began to trend upwards and reached a high 
of sixty-four percent (64%) in November 2012 when B.C.’s carbon tax rate reached its maximum 
level.141 In B.C.’s 2013 Carbon Tax Review, more than seventy-five percent (75%) of the 2,200 
public submissions received from British Columbians expressed support for the tax.142 It was 
noted that this percentage was indicative of public support from the “urban, suburban and rural 
parts of the province”.143 The increasing support of the carbon tax in terms of numerical and 
geographical terms is a good indication of the continued relevance of the carbon tax in British 
Columbia.  
In terms of the cost-effectiveness of carbon taxation, it has been emphasized that experts consider 
carbon pricing as the most cost-effective tool for reducing GHG emissions.144 According to the 
2013 SP review, the cost effective nature of carbon tax in comparison to other alternatives is a 
view held by “[a]lmost all economists, and most Canadian business and environmental leaders.”145 
This tax has been considered efficient for a number of reasons. First the gradual tax rate structure 
of the tax enables businesses to manage their fuel consumption and plan their future 
investments.146 Secondly, the carbon tax puts a price on emissions from consumers along with 
emissions from industrial activity by charging the same price for every unit of GHG emission on 
almost all individuals and businesses.147 Finally, B.C.’s economic growth has kept pace with the 
rest of Canada thereby suggesting that the implementation of the carbon tax has not had a negative 
impact on the province’s economy.148 In terms of GDP growth, available data shows that, “BC’s 
economy has slightly outperformed the rest of the country over the period that the carbon tax has 
been in place.”149Therefore, the revenue- neutral nature of the carbon tax has not affected the 
economic growth of B.C. even with the revenue negative figures it has recorded.150 
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In evaluating administrative efficiency, the OECD noted the cost of administering the tax should 
be relatively minimal.151 The current structure of B.C.’s carbon tax has been described as a good 
structure in terms of administrative burden.152 The implementation of this tax scores high on 
administrative efficiency because it simply requires a change in the rate of existing fuel and 
income taxes that the government already administers and the rate of tax credits that the 
government already distributes.153 Thus, the administration of B.C.’s carbon tax allows multiple 
benefits to the government, companies, and final consumers at minimal cost to all parties 
concerned. 
5.1.3.3. Ex-Ante Assessment 
In deciding whether or not to introduce the carbon taxation into Nigeria, this thesis draws on the 
parameters suggested by the OECD for TEs given the aforementioned similarities B.C.’s carbon 
tax shares with TEs. Thus, this ex-ante assessment of carbon tax will address the need for pollution 
taxation in Nigeria, the proposed objectives of the tax in Nigeria as well as the justification for 
using pollution tax as a tool for reducing emissions as opposed to other alternative market 
instruments.  
The consequent effects of oil spillages and gas flaring discussed in chapter one present a 
compelling need to reduce the environmental impacts of oil exploration and production activities 
in Nigeria. Even though Nigeria has existing measures directed at improving the environment, it 
has not fared well in terms of enforcement of these laws.154 Particularly, the lack of awareness of 
environmental issues by the populace coupled with the failure of government to strictly enforce 
the existing rules have been cited as contributory factors to the current environmental problems in 
Nigeria.155 This thesis contends that carbon taxation, especially the variant adopted in B.C., can 
address these limiting factors. Since the B.C.’s carbon tax is structured as a transfer payment to 
government which is returned to the taxpayers via tax cuts and tax credits, this thesis argues that 
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(i) the potential for continuous incentives is likely to increase taxpayers’ awareness of 
environmental issues and (ii) the enforcement of the tax is likely to be less cumbersome for the 
government since the implementation of the pollution tax is tied to existing personal and corporate 
tax systems.156 Thus, the implementation of a pollution tax similar to the revenue-neutral carbon 
tax in B.C. is predominantly self-enforcing for addressing the environmental challenges that 
accompany oil production in Nigeria.  
In determining the objectives of carbon taxation in Nigeria, it is important to determine the 
proposed scope of application. While the imposition of carbon taxation for individuals and 
businesses (as applicable in B.C.) is desirable for the general reduction of carbon and other harmful 
emissions in Nigeria, introducing an identical structure in Nigeria at the initial phase is likely to 
reduce public support and acceptance of the tax policy in Nigeria. The thesis considers it advisable 
that the initial phase of the tax should be directed at upstream oil and gas companies exclusively 
(i.e., exploration stage) for a number of reasons: (i) the current lack of awareness of environmental 
issues may confer a superficial innocence on individuals and non-oil businesses, thereby these 
groups will consider the tax as unwarranted or consider the tax as “paying for other people’s 
mistakes”; (ii) the past and current oil production activities which resulted in the current and more 
noticeable environmental degradation in the Niger Delta amplifies the complicity of the oil 
producing companies; (iii) the initial imposition of the tax on a broad scale may be costly and 
challenging for the federal government as opposed to implementing the program in the oil and gas 
industry alone. Therefore, this thesis contends that imposition of the carbon tax on upstream oil 
and gas companies in the short term and ultimately on individuals and other businesses in the long 
run is a more politically saleable approach to the introduction of this particular tax in Nigeria. 
Therefore, the remainder of the thesis considers the tax in the terms of the proposed short term 
application (upstream oil producing companies). 
Based on the proposed scope of its application, this thesis contemplates a hybrid tax transplant 
given the proposed modifications of B.C.’s carbon tax prior to its introduction into Nigeria’s tax 
                                                          
156 Rhodes & Jaccard, supra note 146 at S3. This is because the revenue neutral feature of the carbon tax entails that 
all the revenue collected by the provincial government through the carbon tax must be returned to the carbon taxpayers 
(British Columbians and B.C. businesses) through tax cuts to their personal income tax and some business taxes. 
Thus, the availability of the tax cuts can increase awareness of the carbon tax while the administration is less 
cumbersome because the mechanism for implementation of the personal income tax and the relevant business taxes 
are already in existence.  
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system. First, the thesis recommends that the tax should be called an “Oil Exploration Pollution 
Tax” in order to extend the scope of the tax to include oil spillages and other environmental 
pollution issues resulting from oil exploration in Nigeria.  Also, this thesis recommends that the 
proposed objectives for the tax should be: (i) to shift the burden of gas flaring, oil spillages and 
other environmental pollution arising from the exploration and extraction of crude oil to those 
responsible for it; (ii) to impose a price for harm done to the environment through exploration and 
extraction of crude oil; (iii) to discourage pollution and protect the Nigerian environment; (iv) to 
encourage more sustainable behaviour in oil eation and production in Nigeria; (v) to promote 
greater economic welfare by making clean energy alternatives more attractive to oil and gas 
businesses. 
In terms of approach, it has been observed that “among policy analysts, international 
organizations, many large companies and academics, there is a nearly universal acknowledgement 
that a carbon tax represents the optimal policy instrument for reducing greenhouse gases.”157 Even 
though carbon tax has been identified as the preferred policy for reducing emissions, there are a 
number of alternative policy measures that also put a price on carbon which have been adopted in 
other Canadian provinces and other jurisdictions.158 For instance, the “benchmark-and-credit” 
system and the cap and trade policy have been used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Alberta 
and Quebec respectively. Noteworthy is the cap and trade policy which has been a subject of 
comparison with carbon taxation in the literature.159 In assessing the better approach between these 
two dominant alternatives, it is important to describe the cap and trade system of carbon pricing. 
The cap and trade system like the name implies is a system where the government puts a firm 
restriction or cap on the overall level of carbon pollution from the industry and reduces this cap 
annually in order to reach a set pollution target.160 Thus, the cap and trade system begins with a 
fixed quantity of emission and allows the price of the carbon to emerge through trading while 
carbon taxes begin with a fixed price and subsequently allow the quantity of emissions to emerge 
in response to the fixed price.  
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It has been argued that carbon taxation is a better option than the cap and trade system. 
Nevertheless, cap and trade system has also been used successfully in some jurisdictions such as 
the United States and Europe.161 However, this thesis recommends carbon tax for reducing 
environmental pollution from oil production activities over the cap and trade system because: (i) 
the design of carbon tax is simpler, more transparent and can be implemented almost immediately 
because the tax structures are already in place while the design for the cap and trade system would 
involve the initial allocation of permits which may take many years;162 (ii) carbon taxes are likely 
to drive innovation as the fixed price of the taxes will stimulate innovations in technology as 
opposed to cap and trade systems where wealthy investors can grandfather the permits of smaller 
businesses;163 and (iii) carbon taxes are more administratively efficient as they can be implemented 
by using existing tax information which the government already has unlike cap and trade system 
which may require new information requirement from individuals and businesses.164 Furthermore, 
the use of carbon tax provides more price certainty which is a very important factor for businesses 
that aim to work towards a zero environmental footprint in oil and gas exploration and production. 
For the purpose of transplanting the carbon tax into Nigeria’s legal system, this thesis recommends 
that the pollution tax can be imposed at a rate to be determined by the FIRS and Nigeria’s DPR. 
This is because the determination of an effective tax rate that will attract the desired behavior 
(reduction of pollution) involves specialized expertise and data (for instance, chemical 
composition of the pollutants or behaviour of upstream companies to existing schemes) that is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the thesis suggests that the pollution tax be introduced 
at a lower starting rate (as was done in B.C.) and increased over time if the apparent severity of 
environmental degradation is on the increase. Similarly, the tax rate can also be scheduled to 
reduce over time if the severity of pollution from oil exploration activities also appears to be 
decreasing. As earlier mentioned, this thesis maintains that the imposition of the tax at the level 
of exploration and production is an administratively more efficient way to levy the tax given the 
current state of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry.  
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As a result of the dominant role of the NNPC in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, the potential 
effect of the pollution tax on the NNPC is noteworthy. Under the existing laws, the national oil 
company is not exempt from “liability for any tax, duty, rate, levy or other charge”.165 The 
Petroleum Profits Tax Act, provides that tax shall be levied on the profits “of any company 
engaged in petroleum operations during that period”.166 Under the PSC arrangement, the NNPC 
and the IOC are liable to tax “in accordance with the proportion of the percentage of profit oil 
split”.167 Under the JV arrangement, both the NNPC and the IOCs are jointly liable for tax, royalty 
and rent because the concession is jointly held by the IOC and the NNPC.168 For PSC and risk 
service contracts, Nigeria’s petroleum law provides that “the Corporation [NNPC] or the Holder 
[of the concession] … shall pay all royalty, concession rentals and PPT on behalf of itself and the 
Contractor out of the allocated royalty oil and tax oil”.169  Given that the NNPC holds the 
concession under both arrangements, this suggests that the NNPC has the responsibility for paying 
tax, rent and royalty even though the tax liability (chargeable amount) is to be split among the 
parties in the same ratio as the profit oil.170 In effect, the language of the law indicates that the 
NNPC alone should be liable for the payment of these charges under the PSC and risk service 
contracts.  
Although the NNPC pays taxes, rents and royalties as a “company engaged in petroleum 
operations”, its influential position as a national oil company remains significant. Despite its 
liability to pay taxes, the NNPC Act provides that “oil pipelines and other installations” belonging 
to the NNPC such as oil rigs and refineries are exempt for the purpose of imposition of “any tax, 
duty, rate, levy or other charge whatsoever, whether general or local”.171  This means that the 
NNPC enjoys certain exemptions which are not available to other stakeholders. This preferential 
status of the NNPC is also evident in its role as a petroleum revenue collection agent since the 
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government collects royalties, fees and taxes from operators in the oil and gas sector through the 
FIRS and the NNPC.172 
Due to the dual role of the NNPC as taxpayer and tax collector (such as tax oil which the NNPC 
collects under the PSC), the impact of the pollution tax on the NNPC is particularly noteworthy. 
Consequently, this thesis suggests that the imposition of the pollution tax should recognize the 
existing fiscal responsibilities and exemptions of the NNPC. Specifically, the application of the 
pollution tax could be structured to mirror the current corporate income tax structure in Nigeria’s 
petroleum industry. That is, the NNPC and the IOCs should be jointly liable to pay pollution tax 
in proportion to their participating interests under the JV arrangements. Similarly, the licensee or 
the lessee under the PSCs and risk service contracts should be liable for the payment of the 
pollution tax under those arrangements. In terms of exemption, the parties (NNPC and IOCs) 
should also be exempt from the pollution tax under arrangements where the parties currently enjoy 
tax exemptions. For instance, income derived from associated gas framework agreements –which 
are currently exempt from PPT – should also be exempt from pollution tax for both parties. This 
thesis contemplates that the implementation of the pollution tax in this manner will be useful for 
administrative efficiency of the pollution tax. Even though the potential impact of these 
recommendations on the NNPC is likely to be of great significance to government’s decision 
making, this thesis is optimistic that the long-term benefits of the recommendations will be 
recognized and given more preference by the federal government.  
5.2. Administrative Measures 
In addition to the fiscal incentives above, there are certain tax administrative measures which have 
the potential for petroleum sector reforms in Nigeria. In order to increase the viability of these 
measures in Nigeria’s legal system, the administrative recommendations provided in this thesis 
consider and acknowledge the relevant legal considerations between the two jurisdictions 
discussed in 2.3. The two administrative measures proposed in this thesis are the Informants Lead 
Program and the Mandatory Reporting Standards for the Extractive Sector.  
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5.2.1. Informants Lead Program 
In dealing with corruption and lack of accountability, Nigeria can borrow from the Canadian 
government by implementing certain features of the “Informant Leads Program” (ILP).173 This is 
a program instituted by the CRA and provides an avenue for individuals to report tax non-
compliance in an anonymous capacity.174 In Canada, the ILP has three variants depending on the 
source of information or the nature of income under consideration.175 The first variant enables 
informants to notify the CRA of domestic tax fraud. The second variant is the Offshore Tax 
Informant Program (OTIP) which is geared towards international tax evasion and avoidance.176 
For OTIP, the informants can receive up to 15% of the federal tax collected as reward where 
information provided leads to collection of such offshore taxes. The third and the most recent 
inclusion to the ILP is geared towards internal fraud and misuse among CRA employees.177 
According to the CRA, the mandate of the ILP is to coordinate all the leads received by the CRA 
from informants so that the CRA can determine if there is an element of non-compliance with tax 
legislation and ensure that the appropriate departments receive those leads for investigations and 
enforcement of action.178 The nature of information that the CRA may consider useful in 
determining whether or not to undertake an investigation, audit or other action include the name, 
contact information, social insurance number, date of birth and spouse’s name of the person or 
people one suspects of such non-compliance.179 Where the information relates to a corporate 
entity, the CRA may require from the informant details relating to the business name, names of 
the shareholders as well as names of related companies.180 Informants can pass the information 
they wish to give to the CRA by phone, email, facsimile or online through the CRA website.181 
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Although the CRA acknowledges that the informant may not have all the information above, the 
more details that are available to the CRA, the sooner the CRA can initiate appropriate action.182  
As an informant under the ILP, providing personal contact information is not mandatory.183 
However, the 2013 Economic Action Plan indicates that there may be financial incentives to 
providing contact information as an OTIP informant.184 Under this arrangement, informants may 
be entitled to rewards if they have knowledge of major international tax non-compliance that 
results in the CRA’s collection of outstanding tax liability.185 Specifically, the CRA will enter into 
a contract that will result in financial rewards for the informant “only if the information provided 
results in total additional assessments or reassessments exceeding $100,000 in federal tax”.186 This 
contract will provide for payment to the informant between five percent (5%) to fifteen percent 
(15%) of the federal tax collected (i.e., excluding penalties, interest and provincial taxes) and such 
payment is only payable after the erring taxpayers have paid the taxes to the CRA.187 For the 
awards to be paid, the non-compliant activity must relate to transactions conducted partially or 
entirely outside Canada or involve foreign property or property located or transferred outside 
Canada.188 While eligibility is not restricted to Canadian citizens alone, an informant must meet 
the program criteria.189 For instance, informants will not qualify for the financial rewards if: (a) 
the informant is involved in the non-compliance and has been convicted of tax evasion for the 
matter; (b) the individual is the authorized representative of the taxpayer involved; (c) the 
informant is already obligated to disclose the information to the CRA, and (d) the information 
lacks integrity or is already in the possession of the CRA.190 A number of OECD member countries 
including the United Kingdom, United States and Germany already provide rewards for 
information regarding tax non-compliance.191 Thus, the provision of rewards in exchange for tax 
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information is not peculiar to Canada alone. This thesis suggests that Nigeria can benefit from this 
“rewards” aspect of the OTIP as well as certain aspects of the ILP.  
Currently, Nigeria has an existing whistleblowing program directed at domestic fraud and 
corruption among FIRS employees.192 However, this whistleblowing program does not 
specifically address and/or reward the supply of information relating to international tax evasion 
and avoidance. While this thesis does not recommend the adoption of the first and third variant of 
Canada’s ILP, it identifies two areas of improvement for Nigeria’s existing measures and 
recommends the adoption of the OTIP as a complementary measure to these tax evasion reducing 
mechanisms.  
Nigeria’s whistleblowing program for domestic tax fraud and internal fraud among tax 
administrators is carried out by the Values and Doctrines Division (VDD) of the FIRS.193 This 
division was created in 2005 as a result of the “dwindling public perception and confidence” 
towards the FIRS.194 The VDD was created to improve the whistleblower unit of the FIRS called 
the Anti-Corruption and Transparency Unit (ACTU) which had earlier been established to serve 
as a window through which informants could reach the FIRS Chairman with information regarding 
corrupt practices involving the FIRS and its staff.195 The VDD has a mandate to prevent, detect, 
investigate and ultimately refer for prosecution FIRS staff and non-staff who are found complicit 
in tax fraud cases.196 Similar to the CRA’s ILP, informants can report suspected cases of fraud to 
the FIRS through the FIRS dedicated telephone numbers, email addresses or on the FIRS website 
in an anonymous capacity.197 
                                                          
192 For an overview of Nigeria’s whistleblowing program, see Ifueko Omoigui Okauru, Federal Inland Revenue 
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In terms of efficacy of whistleblowing measures, evidence suggests that the most common forms 
of corruption detection in recent times is done through whistleblowing.198 For instance, a 2007 
survey conducted by KPMG (a global network of professional firms providing tax, audit and 
advisory services) noted that out of 360 instances of fraud in businesses in Europe, the Middle 
East, and Africa, the main source of detection was through anonymous tipping by informants and 
whistleblowers.199 Even though whistleblowing has also been instrumental in providing viable 
leads on tax fraud to the FIRS, the program has not reached the desired level of success as an anti-
corruption mechanism.200 It has been noted that risks associated with whistleblowing such as 
ostracism, loss of job or means of livelihood, threat to informant’s life or their loved ones as well 
as loss of income and/or time in cases of tax litigation are factors that deter potential informants 
from providing valuable information to the FIRS.201  
Perhaps the successes recorded in the aforementioned KPMG survey is attributable to the 
existence of legislation and policies that support whistleblowing in these regions.202 Even though 
Nigeria is signatory to several international conventions that emphasize whistleblowing for the 
purpose of reducing corruption,203 there is currently no legal protection for whistleblowers as 
Nigeria’s Whistle Blower Protection Bill (“WBPB”) awaits presidential assent.204 The current 
Nigerian laws which encourage whistleblowing protect the identity of the informants but have no 
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Special Laws”, Vanguard ( 16 June 2015), online: <http://www.vanguardngr.com> 
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additional provisions that address instances where such identity is erroneously or negligently 
compromised.205 However, the new bill is very promising in this regard as it inter alia, contains 
specific provisions that protect informants from victimization and also provides for compensation 
to eligible informants.206 In order to improve the efficacy of whistleblowing as a tax fraud 
detection measure in Nigeria, this thesis suggests the prompt passage of the WBPB into law as 
this will not only energize the FIRS and anti-corruption agencies but also empower Nigerians to 
fight corruption. Secondly, this thesis recommends that policies directed at the protection of 
potential informants from victimization should also be included in corporate governance 
documents for private businesses and non-tax parastatals. 
As a complementary measure to the existing whistleblowing program in Nigeria, this thesis also 
recommends the simple tax transplant of the OTIP for addressing international tax evasion in 
Nigeria. Given the prevalence of tax evasion in Nigeria (as discussed in 1.3.1.4), one may 
reasonably argue that the element of financial reward for non-compliance with tax laws may entice 
potential informants and ultimately increase the amount of unreliable information received by the 
FIRS. Another valid concern could be the possibility of the informants submitting false 
information based on revenge-motive such as business competitors, aggrieved spouses, former 
employees or business partners. However, these concerns can be addressed in a number of ways: 
(i) they can be addressed by ensuring that significant time and resources are invested into the FIRS 
administrative systems for vetting informants and the information received; (ii) heavy fines and 
penalties can also be imposed as a deterrence measure on FIRS staff and/or informants that submit 
false information under the proposed transplant given the rate of internal corrupt practices within 
the FIRS; (iii) in addition to fines and penalties, the incidence of providing false information based 
on revenge-motive can also be reduced by placing the burden of proving the absence of such 
motive on the prospective informant. Since informants that wish to receive rewards are expected 
to submit their personal information, the FIRS may request the prospective informants to provide 
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details of the nature of their relationship to the alleged non-compliant party.207 Even though the 
claims of a prospective informant cannot be directly verified or rebutted by the alleged non-
compliant party due to the element of anonymity of informants, the existence of such requirement 
could be a deterrence for the submission of false information to the FIRS. Given that one of the 
major challenges of oil and gas tax administration in Nigeria relates to evasion of taxes by 
multinational oil companies, this thesis contends that the OTIP could be a suitable medium through 
which suspected cases of international tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance can be reported 
to the FIRS for the purpose of appropriate action. Nevertheless, the whistleblowing measures 
discussed in this thesis can only play a vital role in the reduction of corruption, fraud and 
mismanagement in Nigeria’s tax administration if they are fairly and properly implemented in 
Nigeria’s tax and legal system. 
5.2.2. Mandatory Reporting Standards for the Extractive Sector 
In June 2013, the Canadian government unveiled plans to implement a mandatory reporting 
requirement for corporations in the extractive sector of its petroleum industry.208 The purpose of 
the mandatory reporting standards is to honour and implement Canada’s international 
commitments made to its G-7 counterparts to enhance transparency and accountability of eligible 
payments made by certain entities in the extractive industry. 209 Specifically, the reporting 
standards legislation – called the Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act210 (“ESTMA”) 
came into force on 1 June 2015 and requires public disclosure payments made by mining and oil 
and gas corporations engaged in the commercial development of oil, gas and minerals to all levels 
of government both domestic and abroad (including Aboriginal entities), on a project-by-project 
basis.211  
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211 Canada, Government of Canada, “Harper Government Delivers on Commitment to Enhance Transparency of 
Extractive Industry”, Government of Canada website, (1 June 2015) online: <http://open.canada.ca>. 
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The ESTMA requires Canadian extractive companies to publicly report payments including taxes, 
royalties, fees and production entitlements of $100,000 (CAD) or more which they pay to all levels 
of government in Canada and abroad.212 The legislation applies to two major categories of business 
entities that are directly or indirectly engaged in the commercial development of oil, gas or 
minerals in Canada or abroad.213 The first category are entities that are listed on a stock exchange 
in Canada while the second category are entities that have a place of business in Canada, do 
business in Canada or have assets in Canada and meet or exceed two of the following conditions 
for at least one of its two most recent financial years (a) has at least $20 million (CAD) in assets; 
(b) has at least $40 million (CAD) in revenue; and/or (c) employs an average of 250 employees.214 
Based on the foregoing, the ESTMA is not restricted to Canadian-headquartered entities alone as 
foreign and domestic companies (including their subsidiaries) operating in Canada can potentially 
be captured within the ambit of this legislation if they have a controlling interest in any extractive 
project in Canada or abroad.215 
Where an entity is required to disclose eligible payments under the ESTMA, such entity is required 
to file with the applicable minister (as appointed by the Governor in Council) a report in the 
prescribed form indicating all payments made to a payee during a fiscal year.216 The concept of 
“payee” in the ESTMA comprises Canadian government, foreign governments (at subnational and 
local levels) and also includes boards, corporations, commissions, trusts or other bodies or 
authorities that perform a function for a government.217 Notably, and in furtherance of the 
corruption detection and deterrence objective of the ESTMA, a payment that is made to an 
employee or public office holder of any of the payees is deemed to have been made to that 
government body, and must also be reported.218 Thus, the ESTMA requires public disclosure of 
lawful payments to governments as well as payments that could potentially violate anti-corruption 
legislation in Canada.219 In addition to filing the annual reports in the prescribed form with the 
                                                          
212 See ESTMA, supra note 210. For the nature of payments to be reported, see s 2 and for the threshold of payments 
to be reported see s 9(2). 
213 Ibid, s 2. 
214 Ibid, s 8 (1). 
215 Canada, Government of Canada, “Key Elements of the Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act”, 
Government of Canada website, (26 June 2015) online: <http://open.canada.ca> [Key Elements]. 
216 ESTMA, supra note 210 at s 9. 
217 Ibid, s 2. 
218 Ibid, s 3. 
219 An example of such anti-corruption legislation is the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, SC 1998, c 34. 
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minister, reporting entities are required to make such reports public (annually) by, for example 
posting the reports on their corporate websites.220 Where a reporting entity does not have a website, 
the minister will specify an alternative means to making the report accessible to the public.221 
Since Canada’s approach for mandatory reporting for the extractive industry is similar to the 
United States and European Union approaches (and may also emerge elsewhere), the ESTMA 
contains a substitution clause.222 This clause allows the minister to determine that the reports 
originating from another jurisdiction (including provinces and/or foreign countries) can be 
submitted to satisfy Canada’s reporting requirement subject to certain conditions the minister may 
impose.223 For instance, a report that meets a province’s mandatory reporting standards can 
(subject to ministerial approval) be determined to be an acceptable substitute for the federal 
standards. This provision allows for administrative efficiency as a reporting entity could choose 
to file a provincial report to meet the federal law. In addition to the above, the minister has 
authority to request for an audit or further information relating to payments made to governments 
from a reporting entity for the purpose of enforcing compliance with the ESTMA.224  
In terms of exemption from the reporting standards, the ESTMA does not provide for an 
exemption clause.225 Even though Canada, like the EU and the US, has acknowledged that there 
may be instances where the mandatory reporting standards require disclosure of information that 
is prohibited by another country’s laws or the terms of a contract, no exemptions have been made 
for countries or contracts under their respective reporting regime.226 Apart from nullifying the 
transparency objective of the ESTMA, allowing such exemptions is likely to encourage 
governments or reporting entities who wish to withhold information from interested parties to 
enact such prohibitory or anti-disclosure legislation or terms of contracts.227 Thus, an exemption 
                                                          
220 ESTMA, supra note 210 at s 9 (5) provides for the Minister’s exercise of discretion in making the reports available 
to the public; Key Elements, supra note 215. 
221 ESTMA, ibid. 
222 Key Elements, supra note 215. 
223 ESTMA, supra note 210, s 10. 
224 Ibid, s 14. 
225 ESTMA, supra note 210. 
226 Mandatory Reporting, supra note 209. 
227 Alan Detheridge, “On Transparency Bill, Canada Should Stand Its Ground Against Big Oil”, The Globe and Mail, 
(18 November 2014), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. 
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clause may only serve to undermine the fundamental purpose of the ESTMA which is to provide 
access to information for transparency and accountability purposes. 
In Nigeria, the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act (“NEITI Act”),228 which 
is aimed at developing transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s extractive industry, provides 
a similar mandate to the ESTMA. Under the NEITI Act, extractive companies (including foreign 
companies with a permanent establishment in Nigeria) are required to disclose to the NEITI, 
payments such as royalties, taxes, signature bonuses, levies and sales of equity crude and all other 
payments due to the Nigerian federal government from all extractive industry companies.229 In 
contrast to the ESTMA, the only eligible payee under the NEITI Act is the Nigerian federal 
government who is also required to make disclosures to the NEITI.230 Therefore, the NEITI Act 
requires extractive companies to disclose payments made to the Nigerian federal government 
while the government (including state-owned enterprises like the NNPC) disclose receipts to the 
NEITI.231 These submissions are independently assessed for accuracy by the NEITI and 
communicated in a report to create public awareness about how the country should improve the 
management of its natural resources.232  
Notably, the NEITI audit reports have exposed massive decay and corrupt practices in Nigeria’s 
oil and gas industry.233 For instance, the NEITI was instrumental in uncovering unremitted funds 
of about $2 million (USD) from IOCs arising from underpayments and underassessments based 
on payments and receipts submitted to the NEITI in 2013.234 In addition to uncovering funds, the 
NEITI audits have also been instrumental in identifying other lapses in the oil and gas industry 
such as poor metering infrastructure for crude oil and the incapacity of regulatory agencies to 
verify royalty and petroleum profit tax computations.235 Despite the laudable achievements of the 
                                                          
228 Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act, LFN 2007 s2 [NEITI Act]. 
229 Ibid, s 3. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid, s 4. 
233 Zainab Ahmed, “EITI Implementation in Nigeria: Outcomes, Impacts and Challenges”, (Paper delivered at the 
Global Commodities Forum, 7th – 8th April 2014), online:  http://unctad.org/meetings> at 14-5 [EITI Paper]. A NEITI 
audit report also exposed $9.8 billion as potential revenue due to underassessment, underpayment and variance 
between what companies paid and what government received in the form of taxes, royalties and other eligible 
payments. See also, Adeola Yusuf, “NEITI Uncovers IOC’s N30b Unremitted Fund”, Daily Independent Nigeria (14 
May 2013), online: <http://dailyindependentnig.com>.  
234 EITI Paper, ibid at 15. 
235 Ibid at 14. 
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NEITI in improving transparency and accountability of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, two major 
factors that undermine the effectiveness of the initiative are lack of funds and failure of the 
government to implement the findings in the NEITI audit reports.236 For instance, the NEITI’s 
budget dwindled by about fifty percent (50%) between the years 2011 to 2013, thereby 
jeopardizing the agency’s noble objectives.237 However, the current government administration’s 
commitment to implement the findings in previous NEITI audit reports provides a basis for 
renewed optimism about the future of the NEITI especially in terms of the role it can play in 
Nigeria’s petroleum sector reforms.238 Thus, this thesis simply recommends the hybrid transplant 
of certain features in the ESTMA that have the potential to improve the current NEITI initiative 
in Nigeria. 
Although the mandate of Nigeria’s NEITI Act is similar to the objective of the ESTMA,239 this 
thesis recommends certain measures in the ESTMA to improve the NEITI initiative for a number 
of reasons: (a) the persistent lack of transparency and accountability in the oil and gas industry 
indicates that there is room for improvement in enforcing the NEITI Act, (b) the scope of NEITI 
Act does not extend to payments made to foreign governments; and (c) the NEITI Act allows for 
discretionary disclosure of reports but does not make it mandatory for reporting entities to make 
public disclosures of the payments made. One may reasonably argue that the efficacy of (b) and 
(c) above cannot be verified given that the ESTMA was recently enforced in Canada, however, 
this thesis contends that the inclusion of these measures in the NEITI provisions may be very 
instrumental to broaden the scope of NEITI’s operations and ultimately improve the accuracy of 
its audit reports.  
Specifically, this thesis recommends that the NEITI Act should be revised to include the reporting 
and disclosure by all extractive industry companies (including the NNPC) of eligible payments 
made to all levels of government both domestic and abroad, on a project-by-project basis. 
Secondly, the NEITI Act should be revised such that the reporting entities are required to make 
public disclosure of payments exceeding $82,000 USD (or as determined by the legislators) which 
                                                          
236 “Crippling NEITI through Underfunding”, Editorial, Punch (26 June 2013), online: <www.punchng.com>. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Everest Amaefule, “Federal Government Pledges to Implement NEITI Audit Reports”, Punch (18 June 2015), 
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is paid by the reporting entities to all levels of government in Nigeria and abroad.240 In addition to 
the desire for uniformity, this thesis does not suggest the naira equivalent for the transplant because 
Nigeria’s petroleum industry is a global industry that uses United States dollar denominated 
transactions to drive transactions across international boundaries, therefore, eligible payments are 
likely to be in dollars.241 Furthermore, the failure to apply a threshold for disclosure of payments 
to the public may hinder efficient administration of the initiative. As applicable in Canada, the 
thesis suggests that compliance with the public disclosure requirement may be done by reporting 
entities posting such annual reports on their corporate websites and where a reporting entity does 
not have a website, the NEITI may specify an alternative means to making the report accessible 
to the public. This thesis contemplates that emulating these provisions of the ESTMA may be 
beneficial for improving transparency and accountability of Nigeria’s petroleum sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
240 $100,000 CAD is approximately $81,171.80 USD and approximately N 16.1 million. The choice of currency is 
buttressed by Nigeria’s oil and gas income tax computation requirement which mandates tax computation be done in 
“the currency in which the transaction was effected”. Thus, tax liability is usually computed and payable to the FIRS 
in US dollars based on the returns filed. See PPTA, supra note 99 at s 40. 
241 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES AND CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters, this thesis examined certain inefficiencies in Nigeria’s petroleum 
industry and made five (5) recommendations for reforms: (i) the SR&ED tax credit; (ii) the Clean 
Energy Generation Equipment – Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance; (iii) Pollution Tax; (iv) 
Informants Lead Program; and (v) Mandatory Reporting Standards for the Extractive Sector. The 
evaluative comparison between Nigeria and Canada’s oil and gas tax regimes conducted in this 
thesis shows that certain aspects of Nigeria’s tax system should be maintained while some aspects 
could adopt certain Canadian measures. The comparison of the Canadian and Nigerian petroleum 
tax regimes conducted in this thesis reveals that certain measures employed in the Canadian oil 
and gas system can positively influence petroleum sector reforms in Nigeria. However, the thesis 
acknowledges that there are other measures not recommended in this thesis which also have the 
potential to address or complement the aforementioned recommendations for Nigeria’s petroleum 
sector reforms.1 Furthermore, it is important to note that some of the proposed recommendations 
are intended to complement the existing measures or regulations in Nigeria’s tax and legal system 
while others may provide an option in cases where such regulation or measure have proved 
insufficient or inappropriate.  
6.1. Challenges and Prospects 
Notwithstanding the highly anticipated viability of the aforementioned recommendations, this 
thesis acknowledges that there are certain limiting factors that could impede successful reforms of 
the Nigerian petroleum sector. For instance, the implementation of a pollution tax requires 
adequate information on pollution levels in order to be able to set the optimal tax rate adequately. 
Obtaining accurate data for this exercise may be a challenging task due to poor data management 
resulting from inadequate technology. Moreover, a market-based instrument like environmental 
taxation needs adequate enforcement, which is one of the factors limiting current environmental 
regulations in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. In addition to these possible challenges, additional 
                                                          
1 For instance the country-by-country reporting advocated by the OECD. See OECD, Action 13: Guidance on the 
Implementation of Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting (Paris: OECD Publishing, 
2015). 
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factors that could limit the implementation of the other recommendations factors include political 
discord in the leadership of the country and the arduous process of policy implementation.  
A case in point which reflects these challenges is the much anticipated PIB. Considering the 
omnibus feature of this bill, its passage has been long awaited by stakeholders in the oil and gas 
industry since its introduction in 2008.2 At different times, the National Assembly,3 the presidency 
and the national oil company (NNPC) have been held responsible for the delay in the passage of 
the bill.4 This situation has had a negative impact on the economic climate of the petroleum 
industry as the delay in passage of the bill has resulted in uncertainties for investors.5 Thus, this 
thesis acknowledges that the policy implementation of the proposed recommendations may be a 
challenge to the proposed reforms. 
In addition to the above, administrative corruption in the oil and gas industry is another major area 
that can limit the positive impact and efficacy of the proposed measures. Even though corruption 
is not peculiar to Nigeria alone, one may reasonably question the prospects of the proposed 
recommendations after being transplanted into the Nigerian legal and tax system. However, there 
is great optimism within the local and international community that the newly elected political 
dispensation will bring integrity into public administration in Nigeria.6 Perhaps, the new 
administration’s agenda to “leave no stone unturned in a bid to eliminate corruption in Nigeria” 
and the recent expression of commitment by the G-7 to help Nigeria “tackle insecurity and develop 
its oil and gas sectors” can substantially allay the aforementioned concerns regarding the fate of 
                                                          
2 ThisDay Newspaper,“Long Wait for PIB Passage and Effects on Nigerian Economy”, ThisDay Live (18 October 
2011), online: <http://www.thisdaylive.com>. 
3 Rotimi Akinwumi, “Again, Reps delay passage of PIB” Daily Independent (29 October 2014), online: 
http://dailyindependentnig.com>; Emman Ovuakporie, “NNPC, The Presidency, responsible for delay in passage of 
PIB Bill —Rep”, Vanguard News (13 May 2014), online: <http://www.vanguardngr.com> 
4 Supra note 2. 
5 The Punch Newspaper, “Delay in PIB passage affecting economy –Group”, The Punch (23 April 2014), online: 
<http://www.punchng.com>. 
6 The recently elected President – President Muhammadu Buhari is a former Nigerian military Head of State who has 
been described as a man of discipline with the personal attributes of honesty and diligence. Thus, there is a 
presumption that with his antecedent and determination, he has the capacity to fight corruption that is plaguing the 
country. See generally, James Emejo, “World Bank Commends Buhari’s Move to Address Past Corrupt Practices”, 
ThisDay Newspaper, (14 April 2015) online: < http://www.thisdaylive.com>; David Aduge-Ani, “Buhari Will Stop 
Corruption in Nigeria – Anekwe”, Leadership (4 April 2015), online: <http://www.thisdaylive.com>; Olatunji Daud, 
“You Must Eradicate Corruption, Obasanjo tells Buhari”, Vanguard (31 March 2015), online: 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com> 
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the proposed transplants.7 While these pronouncements are admirable and provide a good premise 
for the optimistic expectations for restoring integrity into public administration (especially the oil 
and gas industry), the proper application and administration of the proposed transplants are very 
useful for the desired reforms to take effect.   
6.2. Conclusion 
Despite the potential challenges discussed and the conflicting views on the transferability of laws 
between jurisdictions discussed in the thesis, the prospects for proposed recommendations are very 
high. This is because the thesis anticipated concerns that can legitimately arise in the process of 
legal transplants and acknowledged these concerns in suggesting recommendations for reforms. 
For instance, a policy maker may reasonably inquire whether these recommendations (being legal 
transplants) will be deemed “successful” when the laws (or measures) are adapted to fit the 
Nigerian legal system or whether such transplant will be considered “successful” if Nigeria 
achieves the same results as Canada based on the application of the transplanted laws. In 
anticipating concerns of this nature, the thesis adopted a fusion of Watson, Legrand and Kahn-
Freund’s schools of thought as the most pragmatic and feasible approach for safeguarding the fate 
of legal transplants in Nigeria’s legal system. The thesis considered the major factors postulated 
by the three schools in its design for “borrowing” of laws between Nigeria and Canada. 
Specifically, the thesis considered: (i) Nigeria’s desire for reforms in conformity with Watson’s 
view; (ii) the suitability of Canadian ideas in meeting the needs of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry; 
(iii) the socio-political context of the prospective Canadian rule in terms of the three political 
factors postulated by Kahn-Freund; and (iv) acknowledgment of the socio-political environment 
of both jurisdictions as directed by Kahn-Freund and Legrand.  
In identifying the desire for petroleum sector reforms, the thesis identified the oil and gas industry 
inefficiencies and the current attempts being made by the federal government in addressing the 
petroleum industry inefficiencies. These discussions highlighted the real need for oil and gas 
sector reforms and the benefit of transplanting Canadian measures to address the major defects in 
Nigeria’s legal system. Secondly, this thesis evaluated the functionality of Canadian ideas in 
meeting the needs for Nigeria’s oil and gas sector reforms by exploring the desirable features of 
                                                          
7 Augustine Ehikioya, “I Will Eliminate Corruption In Nigeria”, The Nation (16 June 2015), online: 
<http://thenationonlineng.net> 
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the Canada’s oil and gas industry and providing justification for the choice of the industry as a 
comparator. In addition, theories of legal transplants were examined so that the relevant concerns 
for the suitability of the intended legal export are clear and identifiable. These theories generally 
confirmed the use of transplants for law reforms although the success of the exercise varied among 
the schools. Nonetheless, the three schools of thought provided a reference point and theoretical 
basis for assessing the fate of the recommendations proffered in this thesis.  
In relation to the socio-political context of the prospective rule, this thesis considered the three 
political factors postulated by Kahn-Freund. Specifically, it considered the political interests and 
the disparities in the forms of democratic government by acknowledging the types of democratic 
governments in the two jurisdiction and the legislative implication of the systems of government 
in the two jurisdictions. The thesis also recognised the influence of organised groups by 
considering the acceptance of certain recommendations to the public (such as the need for revenue 
neutrality to make pollution tax more sellable to stakeholders). In acknowledging the socio-
political environment of both jurisdictions, there were substantial modifications to most of the 
Canadian measures before proposing their adoption for Nigeria’s petroleum sector reforms. 
Although the plight of the PIB raises concerns for the fate of the proposed recommendations, the 
prospects of the above propositions remain positive for a number of reasons. First, the thesis 
envisages that the passage of the PIB would trigger petroleum sector reforms. Second, it 
anticipates that the passage of the bill will provide a favourable fiscal regime for the other 
reformative policies like those recommended in this thesis. Third, the PIB offers a legislative 
precedent for the formulation of the proposed policies in order to avoid similar delays.8 Thus, the 
prospects for a successful implementation of the recommendations outweighs the challenges.  
Even though the proposed recommendations may assist in improving certain aspects of Nigeria’s 
petroleum sector in a theoretical context, the transformation of Nigeria’s petroleum industry into 
a globally competitive tax system remains a collective responsibility of all stakeholders. 
Therefore, the willingness of the major stakeholders in Nigeria’s petroleum industry is crucial to 
                                                          
8 As mentioned earlier, the delayed passage of the PIB has been partly attributed to failure of all the stakeholders 
(such as the legislature, oil corporations and national oil company) to reach a common ground on the proposed terms 
in the bill. Therefore, the legislative journey of the PIB provides a guide for the nature of stakeholder consultations 
that may be useful for implementing legislation for petroleum reforms (like those proposed in this thesis). 
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the implementation of any of the proposed recommendations. Particularly, corporate taxpayers 
involved in petroleum operations need to lend their hands, when required, for enforcement of these 
tax reform initiatives. 
While this thesis concludes that the tax system has a role in petroleum sector reforms through the 
transplant of tax-based measures between Nigeria and Canada, this thesis can only predict the 
success of such reforms as indicated in the ex-ante evaluations above. The accurate and precise 
determination of the rate of success of these transplants in the Nigerian legal system is a subject 
for further research and thus, remains an open question for the purpose of this thesis. Despite the 
fact that the recommendations in this thesis do not purport to provide the final solution to all the 
challenges in Nigeria’s petroleum sector, it is anticipated that they will make a worthy contribution 
to Nigeria’s oil and gas reforms. Ultimately, it is hoped that this thesis provides an insight on the 
reformative role of taxation in other sectors of Nigeria’s economy.
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